Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/3979
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dc.contributor.authorCumbul, Eray-
dc.date.accessioned2021-01-22T06:21:13Z-
dc.date.available2021-01-22T06:21:13Z-
dc.date.issued2021-01-
dc.identifier.citationCumbul, E. (2019). Stackelberg versus Cournot oligopoly with private information. Available at SSRN 3199987.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0167-7187-
dc.identifier.otherarticle number 102674-
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/3979-
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102674-
dc.description.abstractWe compare an n-firm Cournot model with a Stackelberg model, where n-firms choose outputs sequentially, in a stochastic demand environment with private information. The expected total output, consumer surplus, and total surplus are lower, while expected price and total profits are higher in the Stackelberg perfect revealing equilibrium than in the Cournot equilibrium. These rankings are the opposite of the rankings of prices, total output, surplus, and profits under perfect information. We also show that the first n?1 firms’ expected profits form a decreasing sequence from the first to the (n?1)st in the Stackelberg game. The last mover earns more expected profit than the first mover if n?4, or the ratio of the signals’ informativeness to the prior certainty is sufficiently low. Lastly, there is a discontinuity between the Stackelberg equilibrium of the perfect information game and the limit of Stackelberg perfect revealing equilibria, as the noise of the demand information of firms vanishes to zero at the same rate. We provide various robustness checks for the results when the precision of signals are asymmetric, there is public information or cost/quality uncertainty, or the products are differentiated.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherElsevier Inc.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofInternational Journal of Industrial Organizationen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectStackelbergen_US
dc.subjectCournoten_US
dc.subjectPrivate and public informationen_US
dc.subjectSignaling gamesen_US
dc.subjectCost uncertaintyen_US
dc.subjectDemand and quality uncertaintyen_US
dc.subjectFirst and late-mover advantagesen_US
dc.titleStackelberg Versus Cournot Oligopoly With Private Informationen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentFaculties, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of Economicsen_US
dc.departmentFakülteler, İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, İktisat Bölümütr_TR
dc.identifier.volume74-
dc.authorid0000-0003-2126-3523-
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000605152500002en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85096677727en_US
dc.institutionauthorCumbul, Eray-
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102674-
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ1-
item.openairetypeArticle-
item.languageiso639-1en-
item.grantfulltextnone-
item.fulltextNo Fulltext-
item.openairecristypehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf-
item.cerifentitytypePublications-
crisitem.author.dept04.01. Department of Economics-
Appears in Collections:İktisat Bölümü / Department of Economics
Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection
WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection
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