Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/3978
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dc.contributor.authorSağlam, İsmail-
dc.date.accessioned2021-01-22T06:21:13Z-
dc.date.available2021-01-22T06:21:13Z-
dc.date.issued2020-10
dc.identifier.citationSaglam, I. (2019). Bargaining over collusion: the threat of supply function versus Cournot competition under demand uncertainty and cost asymmetry. The Japanese Economic Review, 1-23.en_US
dc.identifier.issn1352-4739
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/3978-
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s42973-019-00027-6-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we study bargaining over collusion profits in a duopolistic industry with cost asymmetry and demand uncertainty. We consider disagreement payoffs obtained from the non-cooperative equilibrium of either the quantity competition or the supply function competition, and bargaining solutions splitting the gains from agreement either equally or proportionally. We find that each duopolist has always incentive to join a collusive agreement, and the more efficient firm (the less efficient firm) in the cartel always obtains a higher agreement payoff when the disagreement payoff is obtained from the equilibrium of supply function competition (quantity competition).en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.relation.ispartofJapanese Economic Reviewen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectDuopolyen_US
dc.subjectCollusionen_US
dc.subjectBargainingen_US
dc.subjectCournot competitionen_US
dc.subjectSupply function competitionen_US
dc.subjectUncertaintyen_US
dc.titleBargaining Over Collusion: the Threat of Supply Function Versus Cournot Competition Under Demand Uncertainty and Cost Asymmetryen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentFaculties, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of Economicsen_US
dc.departmentFakülteler, İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, İktisat Bölümütr_TR
dc.identifier.volume71
dc.identifier.issue4
dc.identifier.startpage671
dc.identifier.endpage693
dc.authorid0000-0002-9561-9476-
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000500847200002en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85076199082en_US
dc.institutionauthorSağlam, İsmail-
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s42973-019-00027-6-
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ3-
item.openairetypeArticle-
item.languageiso639-1en-
item.grantfulltextnone-
item.fulltextNo Fulltext-
item.openairecristypehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf-
item.cerifentitytypePublications-
crisitem.author.dept04.01. Department of Economics-
Appears in Collections:İktisat Bölümü / Department of Economics
Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection
WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection
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