Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/9205
Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Townley, Daniel | - |
dc.contributor.author | Arikan, Kerem | - |
dc.contributor.author | Liu, Yu David | - |
dc.contributor.author | Ponomarev, Dmitry | - |
dc.contributor.author | Ergin, Oğuz | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-11-30T19:36:16Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2022-11-30T19:36:16Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2022 | - |
dc.identifier.isbn | 978-1-939133-31-1 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/9205 | - |
dc.description | 31st USENIX Security Symposium -- AUG 10-12, 2022 -- Boston, MA | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | The security of isolated execution architectures such as Intel SGX has been significantly threatened by the recent emergence of side-channel attacks. Cache side-channel attacks allow adversaries to leak secrets stored inside isolated enclaves without having direct access to the enclave memory. In some cases, secrets can be leaked even without having the knowledge of the victim application code or having OS-level privileges. We propose the concept of Composable Cachelets (CC), a new scalable strategy to dynamically partition the last-level cache (LLC) for completely isolating enclaves from other applications and from each other. CC supports enclave isolation in caches with the capability to dynamically readjust the cache capacity as enclaves are created and destroyed. We present a cache-aware and enclave-aware operational semantics to help rigorously establish security properties of CC, and we experimentally demonstrate that CC thwarts side-channel attacks on caches with modest performance and complexity impact. | en_US |
dc.description.sponsorship | USENIX Assoc,Meta,Google,NSF,Baidu,Chainlink,IBM,Intel Secur,Red Canary,Mercari,Paloalto,Technol Innovat Inst | en_US |
dc.description.sponsorship | NSF [CNS-2053391] | en_US |
dc.description.sponsorship | We would like to thank Atsuko Shimizu, Williams Zhang Cen, Abraham Farrell and Barry Williams for insightful discussions. We would also like to thank anonymous reviewers for their valuable feedback. This research was supported in part by NSF Award CNS-2053391. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.publisher | Usenix Assoc | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartof | Proceedings of The 31st Usenix Security Symposium | en_US |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess | en_US |
dc.subject | High-Performance | en_US |
dc.title | Composable Cachelets: Protecting Enclaves From Cache Side-Channel Attacks | en_US |
dc.type | Conference Object | en_US |
dc.identifier.startpage | 2839 | en_US |
dc.identifier.endpage | 2856 | en_US |
dc.identifier.wos | WOS:000855237504010 | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopus | 2-s2.0-85140960218 | en_US |
dc.institutionauthor | Ergin, Oğuz | - |
dc.authorscopusid | 57209837612 | - |
dc.authorscopusid | 57702277900 | - |
dc.authorscopusid | 57949058100 | - |
dc.authorscopusid | 57210403461 | - |
dc.authorscopusid | 6603141208 | - |
dc.relation.publicationcategory | Konferans Öğesi - Uluslararası - Kurum Öğretim Elemanı | en_US |
dc.ozel | 2022v3_Edit | en_US |
item.openairetype | Conference Object | - |
item.languageiso639-1 | en | - |
item.grantfulltext | none | - |
item.fulltext | No Fulltext | - |
item.openairecristype | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf | - |
item.cerifentitytype | Publications | - |
crisitem.author.dept | 02.3. Department of Computer Engineering | - |
Appears in Collections: | Bilgisayar Mühendisliği Bölümü / Department of Computer Engineering Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection |
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