Cyber Security Risk Management: Public Policy Implications of Correlated Risk, Imperfect Ability To Prove Loss, and Observability of Self-Protection

Abstract

The correlated nature of security breach risks, the imperfect ability to prove loss from a breach to an insurer, and the inability of insurers and external agents to observe firms' self-protection efforts have posed significant challenges to cyber security risk management. Our analysis finds that a firm invests less than the social optimal levels in self-protection and in insurance when risks are correlated and the ability to prove loss is imperfect. We find that the appropriate social intervention policy to induce a firm to invest at socially optimal levels depends on whether insurers can verify a firm's self-protection levels. If self-protection of a firm is observable to an insurer so that it can design a contract that is contingent on the self-protection level, then self-protection and insurance behave as complements. In this case, a social planner can induce a firm to choose the socially optimal self-protection and insurance levels by offering a subsidy on self-protection. We also find that providing a subsidy on insurance does not provide a similar inducement to a firm. If self-protection of a firm is not observable to an insurer, then self-protection and insurance behave as substitutes. In this case, a social planner should tax the insurance premium to achieve socially optimal results. The results of our analysis hold regardless of whether the insurance market is perfectly competitive or not, implying that solely reforming the currently imperfect insurance market is insufficient to achieve the efficient outcome in cyber security risk management.