Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/875
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dc.contributor.authorCumbul, Eray-
dc.contributor.authorVirág, Gabor-
dc.date.accessioned2019-03-28T14:23:05Z
dc.date.available2019-03-28T14:23:05Z
dc.date.issued2018-09-01
dc.identifier.citationCumbul, E., & Virág, G. (2018). Multilateral limit pricing in price-setting games. Games and Economic Behavior, 111, 250-273.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0899-8256
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.06.008-
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/875-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we characterize the set of pure strategy undominated equilibria in differentiated Bertrand oligopolies with linear demand and constant unit costs when firms may prefer not to produce. When all firms are active, there is a unique equilibrium. However, there is a continuum of non-equivalent Bertrand equilibria on a wide range of parameter values when the number of firms (n) is more than two and n⁎∈[2,n−1] firms are active. In each such equilibrium, the firms that are relatively more cost or quality efficient limit their prices to induce the exit of their rival(s). When n≥3, this game does not need to satisfy supermodularity, the single-crossing property, or log-supermodularity. Moreover, the best responses might have negative slopes. Our main results extend to a Stackelberg entry game where some established incumbents first set their prices, and then a potential entrant sets its price.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipTUBİTAKen_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherAcademic Press Inc.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofGames and Economic Behavioren_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectStackelbergen_US
dc.subjectLimit pricingen_US
dc.subjectMarket entry and exiten_US
dc.subjectSupermodularityen_US
dc.subjectBertranden_US
dc.titleMultilateral Limit Pricing in Price-Setting Gamesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentFaculties, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of Economicsen_US
dc.departmentFakülteler, İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, İktisat Bölümütr_TR
dc.identifier.volume111
dc.identifier.startpage250
dc.identifier.endpage273
dc.authorid0000-0003-2126-3523-
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000446949800017en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85050525978en_US
dc.institutionauthorCumbul, Eray-
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.geb.2018.06.008-
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.geb.2018.06.008-
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ1-
item.openairetypeArticle-
item.languageiso639-1en-
item.grantfulltextnone-
item.fulltextNo Fulltext-
item.openairecristypehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf-
item.cerifentitytypePublications-
crisitem.author.dept04.01. Department of Economics-
Appears in Collections:İktisat Bölümü / Department of Economics
Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection
WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection
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