Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/8206
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dc.contributor.authorÇelen, İhsan-
dc.contributor.authorSağlam, İsmail-
dc.date.accessioned2022-01-15T13:00:37Z-
dc.date.available2022-01-15T13:00:37Z-
dc.date.issued2022-
dc.identifier.issn0143-6570-
dc.identifier.issn1099-1468-
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3460-
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/8206-
dc.description.abstractWe consider an infinitely lived duopoly with asymmetric costs and study the incentives of the firms to collude or compete in supply functions under the possibility of technology licensing. Simulating the subgame-perfect Nash equilibria of alternative industry organizations, we show that licensing makes collusion harder; but it always has a positive effect on the welfares of consumers and the less efficient firm in the duopoly.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherJohn Wiley & Sons Ltden_US
dc.relation.ispartofManagerial and Decision Economicsen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen_US
dc.subjectMarket Poweren_US
dc.subjectEquilibriumen_US
dc.subjectOligopolyen_US
dc.titleCollusion in Supply Functions Under Technology Licensingen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentFaculties, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of Economicsen_US
dc.departmentFakülteler, İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, İktisat Bölümütr_TR
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000698495500001en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85115368182en_US
dc.institutionauthorSağlam, İsmail-
dc.identifier.doi10.1002/mde.3460-
dc.authorscopusid57267626800-
dc.authorscopusid6506812060-
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ3-
item.openairetypeArticle-
item.languageiso639-1en-
item.grantfulltextnone-
item.fulltextNo Fulltext-
item.openairecristypehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf-
item.cerifentitytypePublications-
crisitem.author.dept04.01. Department of Economics-
Appears in Collections:İktisat Bölümü / Department of Economics
Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection
WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection
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