Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/1184
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dc.contributor.authorAnshelevich, Elliot-
dc.contributor.authorÇaşkurlu, Buğra-
dc.contributor.authorKar, Koushik-
dc.contributor.authorZhang, Hang-
dc.date.accessioned2019-06-26T07:40:36Z
dc.date.available2019-06-26T07:40:36Z
dc.date.issued2014-04
dc.identifier.citationAnshelevich, E., Caskurlu, B., Kar, K., & Zhang, H. (2014). Capacity allocation games for network-coded multicast streaming. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON), 22(2), 595-607.en_US
dc.identifier.issn1558-2566
dc.identifier.urihttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6496175/-
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/1184-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we formulate and study a capacity allocation game between a set of receivers (players) that are interested in receiving multicast data (video/multimedia) being streamed from a server through a multihop network. We consider fractional multicast streaming, where the multicast stream from the source (origin-server) to any particular receiver (end-user) can be split over multiple paths. The receivers are selfish and noncooperative, but must collaboratively purchase capacities of links in the network, as necessary for delivery of the multicast stream from the source to the individual receivers, assuming that the multicast stream is network-coded. For this multicast capacity allocation (network formation) game, we show that the Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist in general. For a 2-tier network model where the receivers must obtain the multicast data from the source through a set of relay nodes, we show that the price of stability is at most 2, and provide a polynomial-time algorithm that computes a Nash equilibrium whose social cost is within a factor of 2 of the socially optimum solution. For more general network models, we show that there exists a 2-approximate Nash equilibrium, whose cost is at most two times the social optimum. We also give a polynomial-time algorithm that computes a (2+epsilon)-approximate Nash equilibrium for any epsilon > 0 , whose cost is at most two times the social optimum. Simulation studies show that our algorithms generate efficient Nash equilibrium allocation solutions for a vast majority of randomly generated network topologies.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherIEEE-INST Electrical Electronics Engineers Inc.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofIEEE-ACM Transactions On Networkingen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectCapacity allocation gameen_US
dc.subjectMulticast streamingen_US
dc.titleCapacity Allocation Games for Network-Coded Multicast Streamingen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentFaculties, Faculty of Engineering, Department of Computer Engineeringen_US
dc.departmentFakülteler, Mühendislik Fakültesi, Bilgisayar Mühendisliği Bölümütr_TR
dc.identifier.volume22
dc.identifier.issue2
dc.identifier.startpage595
dc.identifier.endpage607
dc.relation.tubitakThis work was supported in part by the NSF under Awards CNS-1017932, CNS-1018398, CCF-0914782, and CCF-1101495.en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000335821100019en_US
dc.institutionauthorÇaşkurlu, Buğra-
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/TNET.2013.2255890-
dc.authorscopusid35104543000-
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.relation.otherNSF [CNS-1017932, CNS-1018398, CCF-0914782, CCF-1101495]en_US
item.openairetypeArticle-
item.languageiso639-1en-
item.grantfulltextnone-
item.fulltextNo Fulltext-
item.openairecristypehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf-
item.cerifentitytypePublications-
crisitem.author.dept02.1. Department of Artificial Intelligence Engineering-
Appears in Collections:Bilgisayar Mühendisliği Bölümü / Department of Computer Engineering
WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection
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