Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/5995
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dc.contributor.authorErsel Hasan-
dc.contributor.authorÖzatay F.-
dc.date.accessioned2021-09-11T15:21:18Z-
dc.date.available2021-09-11T15:21:18Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.isbn9780444531377-
dc.identifier.issn1571-0386-
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/S1571-0386(06)17004-0-
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/5995-
dc.description.abstractDuring the negotiation phase of accession to the European Union (EU), Turkey has to carry out a series of reforms. In this context, reforms are taken as production processes to setup new institutions by using available resources of the society. The EU reserves the right of not accepting Turkey as a member state, irrespective of her reform performance. Therefore, in reforming her institutions, Turkey has to consider this uncertainty. It is shown that reforms lead to a welfare loss vis-a-vis status-quo-preserving policies during the negotiations period. It is claimed that even if all political parties consider reforms as desirable, they will commit themselves to a pro-reform strategy only if certain extra conditions are satisfied. © Emerald Group Publishing Limited.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherEmerald Group Publishing Ltd.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofInternational Symposia in Economic Theory and Econometricsen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.titleThe Eu Negotiations as a Reform Strategy: Turkey's Problem Aheaden_US
dc.typeReviewen_US
dc.departmentFaculties, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of Economicsen_US
dc.departmentFakülteler, İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, İktisat Bölümütr_TR
dc.identifier.volume17en_US
dc.identifier.startpage83en_US
dc.identifier.endpage104en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-84901497052en_US
dc.institutionauthorÖzatay, Salih Fatih-
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/S1571-0386(06)17004-0-
dc.relation.publicationcategoryDiğeren_US
dc.identifier.scopusquality--
item.openairetypeReview-
item.languageiso639-1en-
item.grantfulltextnone-
item.fulltextNo Fulltext-
item.openairecristypehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf-
item.cerifentitytypePublications-
crisitem.author.dept04.01. Department of Economics-
Appears in Collections:İktisat Bölümü / Department of Economics
Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection
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