Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/8582
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dc.contributor.authorAkyol, Ethem-
dc.date.accessioned2022-07-30T16:41:49Z-
dc.date.available2022-07-30T16:41:49Z-
dc.date.issued2022-
dc.identifier.citationAkyol, E. (2022). Ex-Ante Welfare Superiority of the Boston Mechanism Over the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism. Dynamic Games and Applications, 1-32.en_US
dc.identifier.issn2153-0785-
dc.identifier.issn2153-0793-
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-022-00446-y-
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/8582-
dc.description.abstractWe compare two widely used allocation methods for assigning students to schools-the deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism and the Boston mechanism-in terms of students' welfare under a symmetric incomplete information setting in which each student's school preferences are privately known. We assume that each student's type, which is the vector of cardinal values they derive from attending each school, is independently drawn, and each possible strict ranking of schools is equally likely for each student. Furthermore, all schools have an identical student priority order, which is unknown to students. When there are three schools with equal numbers of available seats, we analytically derive the probability difference between the Boston and DA mechanisms of obtaining the first, second, and third choices. Furthermore, we show that the Boston mechanism is ex-ante welfare superior to the DA mechanism under weak conditions on the distribution of valuations when each student's value for each school is independently drawn from an identical distribution.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherSpringer Birkhauseren_US
dc.relation.ispartofDynamic Games and Applicationsen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectSchool choiceen_US
dc.subjectDeferred acceptance mechanismen_US
dc.subjectBoston mechanismen_US
dc.subjectIncomplete informationen_US
dc.subjectBayesian incentive compatibilityen_US
dc.subjectEx-ante welfareen_US
dc.subjectD82en_US
dc.subjectD47en_US
dc.subjectSchool Choiceen_US
dc.subjectAuctionsen_US
dc.subjectStabilityen_US
dc.subjectInterimen_US
dc.subjectGamesen_US
dc.titleEx-Ante Welfare Superiority of the Boston Mechanism Over the Deferred Acceptance Mechanismen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentFakülteler, İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, İktisat Bölümüen_US
dc.departmentFaculties, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of Economicsen_US
dc.authoridAKYOL, ETHEM/0000-0002-2014-7152-
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000785968600001en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85128711840en_US
dc.institutionauthorAkyol, Ethem-
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s13235-022-00446-y-
dc.authorscopusid57209295409-
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
local.message.claim2022-12-12T11:48:15.551+0300*
local.message.claim|rp00048*
local.message.claim|submit_approve*
local.message.claim|dc_contributor_author*
local.message.claim|None*
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ2-
item.openairetypeArticle-
item.languageiso639-1en-
item.grantfulltextnone-
item.fulltextNo Fulltext-
item.openairecristypehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf-
item.cerifentitytypePublications-
crisitem.author.dept04.01. Department of Economics-
Appears in Collections:İktisat Bölümü / Department of Economics
Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection
WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection
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