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https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/9816| Title: | Rationalizability of one-to-one matchings with externalities | Authors: | Mumcu, Aye Sağlam, İsmail |
Publisher: | Economics Bulletin | Abstract: | In this paper, we show that the one-to-one matching model of Mumcu and Saglam (2008) studying stability under interdependent preferences is refutable. We also give a sufficient characterization of the set of matchings that are rationalizable inside the core. | URI: | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/9816 | ISSN: | 1545-2921 |
| Appears in Collections: | WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection |
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