Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/7201
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dc.contributor.authorÇelik, Görkem-
dc.contributor.authorSayan, Serdar-
dc.date.accessioned2021-09-11T15:55:57Z-
dc.date.available2021-09-11T15:55:57Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.issn1434-4742-
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-008-0050-y-
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/7201-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we develop a model of law enforcement with the possibility of corruption between enforcers and potential offenders. We study how the violation rate changes with the level of the fine imposed on violations. We find, in contrast to the conventional wisdom, that the fine level that minimizes violations can be intermediate rather than large. We then study conditions under which different fine levels would be optimal.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherSpringer Heidelbergen_US
dc.relation.ispartofReview of Economic Designen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectCorruptionen_US
dc.subjectLaw enforcementen_US
dc.titleOn the Optimality of Nonmaximal Fines in the Presence of Corruptible Law Enforcersen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentFaculties, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of Economicsen_US
dc.departmentFakülteler, İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, İktisat Bölümütr_TR
dc.identifier.volume12en_US
dc.identifier.issue3en_US
dc.identifier.startpage209en_US
dc.identifier.endpage227en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000207682900004en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-49349090245en_US
dc.institutionauthorSayan, Serdar-
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10058-008-0050-y-
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ2-
item.openairetypeArticle-
item.languageiso639-1en-
item.grantfulltextnone-
item.fulltextNo Fulltext-
item.openairecristypehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf-
item.cerifentitytypePublications-
crisitem.author.dept04.01. Department of Economics-
Appears in Collections:İktisat Bölümü / Department of Economics
Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection
WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection
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