Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/9816
Title: Rationalizability of One-To Matchings With Externalities
Authors: Mumcu, Aye
Sağlam, İsmail
Publisher: Economics Bulletin
Abstract: In this paper, we show that the one-to-one matching model of Mumcu and Saglam (2008) studying stability under interdependent preferences is refutable. We also give a sufficient characterization of the set of matchings that are rationalizable inside the core.
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/9816
ISSN: 1545-2921
Appears in Collections:WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection

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