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https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/12547
Title: | Collective Bargaining With Pre-Donation May Lead To Tax Evasion in the Labor Market | Authors: | Saglam, Ismail | Keywords: | Nash Bargaining Pre-Donation Wage Determination |
Publisher: | Wiley | Abstract: | We consider a collective bargaining model in the presence of a government that can tax corporate income. Using this model, we investigate whether workers or the firm can manipulate the bargaining equilibrium, with the help of Sertel's (1992a) pre-donation idea, by committing to transfer a part of their would-be payoffs to the other party. We show that making pre-donation is beneficial for workers but harmful to the firm. Moreover, the optimal pre-donation of workers enables them to fully extract the tax revenue that the government could obtain in the absence of pre-donation while keeping the welfare of the firm unchanged. | URI: | https://doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.70018 https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/12547 |
ISSN: | 0036-9292 1467-9485 |
Appears in Collections: | Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection |
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