Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/1116
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dc.contributor.authorBarlo, Mehmet-
dc.contributor.authorÖzdoğan, Atabay Ayça-
dc.date.accessioned2019-05-23T05:53:22Z
dc.date.available2019-05-23T05:53:22Z
dc.date.issued2014-09
dc.identifier.citationBarlo, M., & Özdog, A. (2014). Optimality of linearity with collusion and renegotiation. Mathematical Social Sciences, 71, 46-52.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0165-4896
dc.identifier.othernumber of pages 7
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.04.004-
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/1116-
dc.description.abstractThis study analyzes a continuous-time N-agent Brownian moral hazard model with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utilities, in which agents' actions jointly determine the mean and variance of the outcome process. In order to give a theoretical justification for the use of linear contracts, as in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), we consider a variant of its generalization given by Sung (1995), into which collusion and renegotiation possibilities among agents are incorporated. In this model, we prove that there exists a linear and stationary optimal compensation scheme which is also immune to collusion and renegotiation. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherElsevier Science Bven_US
dc.relation.ispartofMathematical Social Sciencesen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectaggregationen_US
dc.subjectagencyen_US
dc.subjectteamsen_US
dc.subjectincentivesen_US
dc.titleOptimality of Linearity With Collusion and Renegotiationen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentFaculties, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of Economicsen_US
dc.departmentFakülteler, İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, İktisat Bölümütr_TR
dc.identifier.volume71
dc.identifier.startpage46
dc.identifier.endpage52
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000342271000007en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-84901020082en_US
dc.institutionauthorÖzdoğan Atabay, Ayça-
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.04.004-
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ2-
item.openairetypeArticle-
item.languageiso639-1en-
item.grantfulltextnone-
item.fulltextNo Fulltext-
item.openairecristypehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf-
item.cerifentitytypePublications-
crisitem.author.dept04.01. Department of Economics-
Appears in Collections:İktisat Bölümü / Department of Economics
Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection
WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection
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