Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/9816
Title: | Rationalizability of One-To Matchings With Externalities |
Authors: | Mumcu, Aye Sağlam, İsmail |
Publisher: | Economics Bulletin |
Abstract: | In this paper, we show that the one-to-one matching model of Mumcu and Saglam (2008) studying stability under interdependent preferences is refutable. We also give a sufficient characterization of the set of matchings that are rationalizable inside the core. |
URI: | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/9816 |
ISSN: | 1545-2921 |
Appears in Collections: | WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection |
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