Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/8201
Title: | Hedonic Expertise Games | Authors: | Çaşkurlu, Buğra Kızılkaya, F.E. Özen, B. |
Keywords: | Common ranking property Hedonic games Team formation Pareto principle Common ranking property General class Global set Hedonic games Nash stable partitions Pareto-optimal Polynomial-time Property Simple++ Team formation Polynomial approximation |
Publisher: | Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH | Abstract: | We consider a team formation setting where agents have varying levels of expertise in a global set of required skills, and teams are ranked with respect to how well the expertise of teammates complement each other. We model this setting as a hedonic game, and we show that this class of games possesses many desirable properties, some of which are as follows: A partition that is Nash stable, core stable and Pareto optimal is always guaranteed to exist. A contractually individually stable partition (and a Nash stable partition in a restricted setting) can be found in polynomial-time. A core stable partition can be approximated within a factor of 1-1e and this bound is tight. We discover a larger and relatively general class of hedonic games, where the above existence guarantee holds. For this larger class, we present simple dynamics that converge to a Nash stable partition in a relatively low number of moves. © 2021, Springer Nature Switzerland AG. | Description: | 14th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2021 -- 21 September 2021 through 24 September 2021 -- 265329 | URI: | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85947-3_21 https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/8201 |
ISBN: | 9783030859466 | ISSN: | 0302-9743 |
Appears in Collections: | Bilgisayar Mühendisliği Bölümü / Department of Computer Engineering Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection |
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