

To My Family

COMPETITIVE JIHADISM: A NEW THEORETHICAL APPROACH
TO JIHADI *DE FACTO* STATES

Graduate School of Social Sciences
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I certify that this thesis fulfills entire requirements to be a thesis for the degree of Masters in International Relations.



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
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ABSTRACT

COMPETITIVE JIHADISM: A NEW THEORETHICAL APPROACH TO JIHADI *DE-FACTO* STATES

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World politics is introduced to a new type of entity with great differences within, namely jihadi *de facto* states. Due to its rather un-celebrated characteristics and lack of legal basis it was hard to encircle it with definitions and understand with theories. This thesis is concerned with state-building phase of jihadi *de facto* states and especially it's consolidation of sovereignty and jihadi competition with their parent states. This thesis accepts “Competitive Democratization” of Nina Caspersen as main frame and customizes it for jihadi *de- facto* states. Moreover it accepts each fact comprises three-level reality and grand theories may not properly function as Rosenau forecasts and names it as “Turbulence Approach”. In this study, it is

acclaimed that there is a positive correlation between consolidation level of sovereignty of a *jihadi de facto* state and its competition on jihadi policies with its parent state(s). Consolidation requirements are adjusted accordingly League of Nations parameters. I especially confirmed that adopted a more jihadist policy by *de facto* jihadi state comparing to its parent state will have positive contribution to its sovereignty level by helping it to gain more repercussion from target audiences and create its own legitimate basis. I applied this hypothesis on “Islamic State-Iraq-Syria” example throughout the thesis, as it is the richest by offering data to study and the most contemporary one. Although it is a recent fact, this case proved to be fully supportive.

Keywords: Competitive Jihadism, *jihadi de facto* state, *de facto* state, Islamic State, consolidation of sovereignty, ISIS, Republic of Iraq, Arab Republic of Syria, content analysis.

ÖZET

REKABETÇİ CİHATÇILIK: CİHATÇI *DE FACTO* DEVLETLERE YENİ BİR TEORİK YAKLAŞIM

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Dünya siyaseti, cihatçı *de facto* devlet adında içinde nevi şahsına münhasır özellikler barındıran yeni bir siyasi birim ile tanıştı. Çokça karşılaşılmayan karakteristiği ve meşruiyet eksikliğinden dolayı bu realiteyi tanımlarla çevrelemek ve onu teoriler ışığında anlamaya çalışmak ise zorlu bir uğraşıdır. Bu tez cihatçı *de facto* devletlerin devlet kurma aşamaları, egemenlik pekiştirme süreçleri ve özellikle söylemsel bazda ana devletleri ile olan rekabetlerini ortak potada inceler. Bu tez Nina Caspersen'in "Rekabetçi Demokratikleşme" yaklaşımını genel çerçeve olarak kabul ederek onu cihatçı *de facto* devletlere göre yeniden uyarlar. Dahası, her gerçekliğin üç fazı olduğunu, büyük teorilerin bunu etkili bir biçimde analiz edemeyeceklerini ve kendi dinamiklerine bakılarak anlaşılacağını söyleyen Rosenau'nun "Türbülans

Yaklaşımı” nı da teorik çerçeve olarak kabul etmektedir. Bu çalışmada cihatçı bir *de facto* devletin ana devlet(ler)inden daha cihatçı bir politika edinmesi ile onun egemenliğinin pekişmesi arasında pozitif bir bağıntı olduğu iddia edilmektedir. Egemenlik pekiştirmesinin gereksinimleri ise Milletler Cemiyeti’nin devlet tanımından yararlanılarak edinilmiştir. Ortaya konulan olgu şudur ki bir cihatçı *de facto* devlet eğer ana devlet(ler)inden daha cihatçı bir politika geliştirir ise bu durum onun egemenliğinin pekişmesinde ve hedef kitlesi üzerinde olumlu ve meşru kılıcı etkiye yol açacaktır. Bu hipotez örneğin güncel olması, zengin veri sunması ve etkilerinin açıktan gözlenebiliyor olmasından dolayı “ İslam Devleti-Irak-Suriye” örneği üzerinde tez boyunca test edilmiştir. Bu konu oldukça güncel bir olgu olsa da test sonucu hipotezi ikna edici bir şekilde doğrulaştırılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Rekabetçi cihatçılık, ,çihatçı *de facto* devlet, *de facto* devlet, İslam Devleti , egemenlik pekiştirilmesi, IŞİD, Irak Cumhuriyeti, Suriye Arap Devleti, içerik analizi.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AQ :	al Qa'idah
AQI :	al Qa'idah in Iraq
DoD :	Department of Defense
IDP :	Internally Displaced Person
IED :	Improvised Explosive Device
IGO :	Inter Governmental Organization
ISI :	Islamic State of Iraq
ISIS :	Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (synonyms with ISIL)
LoN :	League of Nations
NATO :	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO :	Non Governmental Organization
NSA :	Non State Actor
OCHA :	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
SVBIED :	Suicide Vehicle- Borne Improvised Explosive Device
TRNC :	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
UÇK :	Kosovo Liberation Army (<i>Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës</i>)
VIED :	Vehicle Borne Improvised Device
VNSA :	Violent Non State Actor

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Jihad and Jihadism are two fairly old phenomena albeit not obsolete. Adopted for a long time as a state policy by the pre-modern empire states ruled by Islamic law, it was nearly put aside since the first quarter of the 20th century. Rebirth of jihadism as a primal and a bold tier of a global agenda happened with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 along with its repulsion by the *mujaheds*. This period led a way at the end of which *Al-Qai'dah* was born as the uncontested brand for methodology and the pioneer for global jihad seeking the establishment of a global Islamic caliphate.

The word “*Al-Qai'dah*”, for centuries, carried only one meaning, “The Base”¹. However, with the dawn of 1988 the word itself adopted another and maybe more dominant meaning. It commenced to describe an organization, which designated

¹ Arabic Computer Dictionary: English-Arabic, Arabic-English By Ernest Kay, Multi-lingual International Publishers, 1986.

“global armed struggle for the salvation of the Islamic *Ummah*²” as its ultimate goal. In contemporary world politics, *Al-Qai'dah*, functions as an umbrella organization under which there are local groups operating in from Somalia to Indonesia to Syria to Central Asia to Yemen and from Caucasus to North African Coast. The rise of The Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria has however challenged the perspective of *Al-Qai'dah*, which has functioned as a decentralized but monolithic organization. Since the mid-2014, a discrepancy on the methodology of how to reach the ultimate goal, establishing a global *Caliphate*, has surfaced. Starting from the initial days of The Islamic State, al-Baghdadi, leader of the Islamic State, followed a different agenda deviating from his former patron, *Al-Qai'dah*. As stated above, while *Al-Qai'dah* operates mainly as an umbrella organization, which delivers franchises and accepts pledges of local groups, if not installing them by itself, The Islamic State represents a new approach to the Jihadi movement.

The *Islamic State* has taken the current policy of *Al-Qa'idah* one step further and redefined it by establishing a caliphate before establishing *emirates* and linking them to each other under the authority of a claimed *Caliphate*. This is to say, the strategy and methodology of The Islamic State deviated from mainstream *Al-Qai'dah* agenda for before installing local franchises of small-scaled *emirates*, and it announced the establishment of a self-declared *Khilafa*. However, there are two challenges The Islamic State has faced after putting forward its methodology. First, its *Khilafa* is established on the sovereignty zones of two countries, which are the Republic of Iraq and the Arab Republic of Syria. That is to say, The Islamic State's attempt to establish a *Khilafa* on these countries automatically puts them into a

² Eng : Nation. Refers to all Muslims.

conflict. Second, The Islamic State has faced a legitimacy problem in the eyes of Jihadist groups and organizations. Therefore, emerged with a claim of statehood, The Islamic State adopted two deviant strategies in order to avert the aforementioned challenges.

First of all, in order to consolidate and sustain its authority, it commenced an intense institutionalization process by establishing governmental bodies, disciplining and forming armed forces and behaving like a *de-jure* state. Secondly, it has performed a nearly unprecedented propagation campaign reinforced by formal publications, media releases, reports, video and audio broadcastings as well as by informal blogs, fan pages and millions of tweets.

It is uncontested that al-Baghdadi adopted these policies in order to strengthen his position as the *caliph* and the position of the newly founded state in an extremely hostile environment. It is safe to argue that al-Baghdadi's strategies stress to gain legitimacy. However, within the current context of international politics, al-Baghdadi should be aware that The Islamic State will not be regarded as a legitimate actor by the other actors of the international system. Thus, one can ask the question of why is The Islamic State (IS) involved in state-building efforts and ambitiously making jihadist propaganda.

This study argues that The Islamic State (IS) is a *de facto* state. Therefore, state building and propaganda efforts of The Islamic State (IS) might be related to its bid for deepening its sovereignty. This argument necessitates the examination of the basic concepts of the term "sovereignty" by focusing on The Islamic State's practices. In line with the discussion, this study puts the term "Competitive Jihadism" forward in order to explain The Islamic State's policy to consolidate its sovereignty.

The Research question this thesis tackles is “ Is there a positive correlation between a jihadist *de facto* state’s more jihadist policies than its parent states and consolidation of its sovereignty”.

To build a theoretical framework, the literature of the International Relations discipline was reviewed. In doing so, grand theories were visited. Nevertheless, since Jihadi *de facto* states are rather understudied, James Rosenau’s “turbulence theory” was regarded as a starting point. Then, the term “competitive democratization” coined by Nina Caspersen was linked to the Turbulence Theory. As a result, “competitive jihadism” framework was built in order to explain The Islamic State’s survival strategy.

Following theoretical discussions, the methodology of this study is shared in Chapter 3. In this chapter, hypotheses and the variables are presented. In addition conceptualization of the terms “*de facto*”, “sovereignty” and “jihadism” is made. Moreover, the term “sovereignty” is operationalized in order to measure the level of consolidation. The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria is selected as the case study and the “content analysis method” is applied. Chapter 4 has two main bodies. After the introduction of a brief historical background on the rise of the jihadist *de facto Islamic State*, the competition between The Islamic State and the metropole states, which are Syria and Iraq, is dealt with. In doing so, the population size, territorial ownership and functioning capacity of the state apparatus of The Islamic State *are examined* and are compared with the metropole states. A similar test is made within the framework of the jihadist policies as well.

In Chapter 5, empirical findings are compared with the hypotheses presented and a positive correlation is observed. It should be noted that this study provides empirical data and a prospective theoretical framework for further research.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This section has four main goals to achieve. Firstly it seeks to examine the role of Non-State actors (NSA) within the grand theories of International Relations. Secondly, the question of whether *de facto* states could be regarded as non-state actors is discussed. Thirdly, Rosenau's Turbulence approach is applied to designate jihadist entities in the literature. Finally it coins the term "Competitive Jihadism" in order to produce a hypothesis that could address the research question of this study.

2.1 Theoretical Explication of Non-State Actors

Non-State actors chiefly point to players other than states that have enough power to influence international politics. These actors can be international organizations; international enterprises or even individuals. However, it is classified under two

subclasses: intergovernmental organizations and transnational or international organizations.³

Grand theories of international relations have different stances towards non-state actors, and the actual statehood of an actor mostly determined how grand theories would approach it. Moreover, the importance of non-state actors and their capabilities of creating an impact in international politics is one of the crossroads among the grand theories and sometimes this very issue shows the characteristics of Theory. Thus, it is not possible to speak on a shared view regarding non-state actors agreed upon by grand theories except concerning their existence. This widely argued position of non-state actors in the international system causes a significant void to be filled. This section will map out the stances of grand theories regarding this notion.

2.1.1 Realism and Non-State Actors

The realist view of international relations adopts a very strict state-oriented view of politics. Realism very briefly highlights the importance of egoism in human beings and the lack of an upper legislator and executor among states described by anarchism and its restrictive impact on politics among nations.⁴ For political realism, rationalism and state-orientalism are descriptive notions. Thus, political realism

³ Brown, S. *New Forces, Old Forces, and the Future of World Politics*. Post Cold War Edition, *Harper Collins College Publishers*, New York, 1995 p.113

⁴ Gilpin, R. "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism" *International Organization*, 38(2)(Spring 1984) The MIT Press, pp. 287

accepts that states are the pioneering agents in international relations and acknowledges that the nature of state behaviors is flawed.⁵ In such an environment, realists expect states to pursue power maximization in order to survive in an anarchic and pessimistic environment.

Although first specimens of political realism can be traced back to Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes, its emergence as a systematic theory happened after the Second World War by political scientists who adopted the name “political realists”⁶ By doing so, Morgenthau conceptualized the notion that comes from early ages, transformed and theorized it.

First generation realists advocate that flawed human nature is the main driver of the states that are the main players in international relations. For realism, the state is the sole legitimate monopoly of force. Therefore, any other agent that arises as a focus of force is a natural threat to the state. Thus, national security, survival and the will for power are the main components of a modern nation-state. Functionally equal states’ struggle for power is the driver of politics among nations. As can be seen, power is perceived as a substance merely distributable among nations (used as a synonym for state), therefore the only player having enough power to impact international relations are states. Thus, states are welcomed as the only entities that classical realists credit in international relations while the presence and impact of non-state actors are explicitly ignored and downplayed.

As for second-generation realists, structural realists, human nature is no more the main reference point. It is rather substituted with the structure of the international

⁵ Thompson, K. W., *Moralism and Morality in Politics and Diplomacy* London, *University Press of America*, New York 1985 p20

⁶ H. J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* *McGraw-Hill*, New York, 1993,

system. For Waltz too, the state is the main agent in the international system that behaves in an anarchical structure despite being characterized by a hierarchical structure.⁷ Structural realists introduced the idea of the existence of an upper mechanism, structure of international relations, and highlighted the sameness of functions of the nation states and distinguished them by their differently distributed capabilities. According to them, it was balanced and the *status quo* was what the international system's players were seeking. In order to understand this, structural realists devised balancing theories. For instance, Waltz coined the term 'balance of power'⁸ and Walt coined 'Balance of threat'. However, both threat and power are generated and posed by the counterparts of the states, which are also states.

Yet another notion realists tried to theorize is polarity and state behavior in different polarity situations. In fact, realists are interested in how states behave and why they should do so in different scenarios i.e. unipolarity (International system where there is only one hegemon and no rival to it), bipolarity⁹ (two power focuses are present at the same time) and multipolarity. (the existence of more than one power hub in an international system)

Thus, neo-realists too, accepted states as the mere entities by disowning the term 'human nature' coined by their predecessors, classical realists. The main difference for them and the main cause of every type of interaction among states is the structure of the system, so it is systemic. Therefore, as long as the states are the only players in the system so the power to influence the system or to get influenced by it can solely be attributed to states.

⁷ Donnely, J, *Theories of International Relations*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2009 p. 56.

⁸ Waltz, K, *Theory of International Relations*, Waveland Press, Illinois, 2011, p 101

⁹ Mesquita, B. B. , " *Measuring Systemic Polarity*" *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 19(2) Jun. 1976 p 187

For the other prominent realists, predominantly, a state oriented perspective is welcomed nearly without questioning. Novelties are either concerned with the behaviors of states under different circumstances or with their natures or else, but very limitedly they have argued on any actor other than states.

It should be noted that very few realists appreciated the role of non-state actors in international relations, albeit not as one of the main actors but rather as proxies. Wolfers is one of the realist scholars who studied the interconnectedness between states and the non-state actors during the midst of the Cold War. Accepting unarguable championship of the states, Wolfers accepted non-state actors as the remote tools ready for the usage of states. Wolfers argued that the “state approach” is not enough and not adequate to understand the politics among nations.¹⁰ Wolfers suggested that the “non-state approach” should be instrumented in politics in order to understand the shifts in loyalties of units. For him, international relations could not be reduced to mere “billiard ball” modeling and non-state actors like armed groups, influential people, international organizations and even ideologies were being utilized by states in order to fulfill their ultimate goals.¹¹ Wolfers’s perception of the relationship between states and non-state actors as an asymmetric type of collaboration¹², in fact, shows that he also perceived these actors as means for the states; hence states are the sole and primal game players.

Realism as a grand international relations theory has not adopted the claim of explaining all aspects of relations among nations. Besides, it made it clear that

¹⁰ McLean, G.A. , “ Clinton’s Foreign Policy in Russia : From Deterrence and Isolation to Democratization and Engagement” *Ashgate Publishing*, New York, 2006, p 60.

¹¹ Wolfers. A, “ Discord and Collaboration , *Johns Hopkins Press*, Baltimore, 1962 p. 69

¹² Özpek, Burak Bilgehan, *De Facto States and Inter-Military Conflicts, Unpublished PhD. Dissertation, Bilkent University Department of International Relations*, Ankara, 2010 p.27

realism primarily deals with inter-state relations and major power politics, polarity and especially with war and peace.¹³ Thus, particularly for structural realists, non-state actors and state relations with them are merely understood as an extension of the power politics of a given state. Neoclassical theorists, however, have given room for non-state actors, albeit a minor one, in their studies of international relations. They tend to recognize all non-state actors without differentiating between them according to their functions. They accept them as pressure groups on domestic politics.¹⁴ Moreover some theorists suggested that domestic groups like military or one wing of bureaucracy along with NGO's may affect decision-making processes.¹⁵ As can be explicitly seen, while classical and neoclassical realism allocate some space for non-state actors in their work, defensive and offensive realism mostly ignore the phenomenon in their studies. In brief, it can be said for realism that non-state actors are either neglected like with structural realists or perceived as proxies or extensions of a state as in Wolfer's studies. It can also find itself a place in neoclassical realism as a secondary role, restricted as an agent that may influence a state's domestic decision making progress yet not celebrated by any of them as an agent in international relations which has enough power to influence the system in which it is identified.

Today, it is undeniable that non-state actors occupy a great deal of international relations and not only international banks, multinational companies or

¹³ Evan Laksmana, "Realism and Non State Actors Revisited", (Jan 22 2013), , <http://www.e-ir.info/2013/01/22/realism-and-non-state-actors-revisited/> **E-International Relations Students** retrieved 10.03.2015

¹⁴ Caverley, Jonathan D, *Power and Democratic Weakness : Neoconservatism and Neoclassical Realism*, *Millenium Press*, New York, 2010, p. 605

¹⁵ Snyder, Jack L. *Myths of Empire : Domestic Politics and International Ambition* " *Cornell University Press*, Ithaca, 1991, p

intergovernmental organizations are counted as non-state actors but also militia groups, *de facto* states and armed ideological organizations are included in this category. In the following chapter, I will proceed to a liberal view of non-state actors in international relations.

2.1.2 Idealism and Non-State Actors

Idealism, yet another grand theory of international relations, adopts a significantly different stance towards non-state actors compared to realist theories. For liberal theory of international relations, although states occupy a great place, other factors are also important. Thus, contrary to realism, idealism does not solely deal with politics among nations and abstains from downgrading the complexity of the system into inter-state interactions. It also welcomes the role of non-state actors into international relations. Thus idealism poses a challenge to realism concerning the significance of non-state actors. Idealism primarily rejects the state's centric stance in realism and Keohane and Nye state that non-state actors are as important as states are.¹⁶

Idealism puts effort into repelling the pessimism of realism regarding state behavior and the nature of the agent by its native optimistic view and it strongly states that states are not the only actors in international relations. Verily, it promotes the necessity and importance of non-state actors as regulatory organs or actors, and as check and balance systems in the international system, especially in terms of

¹⁶ Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, 'Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction', *International Organisation* (Vol. 25, No. 3, Summer 1972), pp. 329-349.

preventing clashes and providing more wealth and co-operation. However, pluralists opine that non-state actors, despite all the power they possess to influence the system are not always necessarily in collaboration with states nor do they always share one or any of the state's opinions regarding political or economic issues. Moreover, as there are NGO's and IGO's and other organizations, there are armed groups, drug cartels, freedom fighters, pirates, and hacktivists as well.¹⁷ Therefore, broadly organized organizations like *Al-Qa'idah*, entities that have territorial claims like *The Islamic State* or feminist activists like *Femen* can be considered under such a category. Because indeed each of such examples has enough credit to claim influence in international relations or pioneer one kind of ideology and has enough impact to operate organizational cadres and so on.

Idealists indirectly challenged realists about the ownership of the use of force as well. Upon their rejection of the state as the sole owner of power and hierarchies of the importance of issues (military over economy, high politics over low politics), idealists created room for non-state actors to act in an international system¹⁸ and gave them some credit to enjoy what realists advocated only states do. Thus, idealists accept the notion of exercising brutal force when the actor is a non-state actor. Apart from realists, idealists do not tend to accept that these actors should necessarily be proxies or extensions of any given state but could actually operate independently for their own causes. Hence, non-statehood of an actor is not a

¹⁷ Rochester, Martin J. *Between Two Epochs: What's Ahead for America, the World, and Global Politics in the Twenty-First Century*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: *Prentice Hall*, 2002. P 96

¹⁸ Robert Keohane, and J. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston, MA: Little-Brown, 1977), pp. 3-60

restrictive feature for utilizing force or raising policies and bargaining for them in the international arena.

Liberalist vehemently advocated the importance of harmony and cooperation in order to establish peace. They also highlighted the importance of intergovernmental or non-governmental actors that are in fact non-state actors. For instance, liberals accept international organizations and international law as the moral reach for the prevention of clashes.¹⁹ These organizations are both means to prevent inter-state conflicts and results of the co-operations between states. This collaboration stems from the pessimistic view of idealism that highlights the causal linkage between anarchy and co-operation. Nevertheless, unlike realists, idealists attribute independent features to Non-state actors and they accept their capacity of creating impact in the system, not necessarily these non-state actors always serve to establish peace and stability and are always pro *-status quo* actors but they can also act in opposition to the system and can utilize non-peaceful means for their own top-end goals. The League of Nations and The 969 Movement of Burma can be given as examples. Even though both these organizations constitute examples for non-state actors, the former was found in order to keep the security and peace after World War I, while the latter leads extremist political, ethnic and ecclesiastical campaigns against Burma's minorities.²⁰ Thus, although uncelebrated by the vast majority of the international relations actors, existence and the ability of conducting independent policies of organizations like *jihadi* groups are accepted. How idealists perceive

¹⁹ Adler, E. "The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self Restraint, and NATO's post Cold War transformation" *European Journal of International Relations*, 14(2), 2008, p.216

²⁰ Downs, Ray (2013-03-27). "Is Burma's Anti-Muslim Violence Led by Buddhist Neo-Nazis?". <http://www.vice.com/read/is-burmas-anti-muslim-violence-led-by-buddhist-neo-nazis> VICE. Retrieved 10.03.2015

international relations contains three elements: system, structure and the process.²¹ Non-state actors are the part of a system located in the structure (distribution of capabilities). They effect and get affected by the system, which is the process. So the system designates the characteristics of the patterns of relations, these patterns come to existence by the interactions of the agents whose capabilities are distributed and are located in the structure. In this scheme of behaviors, non-state actors are also able to move like states regardless of their ultimate aim or their types and skills. What changes is either their capabilities or their abilities to establish interactions, or both at the same time. Thus organizations like *Al-Qa'idah* , *The Islamic State* and *FARC* are identified in a system and they naturally have their shares from distribution of capabilities and with this share they commence to interact in order to have their aims reached. Non-state actors are of great importance in this three-stage mechanism.

Systemic liberalism, also known as neo-liberal institutionalism, suggests that although states are the primal actors and the system is anarchic, this does not necessarily require a conflict among states. In order to compensate the lack of an upper regulator, systemic liberalism highlights the importance of non-state actors as regulators such as the NATO, UN or regional NSAs.²² Moreover, systemic liberalism sees the seriousness of the threat posed by some kinds of non-state actors and calls for other states to create alliances and institutions in order to defy such threats.²³

²¹ Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, 'Power and Interdependence Revisited', *International Organization* 41(198) 1987, p. 739.

²² Oğuzlu, Tarık. , *Uluslararası İlişkiler'e Giriş : Tarih , Teori, Kavram ve Konular* Şaban Kardaş & Ali Balcı (ed), *Küre Yayınları*, İstanbul , 2014 , p 104

²³ McMillan, John, " Liberal institutionalism" , *International Relations Theory for the Twenty-First Century*, Martin Griffiths(Ed), *Routledge Press*, New York, 2007 pp: 21-34

To summarize, it can be said that idealists have been championing the importance of non-state actors since the very first days. Although the perception of different types of liberalist views differ from each other, so long as their view of them are the same or greatly similar so is their stance towards non-state actors. All of the idealists accept that states are not the only actors and many advocate the necessity of non-state actors as regulators, actors, mitigators and so on. Consequently, non-state actors' role and function point to a significant split between idealists and realists. It can be said that idealists not only accept the role and significance of the non-state actors but also support and appreciate their role for a stable international environment. For idealists, non-governmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations, multinational organizational organizations are of utmost importance for providing and enabling stability and co-operation. Liberals have the full understanding that not all kinds of non-state actors are co-operative or opt for reconciliation. For example, idealists are aware that globalization offers a convenient atmosphere for violent or revolutionist, illegal non-state actors.²⁴ Hereby, non-state actors are accepted as important and powerful players in international relations by idealists. In this sense, this paper accepts how idealists regard non-state actors' power of influencing the international relations and the system regardless of their ultimate aims.

²⁴ Zimmermann, Ekkart. "Globalization and Terrorism", *European Journal of Political Economy*, 27(1) December 2011 pp.252-161

2.1.3 Non-Traditional International Relations Approaches and Non-State Actors

As can be seen above, mainstream theories have debated on the nature of non-state actors in international relations. Although liberals represent a greatly different bearing than realists, they still have not reached a definite understanding of the comprehensive nature of non-state actors. Mostly, motives and driving forces of non-state actors are neglected unless they IGO or NGO's. Moreover, great deal of liberalist studies focus on intergovernmental or Non-governmental organizations even though they are not the only categories of non-state actors. Besides, liberalists show a systemic presence and mostly speak of its benefits while few writers focus on threatening or challenging features of some non-state actors. Although mainstream international relations theories had overwhelming debates on non-state actors, non-traditional approaches also made a contribution to the debate.

Constructivist theory of international relations attempts to fill the gap where liberals and realists failed to fill.

Generally speaking, constructivism highlights the relationship between agent and structure and adopts a level of analysis relevant to every issue.²⁵ Constructivism submit to the claim that agent and structure shape and re-shape each other. By doing so, it brings identities and norms to the forefront. It states that actors behave in accordance with the notion of identities and therefore, distribution of power, anarchy

²⁵ Wendt, Alexander. "The Agent-Structure Problem in the International Relations Theory", *International Organization*, 31(3) 1987, , pp, 335-370

and will of power are not the only drivers for the actors. They are shaped by the interaction of the units, which produces the structure.²⁶ For constructivism, there are two kinds of norms that regulate the relations: regulative and constructive. While the former lays the rules and specifies the boundaries, the latter directly involves the formation process of actors. Therefore, interaction directly points to the evolution of actors, norms and identities.

Constructivism tries to understand the reason behind the issues that grand theories failed to comprehend. Thus, it mainly deals with sovereignty, agent-structure relations and their motives. Thereby, states and their relations with each other as an evolutionary process are the main concern of constructivism. And this causes non-state actors to play a remarkable role in the construction process of identities, which influences the inter-state relations. Thus, unlike realism, constructivism leaves room for non-state actors and unlike liberalism; it ascribes an identity-norm builder to the non-state actors instead of focusing on the material gains stemming from cooperation.²⁷ Constructivists regard the policy-making process as an extension of identity and norm politics as ergo actions of the non-state actors should be understood in this sense too. So long as many non-state actors arise with such identity, this point of view is applicable on them as well. To clarify the point, Hamas can be given as an example. As a non-state actor, the Indian Congress Party, was founded in order to repel the occupation of the United Kingdom in India. After the liberation of India from the British occupation, the party acted in accordance with the new identity and new norms. Hamas in Palestine and Hizballah of Lebanon are

²⁶ Wendt, Alexander, "Anarchy is What States Make of It : The Social Construction of Power Politics" International Organization, 46(2) 1992, pp. 390-421

²⁷ Özpek, *ibid* , p 35

other examples of entities that underwent a similar transition. However, theory itself does not deal with the roles of non-state actors in international relations but it rather portrays them as focuses whose power hold potential to affect the social structure and the policy making process.²⁸ Although constructivism does not treat non-state actors as primal actors and regards them as tools and outcomes of inter-state relations, the constructivist perception can be utilized in order to explicate a different kind of non-state actors. Besides, the constructivist approach advocates that identity creation is a process and the existence of non-state actors contributes positively to the identity building process.

In this respect, this paper deems the novelties introduced by constructivism such as the importance of identity and norms as regulative and constructive indicators of the behaviors of non-state actors like *Al-Qa'idah* and The Islamic State.

Focusing on norm building within a state and a society, constructivist approach in international relations is not able to explain the *de facto* states as they commence a process of norm building apart from their patron states. Thus, constructivism analyses how *The Islamic State* contributes to the norm building progress within Iraq and Syria but ignores its own identity creation process. However, The Islamic State itself is a major identity builder within its territory and is focused on its own identity rather than on contributing to the identity building progress in Iraq and in Syria. Hence, constructivism is not a key explanatory approach for *The Islamic State's* case.

Post-Structuralism is another non-traditional international relations approach that aims to deconstruct *Meta narratives* that produce and reproduce the sovereignty and

²⁸ Cowles, Maria Green. "Non-State Actors and False Dichotomies." Erik Jones & Amy Verdun, (ed)., *The Political Economy of European Integration*. Routledge, New York, 2005 . p25-39.

unquestioned postulates.²⁹ By doing this, it tries to dissolve the artificial *power relations, dominance* and especially the dominance and sovereignty of the state. Social scientists who are generally linked with the Frankfurt School of thought introduced the post-modernist de-construction notion to international relations and they adamantly aimed the *grand narrations*, one of which is the explicit sovereignty of the state. Ashley points that the state-centric reading of international relations naturally begets oppression and conceals the truth.³⁰ Thus, in opposition to state centric grand theories, post structuralism poses a challenge to the state's sovereign and dominant role in international relations and creates room for non-state actors to express themselves as they interact.

The critical Theory, on the other hand, criticized the Westphalian state-system and wholly accepted sovereignty narrations. By this, the critical theory regards international system as the primal reason and the source of conflicts.³¹ According to it, "information" and "communication" as well as the connections between the observer and the observed (where the observer is located to observe) is of great importance. Thus, scholars of the Frankfurt School who came up with the critical approach, criticize modern states and the state system's cost to the world. They study the mechanism of the sets of relationships through which the states function with other actors. According to Cox, states only play a mediator role in the system.³²

²⁹ Lyotard, Jean François, "The Postmodern Condition : A Report on Knowledge", translated by Geoffrey Bennington & Brian Massumi, *University of Minnesota Press*, Mineapolis 1984 p.44

³⁰ Ashley, R.K. "Untying the Sovereign State : A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique" *Millennium*, 17(2), 245,1987,

³¹ Linklater, Andrew." Critical Theory and World Politics" *Routledge Press*, New York, 2007 p.31

³² Cox, Robert, *Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory*" *Millenium Press*, New York, 1981, p 128

According to Critical Theorists, the totalitarian stance of the state in the system bended the ethical norms and re-defined them in the form they wish it to be. Although the critical theory deals the Westphalian System and criticizes it and its ramifications, it does not take dealing *de facto* states in a positivist stance to its agenda. The critical theory's main agenda is creating an anti-balance against problem-solving theories. Since the main focus of critical theorists is to observe whether a narration or a mindset to be applied on a fact produce sovereignty or not, and to try to understand a present system via tools produced by that system that will eventually reproduce the sovereignty, critical theorists especially look at whether *de facto* states and their narrations contribute to human emancipation. Hence, given the fact that *de facto* states adopt current narrations available in the contemporary system, approaching to such states from within the system reproduces sovereignty. Thus, critical theorists don't deal with *de facto* states.

2.2 Jihadi Groups as a Non-State Actors in Literature

According to the Dictionary of Social Sciences, non-state actor means being an organization with sufficient power to influence and cause a change without being linked to any institution or state.³³ Keeping fidelity with the given description of the notion, many examples can be given for “ non-state actors.” Although the definition

³³ Dictionary of the Social Sciences (1 January 2002) , “ Non-state Actors”, *Dictionary of the Social Sciences* ,Cengage Learning, Retrieved 11.03.2015 “<http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1O104-nonstateactors.html>”

of NSA points the features of the entity, functions and capabilities of NSA's differ greatly and in a broad range. Thus, it is important to make an accurate and valid assessment in order to develop a true understanding of the notion. .

There are several types of Non-state actors than can fit into the definition made above. One of them is Non-Governmental Organizations. These kinds of non-state actors do not pursue profit nor are they biologically bound to neither any government nor any governmental body. They can function in political, economic, social, and religious fields and can be funded by governments, businessmen or may be run by mere volunteers. TEMA foundation in Turkey and the "Association for the Protection of the Lebanese Heritage" in Lebanon are only two examples of it. Yet another type of non-state actors are the Multinational Corporations that seek profit and are based in one country as the country of origin despite the fact that they operates in a multinational scope. Some of these NSA's may have a budget that surpasses that of some states. This advantage naturally bestows them with might and a bargain power in international relations. Banking companies like HSBC, CITI group et cetera, energy companies like BP, Chevron, Gazprom et cetera may influence the international system and interactions occurring in it by the virtue of their gigantic budgets, strategic importance and lobbying power. Yet another type of non-state actor is the international media. It is known that media outlets have immediate influence over the audience and a direct and indirect influence over the rulers. Media outlets like Reuters, Al Jazeera, CNN or BBC are believed to have significant effect on the audiences and the foreign policies of the countries. There is even a theory called *CNN Effect* theory that suggests this claim to be true since the

Cold War.³⁴ Relatively, a new aspect of media, social media, can be talked about as non-state actor here as well. All actors and their supporters are excessively using Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, Archive.org, Justpaste.in and such websites in order to influence the system. Religious groups, international diaspora, and *de facto* states are other types of non-state actors.

Yet another type of non-state actors is named ‘violent non-state actors’ or ‘armed non-state actors’. Violent non-state actor (VNSA) refers to any organization or armed group that adopts (illegal) violence to attain its goals, thereby challenging the state’s monopoly of violence.³⁵ Violent non-state actors compete with the states on both the monopoly of legitimate use of force and on sovereignty. Phil Williams states how these VNSA’s differ from each other and identifies 8 parameters to classify VNSA’s and distinguish them from each other. These are motivation and purpose, strength and scope, means to obtain funding or to access to resources, organizational structure, the role of violence for given groups, the relationship between VNSA and state authorities and finally the functions VNSAs fulfill for members and supporting constituencies.³⁶ Among them are warlords, militias, paramilitary forces, Insurgencies, criminal organizations, youth gangs and revolutionary groups et cetera. Jihadi groups all over the world fit into such description because of several reasons. Firstly, they aim to topple the regimes in Muslim countries that they call “apostates”. Thus, they behave like (an in fact, they

³⁴ Belknap, Margaret. “The CNN Effect: Strategic Enabler or Operational Risk” US Army War College, Strategy Research Project, 2001 p. 7

³⁵ Violent Non State Actor (VNSA) Law & Legal Definition, USLegal Online Dictionary, , <http://definitions.uslegal.com/v/violent-non-state-actor-vnsa/> Retrieved 13.03.2015

³⁶ Williams, Phil. “Violent Non-State Actors and National and International Security” International Relations and Security Network, *ISN* New York, 2008., p 8

already are) revolutionary groups. By doing this, they challenge the Westphalian state-sovereign system and pose a threat to the monopoly of the state over the use of force. For *Al-Qa'idah*, because it is organized in several continents and subcontinents, it is generally accepted as a VNSA.

Williams states that *Al-Qa'idah* has designated Saudi and Egyptian regimes as near enemies and United States as the far enemy. Moreover, he stresses that unlike local warlords, the group is organized in various countries and its relations with states vary considerably.³⁷

Williams highlights that the group is transformed from a jihadi network to more of an umbrella organization and social movement, inspiring sympathetic individuals and groups but not controlling them.³⁸

Shaul and Rosenthal are two other scholars who regard jihadi groups as non-state actors.³⁹ They link the threat posed to the state's order and globalization thus they reckon that globalization has created gaps for jihadi groups to operate within. Furthermore, they claimed that while other organizations are adopting either hierarchical or network type organizational structures, *Al-Qa'idah* is organized in a typology called "dune organization"⁴⁰ They argued that dune organization is a type of organization which describes a strategic behavior that relies on a process of vacillation between territorial presence and a mode of disappearance. Territorial presence here points to a formation of a local entity like the nation state, global market, or ethnic community whereas disappearance tactics are closely tied to dune-

³⁷ Williams, *op.cit.* p14

³⁸ *loc.cit*

³⁹ Mishal & Rosenthal, "Al Qaeda as a Dune Organization", The Whitney and Betty Macmillan Center, Routledge Press, Tel Aviv, 2005, p7

⁴⁰ *loc.cit.*

like organization type where de-territorialization is being conducted. This gives them an opportunity to act like a freelance non-state actor from one territory to another and to change their *modus operandi*'s and adopt a convenient one according to the territory and the entity installed in it. Thus, Shaul and Rosenthal accept jihadi groups as VNSAs and allocate *Al-Qa'idah* a special place by describing its umbrella-like organization and claiming its novelty in organizational structure which they name as dune organization.

Robert Bunker is another scholar who states that jihadi groups are violent non-state actors. In his study Bunker portrays a violent non-state actor continuum scheme and stations international jihadi organizations on the right end of the scheme that he calls "private armies".⁴¹

Furthermore, Bunker mentions that even though he puts such organization on the right hand where it marks "high corruption capability", *Al-Qa'idah* shows quite low corruption signs and capabilities. He also states that such groups may transform their structural designs under a different sort of oppression or political/military atmosphere like from network to hierarchy to hybrid and so on.⁴² This also approves Mishal and Rosenthal's de-territorialized organization approach.

Barak Mendelsohn, on the other hand assesses the violent non-state actor threat to international society (IS) and the established state system and mainly focuses on jihadi organizations in the international system.⁴³ He, too, emphasizes that jihadi groups are challenging sovereignty and targeting a state-oriented international

⁴¹ Bunker, Robert J, " Fighting Irregular Fighters Defeating Violent Nonstate Actors", *Strategic Studies Institute* , US Army War College , 2013, p59

⁴² Bunker, *op.cit.* p60

⁴³ Mendelsohn, Barak, "Sovereignty Under Attack : The International Society Meets the Al Qaeda Network" *Review of International Studies.* 31(1) , 2005,, p 58

system but he includes international society as the challenged actor as well. Because his study is inspired by the English School of thought in the field of international relations, he brings this threat few steps further and acknowledges that jihadi groups in general indeed pose a threat not only to several states or to the sovereignty as a notion but most of all, to the international society that's composed of sovereign states. In this respect, tension between the *Qur'an*'ic interpretation of international relations and positive international law did and will produce and fuel such attempts to change the international regime.

Willian Roberto and Ana Melos accept jihadi groups like *Hamas* and The Islamic State as non-state military actors and attribute some of the sovereign state features to these entities.⁴⁴ In their study, they bench mark local jihadi groups like Taleban and Hamas and they conclude that even though they get fed by the same source, they adopt identical narratives and they serve the same cause. *Al-Qa'idah* differed from other groups by the adoption of the transnational Islamic struggle focus which Hamas and Taleban could not mature in a similar manner. Fred Halliday also contributes to this argument and purports that although such groups have identical top-end goals and similar starting capabilities, *Al-Qa'idah* represents an exception by internationalizing very rapidly instead of remaining local.⁴⁵ James M. Smith classifies VNASs into two categories namely: “national non state actors” and “ non-national non state actors”. He uses this level of analysis/ application based on strategic culture of a given non-state actor. For example in his study, Smith cites the

⁴⁴ Willian Roberto & Ana Melos, “ The Situation Regarding Non State Military Actors In the Middle East”, United Nations Security Council UFRGSMUN, Volume 2, 2014, p252

⁴⁵ Halliday,Fred ,The Middle East in International Relations : Power,Politics and Ideology. *Cambridge University Press*, Cambridge, 2005 p121

Japanese cult *Aum Shinrikyo* as national non-state actor whereas he names *Al-Qa'idah* as non-national non-state actor.⁴⁶ He concludes that the given jihadi actor has identity, motive for war that constitutes its *jus bellum iustum* (just war theory), ideology, strategy and et cetera. Thus Smith too, directly refers to *Al-Qa'idah* as a non-state actor. International relations academics overwhelmingly assert non-state actorhood of jihadi groups and very few, if any, academics object this opinion.

Many of the studies stated that jihadi groups in general and *Al-Qa'idah* in particular operate with a well-organized experienced and highly complex core structure and command chain. There have been numerous debates and published publications regarding the type of organization that very entity has developed.

Hierarchical structure, which suggests a direct vertical command line, network structure, that supposes more horizontal and sparsely but complex cells, hybrid and dune-like organizational schemes have been attributed to the given groups. Regardless of the type of organization, all of the experts cite that it is highly complex and internationally organized.

Moreover, jihadi groups as non-state actors have their systematic ideologies and revolutionary aims and enough means to claim impact in international system as can be seen so far. Thus, it would be irrational to call such groups irrational as some scholars suggest.⁴⁷

Besides, jihadi movements in general show interest to interact with other non-state actors or states both directly and indirectly. It can be said that perhaps it would be convenient to call this "*semi-diplomacy*". As they claim to have a place in the international system, either *pro-status quo* like many separatist-nationalist groups in

⁴⁶ Smith, James M, " al-Qaida, WMD Proliferation and Strategic Culture" Institute for National Security Studies, USAF Academy, 2006, 2006

⁴⁷ Nalbadov, Robert, " Irrational Rationality of Terrorism" Journal of Strategic Security, 6(4) 2013 , p13

general or revisionists like all revolutionary groups and jihadi groups, they use force in order to have a bargaining card and this consent-coercion nexus stemming from the use of force poses threat to the states sovereign system which is a descriptive label of VNAS's.

In conclusion, just as non-state actors in general are accepted as powerful actors in international system, so are jihadi groups equally accepted as non-state actors, even violent non-state actors in the view of that system. Another point which has to be made is that the reason of mentioning *Al- Qa'idah* so much is that *The Islamic State* was originates from this group and the vast majority of academic studies conducted are concerned with it. Moreover, they carry same end –goals, same characteristics and are located in the same category group of VNSA's. So, all studies that are made on the previous group in the sense of locating its whereabouts in international system equally befit the latter.

2.3. State of Art and Necessity for a New Theoretical Framework

As can be noticed, there are two main problems regarding the international relations-jihadist movements-non-state triangle. Firstly, it is clearly exhibited that there is no consensus whatsoever regarding the role and effectiveness of non-state actors in international relations. Thus, each and every grand and secondary international relations theory is either positively or negatively biased for non-state actors and this sets shadow over the reality on the field.

Secondly, even though literature is agreed on the nature of Jihadi groups as non-state actor by consensus e, theories are either completely inapplicable to the notion in the

field or are partially ready to be applied. Thus there is a gap between grand theory narrations on non-state actors and the literature concerned with them. Therefore, it is quite risky to apply a theory on jihadi networks and their functioning methods if a deliberate study is sought.

For this reason, this paper abstains from founding its pillars on one theory and applying it to study and understand the reality of the case in question. Instead, I adopted James Rosenau's Turbulence opinion in international relations. Based on this, I used Nina Caspersen's reasoning methodology on competitive democratization and transformed it into "competitive jihadism" as a new term to be coined in order to better understand difference represented by *The Islamic State* and *Al-Qa'idah* examples.

2.3.1 Turbulence Approach as a Theoretical Framework

Rosenau states that the WTC attacks of September 11, 2001 caused a system perturbation so immense that for many observers it was an unprecedented radius-changing event that transformed the systemic dynamics and moved them from local to national, supra national and systemic level.⁴⁸ According to Rosenau, concepts of change and transformation are undependable, sometimes untraceable.

Rosenau's turbulence approach has three systemic variables, distinguished by the levels of aggregation within which they operate. These are micro level, macro level

⁴⁸ Rosenau, James N, "Turbulence and Terrorism : Reframing or Readjusting the Model?" Globalisation, Security and the Nation State Paradigms in Transition, (ed) Ersel Aydinli & James Rosenau, *State University of New York Press*, New York, 2005 p.221

and micro-macro levels.⁴⁹ Rosenau states that, as at least two of these variables change simultaneously, world politics become susceptible and vulnerable to fall into turbulence. The turbulence period of world politics is where theories adjusted and devised for static and stagnated periods fail to be of any effect and thus they have stopped to yield any beneficial knowledge since a long time as world politics went through a turbulence period.⁵⁰

2.3.1.1 The Micro Level Variable

The micro level deals with non-public official individuals. The turbulence approach insists on that regardless of his or her social, economical, cultural or religious backgrounds, every single individual undergoes a continuing three-part skill revolution.⁵¹ These skills are highly transformative and able to shift. By doing so, they directly affect the capabilities of the individual. One of them is the analytical skill that helps them to bond with each other and track their roots and tails. Another one is the emotional skill that works to split into this part and that part of the event. For a deeper clarification, it asks the questions of “what for ?” and “ against what?” to the event or actor in order for them to deploy themselves into a feasible and acceptable stance. The last dimension is the imaginative skill that helps a person to transcend certain limits of his or her imagination. Hereby, he or she can, by the help

⁴⁹ Rosenau, *op.cit.* p223.

⁵⁰ Rosenau, N. James , “ Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier : Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World *Cambridge University Press*, New York, 1997, p 57

⁵¹ Rosenau, *Ibid.*

of imaginative skills, discover and analyze other cultures. As a matter of fact, those who are rich in terms of capabilities are more skillful than those who are poor in analytical, emotional or imaginative dimensions.⁵²

These skills are upgradable and highly susceptible to social and educational interactions or actions. By saying this, Rosenau means that micro level variable is changeable and re-adjustable and that it creates biases or prejudices. So people may code some cultures, places and peoples and hand them in to next generations. 'Jewish is stingy', 'Islamic is fundamentalist', 'Mumbai' is polluted, 'German is disciplined', 'Hitler is evil' and 'Black is inferior' are some examples for this kind of coding.

2.3.1.2 The Macro Level Variable

The second variable is the macro variable. Macro variable occurs where interactions are occurring and where there is a significant and visible mechanism. This, for a long time, was a dominant state-centric system whose anarchy has been an object of argument only very rarely. Because all means of governance like power of economy, army and policy were predominantly distributed among states, the system was to be considered as bipolar, multipolar, hegemonic or etc. By doing so, the role and power of all kinds of non-state actors were zeroed to the ground. Today, according

⁵² James N. Rosenau and W. Michael Fagen, "Increasingly Skillful Citizens: A New Dynamism in World Politics?," paper presented at the Joint Conference of the Japan Association of International Relations and the International Studies Association, Makuhari, Japan, 1996

to Rosenau, Non-governmental organizations, Inter Governmental Organizations and all kinds of non-state actors are challenging the state-centric international system. Thus, they are seizing power enough to change or channelize or at least affect the world politics. Rosenau cites World Trade Center attack conducted by 19 *Al-Qa'idah* operatives as one of the milestones of this dramatic change.

It is clear that the state-centric system is no longer predominant and that the world system is undergoing a skill revolution.⁵³ This is referred to as 'bifurcation' by Rosenau who continues by emphasizing that today's world politics is multi-centric and there are relatively autonomous actors on the ground.⁵⁴ Today, states, the former champions of world politics, are facing two dangers. Firstly they are facing the threat posed by other states, which is classical threat perception. Novelty brought by the new systemic structure is another type of threat posed by non-state actors which Rosenau calls "Threat from the other world".⁵⁵

Macro level variable is the ultimate variable. It has direct links with the individual level by affecting and being affected at the same time.

2.3.1.3 The Micro-Macro Level Variable

The last variable is the micro-macro variable. This level basically points to a sort of interactions and linkages between micro-level individuals and macro-level systemic beings. Individual or collective stances of micro-level agents and positioning or

⁵³ Rosenau, *op.cit* p 83

⁵⁴ loc.cit

⁵⁵ loc.cit

repositioning (be it co-operation, compensation, concession or objection) of macro-level agents according to it designates the micro-macro variable's bearing. According to Rosenau, individuals at the basic level are questioning the unquestioned hierarchical structures today and the complex supra level is going through a crisis. Because of these kinds of unconventional types of authority crisis, governments and state apparatus became more susceptible and less effective in re-installing authority where it was lacking once. The issue here is not being able to quell an uprising by military and law-enforcement apparatus but it is that the state is losing ground to establish co-operations with individuals because individuals are now spotting the problems of governments and questioning their authorities; thus consequently withdrawing their full support. The Arab Spring uprisings, occupy movements, and similar protests in Hong Kong, Istanbul, Madrid, London, and Berlin can be read in this respect.

To make it even clearer, the foundation of *The Islamic State* could be taken as an example. At the micro level, Iraqi Sunnite insurgents who have been radicalized by Maliki's authoritarian policies and the Shia militants' atrocities in Sunnite towns are the first group. The second group at the micro level is the former *Ba'ath* officers who were wanted and lost their positions after Saddam was toppled. These two groups have constituted the majority of commanding and order-executing structure of The Islamic State at first place. Their analytical skills are composed of few factors like losing fame, losing power, discrimination, feeling of betrayal and losing hope for a central state, the Peshmerga example, Jihadi call, and tribal system. Emotional skill here helped them to relocate themselves after Saddam's toppling and Petraeus Plan combined with Maliki's continuing sectarian and authoritarian policies at domestic realm. Thus, answer of "what for" question has changed drastically and

this pushed them to compose a new structure or join one. Their imaginative skills are also affected by this trauma and the recent experience of a fragmented minority (especially after the first 2005 elections).

Macro variable is the systemic, which caused the rise of new players in Iraq, in West Asia and in world politics after 9/11 attacks. One of them are militant groups like the significantly successful *Peshmerga* or pro Shia -sectarian *Quds Force*, *Badr Brigades* and *Muqtada Al Sadr Brigades* which are now taking place in Iraqi politics. In the Middle East, *Al-Qa'idah* was escalating and discourses of *Al-Qa'idah* and Iraqi insurgent militias were nearly identical. In the global scale too, *Al-Qa'idah* was a non-state player. Moreover non-state actors and their struggles against well-established state forces show that state-centrism is in crisis and unable to offer a solution in such cases.

Roseanu's turbulence approach also helps us to understand The Islamic State's reality. While the macro-level created sovereignty of Syria and Iraq and their statehood claims that they are recognized in international relations realm, micro level produced *The Islamic State's* reality as well as its sovereignty and identity building process. A relationship between them points to a change in micro-macro level balance. Explaining this relationship will open a door to understand the reality behind a fact which is not explained by grand theories. Turbulence approach is a useful tool as to understand why *The Islamic State* is launching a state building program or performing powerful propaganda campaigns. The shift in balance between micro and macro areas created enough room in which *The Islamic State* may conduct its campaigns. Secondly, it commenced to challenge its patron states in discourse fields as well, in order to attract more attention and consolidate its sovereignty by showing its target audience its will. As Caspersen stated similar

pattern before for *de facto* state- democratization nexus, this approach emulates it with respect to *jihadi de facto state-jihadist policies* nexus. Thus, “competitive jihadism” can be best explained by the aforementioned turbulence approach.

2.3.2 Competitive Processes: Competitive Democratization and Competitive Jihadism

A competitive process, at first points to a race, a competition among two or more parties whose ultimate reach is generally the same. This competition can be about acquiring recognition, a right over some sources, (like competing right in International Law, International Sea Law) over votes, attendants, et cetera. Moreover, its nature can be a zero sum game or non-zero sum game varying from one scenario to another. In this section, a widely used notion, competitive democratization, will be accepted and will be modified for the subject of the Thesis under the title of “ Competitive Jihadism” in order to shed a light onto the diversification of policies and their outcomes which belong to *The Islamic State* and the Syria-Iraq parent state axis.

2.3.2.1 Competitive Democratization

Democratization, as Linz and Stepan argued, is a complex process that includes transition and consolidation phases. These are namely the power of issuing new executable policies, determination of administration by popular and free voting

and a sufficient consensus on the political procedure.⁵⁶ Moreover, economic and political freedoms are inseparably bound to each other and economic freedom supports and promotes humans to express their beliefs and opinions and their problems in an atmosphere free of fear or concern about their freedoms.⁵⁷ These requirements and their sub-elements unarguably affect the identity of a state or a *de facto state* in both ways: domestic identity and foreign identity.

Maybe the greatest signs of the impact of democracy over the international system is UN Charter's spirit of which opening words are "We the Peoples"^{58 59} and discourses perennially expressed by leaders regarding the role of democracy. Thus, it can be said that today's world politics' main engine is democracy in the sense of type of ruling the states. It also facilitates the recognition of a newly founded state or a political entity, namely a *de facto state*.

Many non-state actors, and predominantly *de facto states* use this legitimate key to get into broader interaction with their counterparts and gain legitimacy in this sense. According to Nina Caspersen, these non-state actors changed their recognition programs since the end of the Cold War as the shift of the world politics occurred in favor of democracy and liberation.⁶⁰ Even though such entities are pervasively seen as a source of instability, militarism, criminality and competition over some pieces of land run by warlords, they are actually at the threshold of the state-building

⁵⁶ Linz, Juan ,J, & Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Maryland, 1996, p3

⁵⁷ Fish, Steven, "Democratization's Requisites : The Post Communist Experience," *Post Soviet Affairs*, 14(3) p.237

⁵⁸ Democracy and the United Nations , United Nations Global Issues, http://www.un.org/en/globalissues/democracy/democracy_and_un.shtml Retrieved 25.03.2015

⁵⁹ United Nations also endorses this approach officially in their official website cited above.

⁶⁰ Caspersen, Nina. , *Unrecognized States*, *Polity Press*, Cambridge, 2012 , p53

process and hence they expect and struggle for international recognition. According to Caspersen, their primal strategy is to adopt internationally accepted “ hegemonic international values” i.e. democracy.⁶¹

Democracy and democratization are so influential that scholars use them as tools that contribute to the process of recognition. According to Broers, non-recognized states are playing a competitive democratization quest. This rivalry takes place between non-recognized states and their parent states where the non-recognized state (*de facto state*) tries to prove that it surpasses its parent state in terms of democracy⁶² Moreover, they are keen to display themselves as the “democracy islands” in the authoritarian waters.⁶³ As a matter of fact, this democratization competition is so vital for some cases that parent states raise this issue against non-state actors in order to display them as illegitimate beings in terms of public support and their separatist motives.⁶⁴ Especially some Post-Soviet *de facto* states got into democratization competition with their parent states and used this competitive democratization process in order to gain recognition.⁶⁵ In sum, *de facto* states are avid to refer to democratization as a strategy and competitive democratization as a tool to gain recognition.⁶⁶

Succinctly, there are certain notions (democracy, human rights, legitimacy), certain audiences (third party states), certain agents (non-state actor, parent state,) and a

⁶¹ loc.cit.

⁶² Broers, Laurence, “ The Politics of Non-Recognition and Democratization” *Accord*, Vol 17, 2005,, p71

⁶³ Caspersen, p.71

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ Protsyk, Oleg, “Representation and Democracy in Eurasia’s Unrecognized States : The Case of Transnistria.” *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 17(13) , 2009, p258

⁶⁶ Özpek, Burak B. “ The Role of Democracy in the Recognition of De Facto States: An Empirical Assessment.” *Global Governance*, 20(4), 2014, p 590

certain designated outcome (either recognition or non-recognition). This pattern is the grand pattern of competitive processes and I argue that it is applicable to the notion I call “competitive jihadism” as well.

2.3.2.2 Competitive Jihadism

The ultimate goal of a non-recognized state is to gain recognition by the international community through which that non-recognized state seeks its legitimacy. This proposal is also valid for the Islamic State as a pattern. The Islamic State too, seeks its recognition but the target group this time is not the international community, naturally, it is Islamic World in general.

Although their sources of legitimacy are different, an ordinary *de facto* state and The Islamic State share the same methodology and ultimate goal. Tension between parent state and *de facto* state for a regular incident like Moldova-Transnistria exists between The Islamic State and the group that begot it and between the Islamic State and its parent states.

Caspersen states that when a *de facto* state is born, it seeks recognition in order for survival and adopts a democratic narration in order to attract the approval of international community by competing with its parent states in democratization. The Islamic State too, as a *de facto* state, is involved in competition with its parent states which are Iraq and Syria. But this competition does not contain democratic notions but rather jihadi notions because of the target audience being the Islamic State not the international community like other *de facto* states but it is generally Islamic community. This situation causes an inevitable tension and this tension is also present between The Islamic State and the Iraq-Syria axis. It is clear that non-recognized states develop narrations in order to the stricten bond within the target

audience and many times it shows up in the form of nationalism like in the example of Abkhazia and Nagorno-Qarabakh⁶⁷ or in the form of socialism like in the example of Transnistria⁶⁸ and sometimes in the form of Islamism like in the example of Imarat Kavkaz in North Caucasus according to their ideologies. Tension created by the difference in methodology and priorities between two groups are now displaying a clear example for tension between a parent state and non-recognized states today. Moreover, just as *de facto* states attempt to create a new society customized according to its ideology, the Islamic State too redesigns its target audience by claiming a Caliphate in order to legitimate its claim in the eyes of the Muslim community. It should be noted that adopting this narration is also important because the Islamic State needs to attract more fighters to fight alongside.

Another characteristic of a non-recognized state is to go into a heavy institutionalization period in order to prove its capability of being able to be a state. According to Caspersen, these entities go through 3 overlapping steps.⁶⁹The first step is gaining psychical control over territories that is accomplished by all of the *de facto* states. The second one is having a credible defense capability and monopoly of the use of force. Third one is creating internal sovereignty. Keeping the examples of Chechnya of Dzhohar Dudayev and *Imarat Kavkaz* of Dokku Umarov, Transnistria, TRNC and pre-independence Kosovo in mind will help to test the hypothesis. For example, militia forces of Kosovo before independence held a considerable part of the country in control as they united under the banner of UÇK (*Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës*) and UÇK constituted the defense forces of Kosovo. Under the UN

⁶⁷ Caspersen, Ibid, p.93

⁶⁸ Caspersen Ibid. P92

⁶⁹ Caspersen, Ibid, p52

watch, Kosovar people got ready for self-rule and they announced Kosovo as a sovereign state. Chechnya has gone through the same process although not as successful as the one in Kosovo. The Islamic State, today is going through the same process in a much more limited time and more hostile environment despite its lack of experience whatsoever. Yet, it surprisingly still managed to take control of some considerable parts of Syria and Iraq in few years and has undeniable defense forces as police and military forces. Moreover, The Islamic State is going through a rapid institutionalization period where it is building an army, opening schools and universities, founding courts, opening factories and paving roads, let alone forming an army. Just like any *de facto* state would like to prove its competence against its parent state over such points, The Islamic State is trying to prove its competence in the Iraq-Syria axis as well as other nations.

Another particularization of non-recognized states is their inclination for propagating themselves by any means possible. This can be by the means of diaspora, third party states, and media or by action. For example, TRNC used the help of the Republic of Turkey to gain recognition and especially Muslim countries were the targets in Turkey's campaign. Nagorno-Karabakh had the help of Armenia and the Armenian diaspora for recognition as a state albeit futile it was. For The Islamic State, media is the primal choice of propaganda due to which it was banned to propagate *The Islamic State* in nearly every state and had no recognized state to advocate it. Thus, *The Islamic State* put an unprecedented effort on media campaigning in order to gain sympathy and attract the attention of its target group, Muslim communities in all over the world. *The Islamic State* utilized especially social media means like Twitter, YouTube, Facebook (it formed its own 5elefabook.com afterwards) and countless websites, personal blogs and websites for

news. It uploaded HD Videos and documentaries like “Flames of War” or “Saleel as Sawareem” in order to propagate themselves. The Islamic State espoused media war idea from the very first days and invested and depended on it in a great scale so much so that it attracted the attention of media outlets.⁷⁰⁷¹

Succinctly put, from territorial defense to creating necessary institutions, to public service to adopting a narration for legitimacy and to propagating their ideas, The Islamic State is displaying the identical behaviors and methods in order to achieve the similar top-end goal: recognition. Although an ordinary non-recognized state competes against her parent states by these means, The Islamic State is competing against its parent states (Iraq and Syria) and for the recognition, recruiting and gaining supremacy over them. Maybe the only difference here is while the former is acting in the frames of International Law for recognition, producing discourses defined in this system and competing its parent state in competitive democratization process, the latter is acting according to the Islamic *Shari'a* law , producing discourses defined in Islamic system and competing its parent states in competitive jihadism process. This clearly shows that they differentiate their target audience that is namely the international community for the former and the Islamic Community for the latter. For both entities, it is important to prove the target audiences they are actually more eligible in the system in which they are defined (democracy and Islam). Thus, by competitive jihadism, The Islamic State is competing with its parent states in order to attract attention, recruit jihadist and empower itself in order to fulfill its primal instinct: Survival.

⁷⁰ Becker, Olivia, ISIS Has a Really Slick and Sophisticated Media Department, (12.June.2014,) <https://news.vice.com/article/isis-has-a-really-slick-and-sophisticated-media-department> VICE Retrieved 26.03.2015

⁷¹ Media campaigns of The Islamic State will be analyzed with more details in next chapters.

Competitive democratization framed by Nina Caspersen and competitive jihadism fact for jihadi *de facto* states is accepted within micro-macro level of Rosenau's turbulence approach. According to Rosenau, it is not possible to understand world politics without bearing micro-macro level conceptualization in mind. As for Theory making process regarding jihadi *de facto* states in particular and *de facto states* in general, while *de facto* state level is micro level, *de-jure* states is macro level. However, it is compulsory to define the relationship between micro and macro level and thus the notion of competitive jihadism is presented.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.1. Research Design

In the previous chapter, the importance of non-state actors in international relations literature and its place in theoretical approaches were covered and the term “competitive jihadism” is coined in order to explain why The Islamic State is involved in state building efforts and is using Jihadist propaganda. Studying a *de facto* state that is in all-out war with all the states obligates several restrictions upon the researcher. One of them is that it is not possible to observe the entity firsthand and to conduct research or interviews. It poses life risk and is illegal. Thus, this restriction brings limitations. Secondly, the ideology and policy, jihad and jihadism, are abundantly discussed. Hence there is no one definition on which all sides are agreed. There are disputes between Muslims and non-Muslims, few contemporary

scholars and predeceasing scholars of Islam and among Islamic sects. Thus, instead of appointing what is the most agreed upon, the norm jihad is referred as the Islamic State refers to it in order to provide a norm matching and avoid conceptual tumult.

3.1.1 Conceptualizing the Terms

For jihadi *de facto* states, terminology to be employed is of peak importance in order to attract the attention of the targeted masses. For the Islamic State and its policies, the terms jihad , jihadism and jihadist policy are to be conceptualized in order to avoid possible confusions.

Jihad is a highly articulated notion in Islamic sources. It originates from the Arabic root “*jaahada*” literally meaning, “ He strived”. However, in prophetic narrations and in Qur’anic verses it can be seen to be loaded up with a new meaning that can mostly be understood as “ *qitaal*” or to fight. The concept of jihad was born young in the Verses revealed during the Meccan period of revelation; it grew and matured among the Muslims who found a city-state in Medina. For example it is said in the Qur’an “Fight in the way of Allah those who fight you but do not transgress. Indeed. Allah does not like transgressors.”⁷² Continues as following “ And kill them wherever you overtake them and expel them from wherever they have expelled you, and trial and turbulence is worse than killing. And do not fight them at al-Masjid al-

⁷² Surah al Bakara, Holy Qur’an, verse 190

Haram until they fight you there. But if they fight you, then kill them. Such is the recompense of the disbelievers.”⁷³

A prominent scholar, Ibn Qayyim Ibn Jawziyyah categorized jihad in four categories as follows:

- a) jihad against hypocrites
- b) jihad against non-muslims
- c) jihad against the devil
- d) jihad against the self⁷⁴

Thus he placed actual warfare in the first two categories as opposed to inner war in the last two categories. However, Ibn Qayyim Ibn Jawziyyah states that actual warfare also contributes to one’s inner war against his self.⁷⁵

One of the most renowned scholars of Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*), Imam al Shafi’i stated jihad in his *Al-Umm* referring to it in the sense of fighting.⁷⁶⁷⁷ Another prominent scholar of Islamic jurisprudence, Imam al Mâlik described jihad as “a Muslim waging war against a non-Muslim who has no peace agreement with Muslims and the fighting is for the sake of the word of Allah to prevail. Jihad is also fighting the non-Muslim who attacks Muslim territory and it is also the Muslims attacking the non-Muslims in their land.”⁷⁸

⁷³ Surah al Bakara, Holy Qur’an, verse 191

⁷⁴ Ibn Qayyim Ibn Jawziyyah *Zad al Ma’ad*, vol. 2 , p 47

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ Al-Sheerazi, *Al Muhadhab*. p 343

⁷⁷ Transliteration of his actual statement in his book is “ *al jihad al Qital*” which undoubtedly referring to one’s fight in battlefield.

⁷⁸ Imam Mâlik, *Mawahib al Jaleel fi Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil*, vol 2 p 267

Shaykhulislam Ibn Taymiyyah also stated the same meaning of jihad in his letters to the people of Dimashk and told them that it is the pinnacle of Islam.⁷⁹ Although there are articulations as to greater jihad being one's inner war instead of actual fighting, one of the early scholars, Ibn Nuhaas stated that such narration is invalid and wasn't narrated by any credible narrators in his book *Mashari al Ashwaq ila masaari al ushaaq wa mutheer al gharaam ila daar assalaam*, which is completely dedicated to the topic of jihad.⁸⁰

Western scholars, on the other hand, stress the "inner war" dimension of jihad and promote one's self struggle. Diane Morgan states that Muslim and non-Muslim scholars agree on that the term jihad carries two legitimate meanings: inner spiritual effort and outer physical effort against the enemy.⁸¹ However, it is crystal clear that the Islamic State has adopted the opinions of Muslim scholars over the Western Tasawuf-oriented inner war claim.

The right of waging war and its conditions are also regulated in Islamic jurisprudence. A renown scholar of Hanafi jurisprudence of Islam, Ibn Qudamah, stated in his book that jihad is the responsibility of the ruler and the ruler is independent to decide whether to wage it or not. Once call is made, it is obligatory (*Fardh*) on believers to obey.⁸² Imam Sharbini , Bin Baz, Nasuriddin el Elbani, Al Sharkasi and other renown scholars also stated the same opinion from all jurisprudence and sects of Islamic belief. Imam Sharbini said that when a leader fortifies the frontiers, arms his commanders and takes the lead, it becomes

⁷⁹ Shaykhulislam Taquyyiddin Ibn Taymiyyah, al Risalaat ilal ahl-ul Dimashq, p 4

⁸⁰ Ibn Nuhaas, *Mashari al Ashwaq ila masaari al ushaaq wa mutheer al gharaam ila daar assalaam* , p 23

⁸¹ Diane Morgan, *Essential Islam: A Comprehensive Guide to Belief and Practice*, Praeger Publishing, California ,2009, p89

⁸² Ibn Qudamah, *Al Mughni*, vol 9 p.184

applicable.⁸³ Imam Sharkasi said that the leader of Muslims must exert his best effort to lead an army himself and trust in God to get aided for victory.⁸⁴

It can be said that the most promoted dimension of jihad is to war in verses, by hadiths and by the scholarly books as conceptualized above. Jihadism, on the other hand is an all-out warring ideology based on main pillars of Islamic thoughts that promote the use of force either with defensive or offensive manners in order to either expand “*Dar-ul Islam*⁸⁵” or defend it. (Also can be stated as *Al Jihad Bi sayf*)

Thus, in this thesis the term jihad refers to the meaning accepted by the Islamic State due to it is the only way to analyze jihadi policies of the Islamic State and in order to avoid a probable tumult. Clearly, jihad refers to a notion which is to war either to expand the territory of the Islamic land or to defend it against an offensive launched by non-Muslims. In this study, Jihadism is conceptualized as implementing and launching jihad as a primal foreign policy of an Islamic state.

The Jihadist policy is the tool for implementing ideology (jihadism) by the help of the cause and strategy (jihad). It is safe to argue that a state policy should be customized fittingly in order to be called a jihadist policy. First of all, the ruler or elite of a state’s discourse is sought for. Jihadist discourse constitutes a very powerful jihadist policy indicator. This is to say whether proven by action or not, a discourse that contains jihadist content is a jihadist policy. Secondly, because jihad is an active engagement, it requires an opponent. Thus, designating an enemy and an ultimate goal should be consistent with the ideology adopted in this case. Thus, the relation between the jihadist discourse and the designated enemy displays whether it

⁸³ Al-Sarkhasī, al-Mabsūt, vol. 10, p. 3.

⁸⁴ Al-Sharbīnī, Mughnī al-muhtāj, vol. 4, p. 210.

⁸⁵ Please refer to dictionary for the meaning

is a jihadist policy if the correlation is positive. Thirdly, the jihadist policy should also be sought in internal system of a state. An educational system, constitutional system and press releases dedicated to jihadi aims constitute powerful indicators of a jihadist policy. Finally, there should be no contradiction between ultimate goal, discourse and actions as to reach that aim.

3.1.2 The Hypothesis

The Islamic State has a rather dynamic profile in the field. Although it is a newly proclaimed state, its statements regarding the state policies are mostly offensive and radical. Its institutionalization is going very rapidly and the call for migration is made very repeatedly. However this growing effect of The Islamic State is occurring on the expense of its parent states and other groups in the field. Consequently, discourses made by officials are also warring alongside the fighters in the field.

I accept this clash between The Islamic State and its parent states as a zero-sum game. Hereby, the gain of one is the loss of the other and positive for one is negative for the other. It is true especially when the content of speeches of officials and policies of authorities are challenging each other. I picked the “jihadism” topic among these controversies as a research topic. Hence, my hypothesis to be tested is as follows:

Hypothesis: *“If a Jihadist de facto entity adopts a more jihadist policy than its parent state, jihadi de facto state consolidates its sovereignty.”*

3.1.3. Dependent Variable

Main dependent variable of this hypothesis is the consolidation of sovereignty which encompasses population, size of territory, law enforcement forces and institutionalism as its indicators.

3.1.3.1. Consolidation of Sovereignty

Sovereignty in international terminology is not a term clearly agreed upon in terms of definition. According to Wolff, it is “the right to command and correlatively the right to be obeyed.”⁸⁶ But in terminology, sovereignty harbors numerous components and champions of each component devised another definition for the term sovereignty.

Sovereignty comes along with being supreme and it is repeatedly stated as a notion that is absolute. Alan James argues that sovereignty cannot be non-absolute and supreme at the same time in one entity.⁸⁷ However this perception is being criticized today as the European Union example is alive in which members are in absolute sovereignty of some functions of the state apparatus while they are in non-absolute sovereignty of some.⁸⁸ Another form of distinction concerning the definition of

⁸⁶ R.P.Wolff. , *The Conflict Between Authority and Autonomy*, Basil **Blackwell Press**, Oxford, 1990, p.20

⁸⁷ Alan James, “The Practice of Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society” *Political Studies* 47(3) pp.457 pp.462-464

⁸⁸ Sovereignty, “Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy”, First published Sat May 31, 2003; substantive revision Tue Jun 8, 2010 , Retrieved 02.04.2015 ,” <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sovereignty>”

sovereignty stems from its feature of being external or internal. According this definition, while internal sovereignty points the Westphalian Sovereignty, external sovereignty points the situation where outsiders (i.e. other states) accept an entity as sovereign and showing respect to its borders and internal issues.⁸⁹

In positive international Law, sovereignty is described and its definition of sovereignty is agreed upon by the states. The Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States (1933), Article 1 explicitly defines the notion and the components.

“The State as a person of International law should possess the following qualifications:

- (a) a permanent population
- (b) a defined territory
- (c) a government and
- (d) capacity to enter into relationship with other states.”⁹⁰

It is understandable that the definition made by the League of Nations is state-centric because no single authority welcomes a *de facto* entity in expense of sovereign state system. Moreover, in international law theory there are two approaches to explain the birth of a new state and its recognition. One of them requires a general recognition whereas more accepted one states that it is only a matter of announcement.⁹¹ So, once a state is announced, its existence and meeting sine-qua-non requirements, general recognition is not sought for anymore. Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is a good model to understand what is a sovereign entity that lacks international recognition.

⁸⁹ *loc.cit.*

⁹⁰ *League of Nations Treaty Series*, vol. 165, pp. 20-43.

⁹¹ Hüseyin Pazarcı, *Uluslararası Hukuk, Turhan Kitabevi*, Ankara 2013, p.127, p.127

Apart from state-centric international law definitions, scholars generally accept that *de facto* states meet many requirements to be called as sovereign. They enjoy the internal sovereignty⁹², albeit not external, they perceive themselves as equipped with the capability and desire of entering into relations with other states⁹³ and gain recognition at the end. This paper accepts The Islamic State as a *de facto* state and accepts that The Islamic State fulfills all the requirements to be labeled as one including the lack of recognition by *de-jure* states. The Islamic State, by many aspects displays the characteristics of a *de facto* state.

Firstly, it fits the definition made by scholars with exception of seeking recognition from other states without conceding its position and status. As not all the *de facto* states seek integration into modern state system, The Islamic State has set a completely different agenda with different priorities and different target audiences. However, this situation does not vitiate the *de facto* statehood of any entity.

Secondly, *The Islamic State* shows the features of a *de facto* state in its internal policies as well. Like its other peers, it started to build original and necessary institutions ranging from universities, hospitals, bridges, fully functional courts, police forces specialized for women and ministries. This is a classic policy to be conducted by every *de facto* state.

Thirdly it has a comprehensive and coherent domestic policy and these policies are strictly abided by. This indicates that entity enjoys an order that it adopted itself as a

⁹² Perceptions of 'Security & Governance in De-Facto and Partially-Recognized States' UCL Department of Political Science , School of Public Policy, Published on 08.09.2014, <http://www.ucl.ac.uk/spp/spp-news/080914> Retrieved 02.04.15

⁹³ Scott Pegg, De Facto States in the International System , Institute of International Relations The University of British Columbia, Working Paper No 21, 1998,,p4

system to be applied. Just as an ordinary *de facto* state may adopt socialism or liberal democracy, *The Islamic State* adopted religious based *Sharia* system.

Fourthly, it has an anthem, a flag, a capital city, a professional bureaucratic structure and it is minting coins from golden, silver and copper. All these indicators show that *The Islamic State* is showing symptoms of a future Khilafa (Caliphate).

This paper accepts controlling a defined territory, establishing government, establishing order (by coercion and consent) and capacity to enter into relationship with other entities (states or NSA's) as indicators. In other words, the most agreed on indicators in the literature are selected.

For scaling and gauging the consolidation of sovereignty of The Islamic State, I use available data sources and focus on the dates between 2013-2015. Although The Islamic State proclaimed its statehood in 2014, the year 2013 is also included because The Islamic State started to rule a certain territory since this date on. On the other hand, states generally are not enthusiastic about establishing diplomatic relations with *de facto* entities. The Islamic State carries both of these attributions. It is undeniably a *de facto* state and employs an offensive discourse at its maximum. Thus, its capability and/or willingness for the establishment of diplomatic relations with other states are improbable. Based on this, I disregard the fourth verse of definition of the League of Nations in this study.

3.1.3.2 A certain and credible size of territory.

There should be a certain portion of soil under the rule of competing entity and this territorial size should make sense to be called a "country". This is one of the sine-

qua-non conditions of being a state.⁹⁴ Any *de facto* state emerges with *de facto* and *de jure* territorial claims and tries to consolidate its sovereignty within these borders. Therefore, territory is the first aim of such an entity. Territorial claims may differ in accordance with the characteristics of the state. If a *de facto* state bases its narrations and claims on ethnicity such as TRNC or Abkhazia, its borders are determined accordingly. If it is a historical or ideological *de facto* state, its borders take shape in that sense like in Transnistria or *Imarat Kavkaz*. But in any case, a heartland is a natural prerequisite for a *de facto* state. For this study, this territory is defined by the Raqqah-Mosul-Anbar triangle as the core and annexes are also taken in calculation where available and necessary.

3.1.3.3. A credible size of population

Another variable is the size of population within the given territory. If the correlation between the time and size of the population is positive, then it could be argued that *de facto* entity is displaying a desirable semblance to its target audience. The population may change with production and migration from other states and both of them show the success of a *de facto* state in the sense of population. However, in this thesis, instead of the number of foreign fighters who joined the ranks of The Islamic State, I accepted the number of civilian population as the variable.

3.1.3.4. A potent security and law enforcement force

Yet another variable is the presence of security force and law –enforcements forces. Existence of such force is a positive contribution for consolidation of a *de*

⁹⁴ League of Nations Treaty Series, Ibid.

facto state and as Caspersen stated, many of *de facto* states are heavily militarized.⁹⁵

Generally speaking regular army and specialized security forces bear more positive outcomes than untidy forces and militias. Thus in this paper, potent security and law enforcement forces meant the following:

- (a) An Armed force with regular command chain
- (b) Internal security force (i.e. Gendarme or Police)
- (c) Specialized security forces (Intelligence or other specialized fields)

These forces should be able to defend the borders and establish the internal upheavals during turmoil and should be able to cast enough deterrence during internal peace periods.

3.1.3.5 Institutionalization

Institutionalization is one of the most important indicators of the statehood and a significant supporter of the claim of sovereignty. In fact, building state-like institutions is the top priority for *de facto* states.⁹⁶ Per se, this process may be split into two subgroups. The first groups of institutions are the static ones and the second group is the dynamic one.

The dynamic condition refers to ideology, regime type, type of social, economic program, political agenda foreign policy strategy. Jeffrey Checkel states that, for *de facto* states, it is a greater chance that administrative elite has visible impact on the identity of the state comparing to a *de-jure state*.⁹⁷ Hashim Tachi and Kosovo-before

⁹⁵ Caspersen, *op.cit.* p 94

⁹⁶ Yaniv Voller, From Rebellion to de-facto Statehood: International and Transnational Sources of the Transformation of the Kurdish National Liberation Movement In Iraq Into the Kurdistan Regional Government, *London School of Economics and Political Science, Unpublished PhD Dissertation* London, 2001, p.1

⁹⁷ Jeffrey Checkel, *Ideas and International Political Change* New Haven: *Yale University Press*, 1997), p11.

announcement of the independence-, Milorad Dodik and Republica Srpska can be given as examples) Thus, if a *de facto* state is willing to adopt democracy as its own political system, it starts to build its parliament, issue laws and constitution, set up elections in democratic sense and so forth. But the absence of these would not harm the claim of *de facto* statehood.

The second one is the static condition, which refers to the necessary institutions. These are sine-qua-non for a state in the sense of 21st century. These institutions are necessary in order to establish and maintain the social, political and security requirements of the population and are important for the validity and the survival of the *de facto* state. These are armed forces, adequate education institutions, a constitution and legal mechanism of state apparatus, courts, symbols of the state (money, flag, anthem et cetera) and web of administration.

3.1.4. Independent Variables

This thesis accepts statements and releases of the Islamic State and Iraq and Syrian governmental bodies as independent variables.

3.1.4.1. Statements and Releases of The Islamic State.

As has been clearly explained in second chapter of this study, while ordinary *de facto* states propagate themselves in order to attract positive attention over their parent states, The Islamic State propagates its ideas and aims in order to attract Muslims instead of aiming to get the sympathy of the international society. In doing

so, The Islamic State uses various methods to disseminate its propagations. Below is a list of these instruments:

- (a) *Fatawa* of Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, The Caliph
- (b) *Fatawa & Speeches* of Abu Muhammad Al Adnani, The Spokesman of *The Islamic State (See Annex)*
- (c) Video Releases.
- (d) *Dabiq Magazine and ISR & ISN Periodicals.*

In order to designate the propagation and to gauge the policy of leaders of The Islamic State, the aforementioned sources are examined and. Jihadist attitude of The Islamic State is assessed.

3.1.4.2. Statements and Releases of Parent States

This study focuses on the competition between The Islamic State and its parent states, which are the Republic of Iraq⁹⁸ and the Syrian Arab Republic⁹⁹. Therefore, Jihadist discourses and policies of Iraq and Syria are examined in order to make a comparison with The Islamic State.

The following sources are used in order to get available data concerning the jihadist attitudes of the parent states:

- a) Official Statements made by Head of States
- b) Official Statements made by Ministry of Foreign Affairs

⁹⁸ From now on may be used as Iraqi Government or Iraqi Authorities et cetera.

⁹⁹

From now on may be used as Syrian Government or Syrian Authorities et cetera

- c) Public Releases regarding Jihadism
- d) Miscellaneous official materials concerning Jihadism (i.e. Treaties, website releases, reports)

CHAPTER FOUR

DE-FACTO vs DE-JURE

4.1. Historical Background: Rise of The Islamic State

On May 16, 2010 The New York Times Newspaper mentioned the name “Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi” as a name of a man who got in charge of a nearly neutralized group called *The Islamic State of Iraq*. Newspaper released this news like every other news and passed the name of al-Baghdadi on the fourth paragraph as the following:

“Unlike past statements that were often replete with florid language, Sunday’s announcement was subdued. It said the group had named Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi al-

*Husseini al-Qurashi as the new leader after consultations with the group's leaders, influential people and "opinion makers." "*¹⁰⁰

Born in 1971, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is a PhD holder in Islamic Studies from the University of Islamic Sciences in Baghdad. He was described by his friends as quiet, attached to the mosque, retiring, excellent as soccer player, owner of scholarly manners and very far away from displaying fanatic behaviors.¹⁰¹

Although he was a quiet person and established his own Islamic faction called "Jaish Ahl-as Sunnah wal Jama'ah".¹⁰² This caused him to end up in Bucca detention camp until December 2004. Although he joined the Mujahideen Shura Council in 2007, he didn't enjoy the idea of lingering amidst diversified ideas rather than a monobloc organization.

According to Iraqi security specialist Al-Hashimi, al-Baghdadi's ascension to ISI leadership was nearly agreed upon, 9 out of 11 votes of Shura Council because of three reasons;¹⁰³ Firstly, He is from Quraish Tribe that is a very eminent tribe among Middle Eastern nations thanks to it is made mention in a prophetic narration as the tribe all caliphs will come from.¹⁰⁴ Secondly, he himself was from the Shura Council, so he was not an outsider to organization and its mechanism or goals.

¹⁰⁰ Shadid, Anthon (May 16, 2010) , " Iraqi Insurgent Group Names New Leaders", <http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/16/iraqi-insurgent-group-names-new-leaders/> Retrieved 05-20-2015

¹⁰¹ Hassan ,Hassan, Weiss, Michael, " ISIS: Inside The Army of Terror", *Regan Arts*, New York, 2015 p. 87

¹⁰² *Ibid.* 89

¹⁰³ *ibid.*

¹⁰⁴ Zelin, Aaron Y, , "Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi: The Islamic State's driving force" (31 July ,2014), <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28560449> **BBC News** Retrieved , 05-20-2015

Thirdly, he was the youngest member and was charismatic. They believed that he could bring dynamism to the ISI.

After he took office in ISI, he pledged his alliance to *Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri*, Emir of al-Qa'idah. Then, he sought professional strategists and people who lost their jobs and titles and furthermore who shared same enemies with himself (Shi'a and West). At this juncture, al-Baghdadi aligned with former components of Ba'ath Party in Iraq.

Ba'ath ¹⁰⁵ Movement and Jihadi movement both suffered from Shi'ite sectarianism and US invasion and this caused members of two groups to end up in detention camps where marriage of these two ideologies happened between 2008-2010.¹⁰⁶ As the main driving force behind ever growing *The Islamic State* administration, Ba'athists and jihadists shared fundamental grounds. They had common enemies on which they converge on and Islam's role both as religion (jihadism) and culture (Ba'ath) brought them under the same banner.

Influx of ex-military and intelligence personnel helped ISI to reshape its capabilities and differentiate itself from other jihadi groups in administration, professionalism, scope, militant number and capability of conducting fatal operations. These features made ISI unchallenged among Sunni militant groups whereas Shi'ites were organizing under the banner of Muqtada al-Sadr, Quds Force and Badr Brigades. Barrett claims that this collaboration between ex-Ba'ath members and jihadists within ISI (and later on ISIS) was actually a competition and Ba'athists had the

¹⁰⁵ Meaning "Resurrection" in Arabic Language

¹⁰⁶ Barrett, Richard, "THE ISLAMIC STATE", The Soufan Group, November 2014, p26

upper hand in the administration of ISI until 2011 although jihadist wing took over the leadership later on.¹⁰⁷

ISI started to carry out deadly attacks in Iraq after a long time of solitude and regeneration. In 2011, ISI made its first coordinated attacks after US withdrawal and attacked 14 different security points leaving 69 dead¹⁰⁸ and 25 more right after a secondary attack just after US DoD officially labeled al-Baghdadi as a terrorist and put 20 Million USD bounty on his head.¹⁰⁹ In September 2012, ISI raided Tikrit prison, bombed cars in Baghdad and by the help of these attacks, regained a dominant role in Iraq especially right after US troops withdrew from Iraqi soil. All these attacks were a part of a year –long plan called “ Breaking the Walls” launched in July 2012.¹¹⁰ Main objective was to retake the territory that AQI once was over control and repelled and secondary objective was to terrorize the capital Baghdad so keeping Shi’ite busy and alerted especially in vicinity of Baghdad.

Meanwhile, opposition movements in the Syrian Arab Republic were quite strengthened by the end of 2012. Already being supported by Al-Qa’idah core and gained immense power, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi wanted to be involved in the Syrian civil war. However, in order to not alienate local people,, ISI agreed to subordinate itself under the Syrian branch of *Al-Qai’dah* to avoid its hostility. Yet another reason for such a venture was capturing the oil revenues of Syria and benefitting

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ Roggio, Bill (December 27, 2011) , “ Al Qaeda in Iraq Claims Baghdad suicide attack,bombings ”www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/12/al_qaeda_in_iraq_cla_1.php Retrieved 05-20-2015

¹⁰⁹ US Department of State Media Note, (October 4, 2011) “Terrorist Designation of Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri” <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/10/174971.htm> Retrieved 05-20-2015

¹¹⁰ Lewis, Jessica , “Al-Qeade in Iraq Resurgence : The Breaking the Wall Campaign , Part I” **Middle East Security Report** No 14, ISW, September 2013, p7

from Syrian youth ready to be recruited .as well as expanding the Iraqi front by abolishing Iraqi-Syrian border, also known as *Sykes-Picot Border*. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi sent one of his top commanders, being also his friend from Camp Bucca, Abu Muhammad Al- Julani¹¹¹ with money and fighters to Syria to form the Syrian front of ISI. In January 2012 Al-Julani founded “*Jabhat Al Nusra Li Ahli Ssham*” (mostly known as Jabhat al Nusra,) ¹¹² Within a very short period of time, Jabhat al Nusra gained great success and became one of the most powerful factions in the field and performed the most rapid growth especially in the Battle of Aleppo in early 2012 alongside with other insurgent groups. Upon conducting a very successful campaign in Syria, Jabhat al Nusra became the most popular insurgent front in Syria in the first quarter of 2013 and therefore, al-Baghdadi’s ISI released a voice record on the internet promulgating the merging of Jabhat al Nusra with ISI¹¹³. However this monumental moment was the date when The Islamic State of Iraq and Levant was proclaimed. Although *Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri* tried to be a mediator between two groups, his ties with ISIS were evidently severed in February 2014.

The year 2013 was the full throttle period of al-Baghdadi’ s group both in Syria and Iraq. In July, ISIS started to conduct their second policy in Iraq whose name was “A soldier’s Harvest” that aimed to assassinate and neutralize the Iraqi security forces and expand the territory under the control of ISIS. Similar policy was also being implemented in Syria not only against Asad’s Regime Forces¹¹⁴ but also other jihadi

¹¹¹ Golani, Juwlani, Jolani , Gulani are also used.

¹¹² Eng : The Support Front for people of Greater Syria.

¹¹³ Iraqi al-Qaeda and Syrian Group ‘merge’, (09 April 2013) <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/04/201349194856244589.html> **Aljazeera**, Retrieved 05-20-2015

¹¹⁴ Ar: Kuwwat al Nizam

groups like Ahrar Al Sham¹¹⁵ and Jabhat al Nusra especially in Aleppo and Raqqah, which then became the capital city of The Islamic State,. After a successful blitz war, ISIS claimed control over the Mosul in June 2014¹¹⁶ and annexed this territory by claiming the abolishment of *Sykes-Picot Borders*.¹¹⁷ Just few days after this shock, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced the new state called” *The Islamic State*” and the re-installation of the prophesied Khilafa¹¹⁸

From that time on, many milestones have happened for two *de-iure* states and for one *de facto* one. Beheading of James Foley, setting Jordanian pilot on fire, appearances of John Cantlie several times, siege of Ayn Al ‘Arab¹¹⁹, coalition airstrikes, assault of Iraqi ground forces with Shite militias against *The Islamic State* and so on. Nevertheless Islamic self-proclaimed Khilafa still controls vast geography, several million population and tens of thousands of armed force.

After having introduced newly founded Islamic-*de facto*- State, I will proceed to analyze jihadi discourses of The Islamic State and Iraq-Syria Axis in the following chapter.

¹¹⁵ Formed by Hasan Aboud, operates mainly on Northwestern Syria and has 15.000-25.000 armed force, considered as the driving force of Islamic Front .

¹¹⁶ Militants Seize Iraq’s second city of Mosul , (10 June 2014) <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27778112> **BBC News** Retrieved 05-20-2015

¹¹⁷ Memri, (June 11, 2014), “ISIS Celebrates Takeover of Nineveh Province, Says The “ Sykes-Picot Borders” Have Been Removed” <http://www.memrijtm.org/isis-celebrates-takeover-of-nineveh-province-says-the-sykes-picot-borders-have-been-removed.html> **MEMRI** Retrieved 05-20-2015

¹¹⁸ syn: Caliphate

¹¹⁹ The Islamic State re-named it as “ Ayn al Islam” whereas Kurdish population calls it “ Kobane”. However, I accept neither names and appreciate the official name of the village.

4.2. Independent Variables: Jihadist Discourse

As argued in the previous chapter, the independent variables of this study is jihadism. Thus, in the following section the statements and releases of the parties, which are The Islamic State, Iraq and Syria, are focused on.

4.2.1 Jihadi Discourse of *The Islamic State*

The Islamic State pays immense amounts of attention and funds for propagation and in order to reach the target masses, it employs various conduits. These are either via video messages, audio messages and sometimes via publications, booklets and songs (*nasheeds*) and by other means. I will analyze all of these instruments in order to gauge a holistic result.

4.2.1.1 Speeches of “The Caliph”

First appearance of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was at Mosul’s Great Mosque, leading congregation prayer in the 4th of July 2014¹²⁰. This date is important for two reasons: Firstly it is the first time ever Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was seen while actually making a speech before leading the prayer during the Holy Ramadhan Month in the Iraqi city of Mosul. Secondly, time that was chosen was especially important because it is actually the “independence day” of the United States of America.

¹²⁰ Prothero, Mitchell, (6 July 2014) , “The Islamic State releases video of Baghdadi in Mosul in new assertion of authority”
<http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2014/07/06/232422/islamic-state-releases-video-of.html> Retrieved 05-22-2015

Expectedly, 21 minutes 03 seconds long sermon's content was about the newly founded state and expectations from the "ummah".

7:04-7:29 : *Ramadhan is a month in which the market of Jihad (**souq al Jihad**) is prepared. Therefore, The Prophet, may peace and salutations upon him, would prepare brigades and armies to fight the enemies of Allah and perform Jihad against the polytheists (**mushrikoon**). So, seize the opportunity of this noble month, O slaves of Allah, by obeying Him. For in this month, reward is multiplied.*¹²¹¹²²

He continues as following:

7:49-8:13 : *Allah Tebaraka and Teala ordered us to fight His enemies and perform Jihad in the path of Allah (**fi sabeelillahi**) to establish this oneness (**tawheed**)¹²³ and establish the religion.*” And after these words he continues his sermon by reciting the verse : “*And fight them until there is no fitnah and until the religion , all of it, is of Allah’s. And if they cease, then indeed, Allah is seeing all what they do.*”¹²⁴¹²⁵

9:09-9:43 : *Indeed your brothers the mujahideen were blessed with victory by Allah tabaraka and Ta’ala and we are blessed with consolidation after long years of jihad, patience and fighting the enemies of Allah. Allah guided them and strengthened them to establish this goal. Therefore they rushed to announce the Khilafah and*

¹²¹ D Bret. “English subtitles of full sermon by ISIS's Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi, Caliph of the "The Islamic State" <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PxJSm7XwxqA> **YouTube**, 12 July 2014, Web, Retrieved 05-22-2015

¹²² **Bold** and underlined styles are inputted by me. While bold words are for translation , words are underlined to attract special attention to the word.

¹²³ Although *tawheed* in dictionary means “ oneness”, in terminology it directly points the Religion of Islam and main dynamics of it.

¹²⁴ Holy Qur’an, Sura al Anfal Verse 39

¹²⁵ Bret, *Ibid*.

appoint an imam. This is an obligation upon Muslims and an obligation abandoned for centuries and disappeared from the face of the earth.

12:17- 13:19 “If you want Allah’s promise, then perform jihad fi sabeelillah. Incite the believers and be patient upon this hardship. If you knew what was in jihad, a reward, honor, loftiness and might in this world and afterlife, none of you would sit back or remain behind abandoning jihad. It is the trade Allah guided to. He saved the people from humiliation by it. And He attached honor to it (jihad) in this world and afterlife. It is that you believe in Allah and His messenger, and perform jihad in the path of Allah with your wealth and your lives. This is the best for you, if you should know. He will forgive you for your sins, and admit you to a garden under which rivers flow, that is the great triumph.”

Although entire speech revolves around acknowledging the importance of the establishing a state, the correlation between performing jihad against enemies and helping the state (consolidating it) is pointed out.

The second speech where al-Baghdadi addressed the people is called “ *Although the Disbelievers Despise*” (**Walaw Kareehal Kaferuun**). It is released both as video and audio separately and uploaded to internet on November 13, 2014 by official media outlet of The Islamic State “*Muassasatul Al Furqan*” Media Outlet. Name of the video is adopted from the Qur’anic Verse Surat at- Tawbah (**Repentance**) Verse 32 that says

“They want to extinguish the light of Allah with their mouths, but Allah refuses except to perfect His light, Although the disbelievers despise it”

Video Release is 16 minutes and 55 seconds long. The main concern of this speech is struggling and fighting. Some quotations are as follows:

00:56-01:09: *Allah - 'azza w jall- has enjoined fighting upon us as He enjoined prayer and fasting. For He -subhana w ta'ala said : " Fighting has been enjoined upon you while it is hateful to you"*¹²⁶¹²⁷

01:19-01:31 : *"Allah –Tabaraka w ta'ala- also made Jihad the best of deeds and the peak of Islam. He –subhanallah- placed the honor of the Muslims in Jihad and imposed humiliation upon them for abandoning it."*

01:52:02:24 : *"Allah –('azza w Jall) also prepared a painful torment for those who stay back from Jihad. He (te'ala) said : " If you do not go forth, He will punish you with a painful punishment and will replace you with another people and you will not harm Him at all."*¹²⁸ *He ordered all with jihad without making exception for anyone. For He ('azza wa Jall) said " Go forth, whether light or heavy".*¹²⁹ *Allah (subhanallah) ordered with fighting in all conditions, even if only one mujahid were left."*

As can be seen, al-Baghdadi stressed three points in first 150 seconds which are:

1) Importance of implementing Jihad

2) Reward and necessity of Jihad and

¹²⁶ Holy Qur'an ,Al-Baqarah-216

¹²⁷ "Walaw Kareehan Kaferuun, no upload time https://videos.files.wordpress.com/V1rhjaVu/baghdadi_dvd.mp4 Retrieved 05-23-2015 (Video is uploaded in Arabic Language with no subtitles)

¹²⁸ Holy Qur'an- At Tawbah-39

¹²⁹ Holy Qur'an At-Tawbah -41

3) Threat of abandoning jihad whether old or young & much or few.

In the following section, al-Baghdadi creates a causal link between previous paragraphs and the situation in which the Islamic Nation is in, in order to encourage all Muslims to participate in Jihad. He continues :

02:24:03:48 *“Thus, it is upon the Muslims to understand well and realize that fighting is obligatory upon each individual from amongst them, and that Jihad is the best of the deeds and the peak of Islam.! Their Honour and sublimity is by it, as their wellbeing in the world and hereafter. Their humiliation, failure and degradation are by abandoning it as well as their torment in the world and hereafter. They must also realize that Allah (‘azza wa Jall) will aid the mujahideen. This is inevitable. And thus, for his reason the soldiers of The Islamic State fight.! They fight in obedience to Allah and to gain closeness to Him (subhanah wa ta’ala). They will never abandon fighting”*

After making a point about the necessity of performing Jihad, al-Baghdadi promotes The Islamic State and shows it as the primary and the only address to perform it as can be seen above. After this, he started to point and define the enemy. As follows :

04:41:05:12 *“And despite this Crusade (**Saleebeen**) being from the most severe and fiercest of them, it is yet but the most failing and disappointing. We see America and its allies stumbling between fear, weakness , inability and failure. America, Europe, Canada, Australia, their apostate¹³⁰ tails and slaves from amongst the*

¹³⁰ *Murtadd* (Apostate), comes from the arabic root “ ridda” means leaving, staying out. So, Murtad here is pointing a group of people who used to be considered as Muslims but after their actions, they lost thier recognition by it.

rulers of the Muslims' lands were terrified by The Islamic State. The Jews were frightened.”

07:48-07:58: “America and its allies are terrified, weak and powerless. Due to their fear and weakness, the Jews covertly and stealthily participate in this crusade.”

09:04-09:32 “The leaders of the Jews, Crusaders, apostates, their devils, chiefs and seniors gathered. They thought, calculated, planned, plotted and schemed for a war against The Islamic State. Then they came out with a failing plan manifested by bombarding the positions, battalions, vehicles and soldiers of The Islamic State with the purpose of preventing its advance and march.”

al-Baghdadi, after defining the enemies and their collaborators both among Muslims and non-Muslim communities, proceeds to talking about the situation in the field which he describes as “ a certain defeat for them”. And continues to talk about “glad tidings”

10:35-10:48 : “And indeed the Muslims will be victorious. By Allah’s promise, they will be victorious. And the march of the mujahideen will continue until they reach to Rome, by Allah’s permission. Therefore, be assured, O Muslims, and glad tidings.!”

After mentioning the futility of anti-IS campaign, al-Baghdadi calls all Muslims on the Earth for armed struggle as follows :

11:17-16:55 “(Some parts are cut) Glad tidings O Muslims, for we give you good news by announcing the expansion of The Islamic State to new lands. To lands of Al-

Haramain¹³¹ and Yemen. to Egypt, Libya and Algeria. We announce the acceptance of the bay'ah¹³² in those lands.

*So O sons of Al-Haramayn, O people of tawheed, O people of walâ and Barâ.¹³³ The serpent's head and the stronghold of the disease are beside you! Thus, draw your swords and break their sheaths. Divorce the Dunya , for there will be no security nor rest for Âl Salûl (**Crusaders**) and their soldiers after today. Draw your swords deal with the rafidha¹³⁴ first, wherever you find them! Deal with the rafidha, al – Salul and their soldiers.... be patient, do not hasten. Soon, godwilling, the vanguards of The Islamic State will reach you! (addressing to the Yemeni People:) Be harsh against the Houthi¹³⁵ rafidah for they are kuffar apostates. Fight them and overcome them. Be certain that their turn is coming and it will be in your favor for the rafidah are a forsaken nation”*

As can be explicitly seen, this recording aims to define Jihad, and its religious framework and to clarify the goals and enemies. The most crucial points about this recording is that al-Baghdadi openly and clearly classifies the enemies under 4 categories as follows :

- 1) United States, European States and their allies
- 2) Jewish community and the State of Israel

¹³¹ Holy cities of Mecca and Madinah

¹³² religious pledge of allegiance

¹³³ religious terms that imply “ to love for Allah what He loves and to hate for Allah what he Hates.

¹³⁴ “Rafidha” in dictionary means “ the ones who reject” but in terminology it is the other name of Shi’a. Also can be used as “ Rafidhiyya”

¹³⁵ named after the Houthi tribe, a *Imamiyya Shi’a* currently fighting against Zaydi Shia and Sunni’s.

- 3) Secular regimes controlling Muslim soil and population
- 4) Shi'a

And secondly it calls all Muslims for armed struggle of which reward is immense and torment it is as immense respectively for those who participate and those who don't. Thus, this speech constitutes a monumental milestone for the "jihadi discourse" made by a top rank of *The Islamic State* authority.

Another speech delivered by al-Baghdadi is named "*March Forth, whether light or heavy!*" Name of recording is derived from a Qur'anic verse mentioned in Sura At-Tawbah as follows: "*March Forth whether light or heavy and perform Jihad in the path of Allah with your wealth and lives and this is better for you if only you know so.*" Audio recording lasts 34 minutes and 47 seconds long. It is uploaded to internet on the 14th of May, 2015 in Arabic language.

04:42-05:04 : "*O Muslim! O you who claims to love Allah (the Mighty and Majestic), and claims to love His Prophet (peace be upon him) If you are truthful in your claim, then obey your beloved and fight for the cause of Allah, and emulate your beloved (peace be upon him), and do not die except as a mujāhid for the cause of Allah.*"¹³⁶

06:44-07:12 : "*Indeed, your Lord has made jihād for the cause of Allah obligatory upon you and has commanded you to fight His enemies so that He may forgive your sins, raise you in rank, take from among you martyrs, purify the believers, and destroy the disbelievers. Otherwise, He Himself (the Glorified) is capable of prevailing over them. But it is in order to test you*".

¹³⁶ Audio is released anonymously on "<http://justpaste.it/Infiro>" web adress on 14th of May 2015.

07:45-08:05 *“O Muslims! Whoever thinks that it is within his capacity to conciliate with the Jews, Christians, and other disbelievers, and for them to conciliate with him, such that he coexists with them and they coexist with him while he is upon his religion and upon tawhīd, then he has belied the explicit statement of his Lord.”*

09:43-10:22 : *“O Muslims! Do not think the war that we are waging is The Islamic State’s war alone. Rather, it is the Muslims’ war altogether. It is the war of every Muslim in every place, and The Islamic State is merely the spearhead in this war. It is but the war of the people of faith against the people of disbelief, so march forth to your war O Muslims. March forth everywhere, for it is an obligation upon every Muslim who is accountable before Allah. And whoever stays behind or flees, Allah (the Mighty and Majestic) will be angry with him and will punish him with a painful torment.”*

11:07 -11:31 *“So there is no excuse for any Muslim who is capable of performing Hijrah to The Islamic State, or capable of carrying a weapon where he is, for Allah (the Blessed and Exalted) has commanded him with hijrah¹³⁷ and Jihād, and has made fighting obligatory upon him. And we call upon every Muslim in every place to perform hijrah to The Islamic State or fight in his land wherever that may be.”*

16:48 :17:40 *“O Muslims, the apostate tyrannical rulers who rule your lands in the lands of the Two Holy Sanctuaries (Mecca and Medina), Yemen, Shām (the Levant), Iraq, Egypt, North Africa, Khorasan, the Caucasus, the Indian Subcontinent, Africa, and elsewhere, are the allies of the Jews and Crusaders. Rather, they are their*

¹³⁷ Migration to a place where Islamic rule is applied or going to a place in order to participate in Islamic affairs ranging from education to military service.

slaves, servants, and guard dogs, and nothing else. The armies that they prepare and arm and which the Jews and Crusaders train are only to crush you, weaken you, enslave you to the Jews and Crusaders, turn you away from your religion and the path of Allah, plunder the goods of your lands, and rob you of your wealth. This reality has become as obvious as the sun in the middle of the day.”

As can be apparently seen, authorities of mentioned lands are named as dogs and slaves of Jews and Christians and they should be toppled. This is an explicit call for armed struggle against these authorities.

21:56-22:42- *“O Muslims everywhere, has the time not come for you to realize the truth of the conflict and that it is between disbelief and faith? See on which front the rulers of your lands stand and to which camp they belong. Has the time not come O Ahlus-Sunnah for you to know that you alone are the targets? This war is only against you and against your religion. Has the time not come for you to return to your religion and your jihād and thereby bring back your glory, honor, rights, and leadership? Has the time not come for you to know that there is no might nor honor nor safety nor rights for you except in the shade of the Caliphate?”*

24:46-24:58 *“So seek shelter – after Allah – with The Islamic State. What do you wait for after the truth has become clearer than the day and after the spiteful Rāfidah exposed their reality?”*

The final paragraph above is indeed a brief summary of the entire speech. al-Baghdadi is defining the Saudi Kingdom, USA and coalition, Iran, Israel and its parent states (Syria and Iraq) as enemies. His ever-repeating stress is on Shi’a (he

uses a more special name “ Rafidha” or “ Rafidhiyya”) and calls for hijrah and performing jihad.

Another message from al-Baghdadi is named “A message to the Mujahideen and to the Islamic Ummah in the month of Ramadan.” Release is uploaded to Internet by al-Furqan Media Outlet on 1st of July, 2014¹³⁸ and lasts 19 minutes 53 seconds. He continues to repeat his messages on calling for armed struggle and performing jihad.

03:46- 04:16 “And there is no deed in this virtuous month or in any other month better than jihad in the path of Allah,so take advantage of this opportunity and walk the path of you righteous predecessors. Support the religion of Allah through jihad in the path of Allah. Go forth, O mujahidin in the path of Allah. Terrify the enemies of Allah and seek death in the places where you expect to find it, for the dunyā (worldly life) will come to an end, and the hereafter will last forever.”¹³⁹

06:42- 06:46 “So take up arms, take up arms, O soldiers of The Islamic State! And fight, fight!”

09:37-09:45 “So listen, O ummah of Islam. Listen and comprehend. Stand up and rise. For the time has come for you to free yourself from the shackles of weakness, and stand in the face of tyranny, against the treacherous rulers – the agents of the crusaders and the atheists, and the guards of the Jews”

¹³⁸ Anjarini Suhaib, (July 2 2014) “ Al Baghdadi following in bin Laden’s footsteps.” <http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/20400>” Retrieved 05-23-2015

¹³⁹ الأفر قبل مؤسمة : Al-Furqaan Media, (01.07.2014) “A Message to the Mujahideen and the Muslim Ummah – Al Sheikh al Baghdaadi” https://archive.org/details/bghdd_20140701 Retrieved 05-23-2015

15:08- 15:20 “Therefore, rush O Muslims to your state. Yes, it is your state. Rush, because Syria is not for the Syrians, and Iraq is not for the Iraqis. The earth is Allah’s.”

15:32-15:43 “O Muslims everywhere, whoever is capable of performing hijrah (emigration) to The Islamic State, then let him do so, because hijrah to the land of Islam is obligatory.”

As can be seen clearly, al-Baghdadi is building his speeches on major themes which are identical or very similar to each other in speeches. He stresses that there is a legitimate The Islamic State and western states, Gulf states and other regimes in the region as well as local forces as enemies which should be destroyed. Muslims have a country and they are obliged to make *hijrah* there and participate in the act of jihad. The Shi’a is the primary enemy and Iraqi and Syrian forces are as well. Not so obvious in the former speeches but it is obvious in later ones that al-Baghdadi starts to make mention of how well institutionalized the newly-founded state and self-sufficient it is to be victorious. Speeches actually designed in with a recurring pattern and that pattern has indispensable parts. These parts can be said to have become meta narratives for the group and are the evidence *The Islamic State* is built on prophetic way and equipped with prophetic goals, it is persistent on soil and Muslims are obliged to support it with their belongings and their lives. They must also participate in Jihad alongside *The Islamic State* against the designated enemy Shi’a, Nusayri Regime, Crusaders (USA and coalition), and apostate regimes. Thus, it tries to be a focus and command center for all those jihadist group outside. This ambition and discourse causes two great challenges for the IS. First one is that it creates a challenge against its parent states, Iraq and Syria namely. Secondly, it

creates a challenge against other jihadi factions like *Al-Qai'dah* , *Taleban*, *Ahrar-ush Sham* and so on. Harith Hasan al-Qarawee says in his study that The Islamic State's messages vary according to who is uttering them. For major topics, key leaders are in charge and for daily issues and miscellaneous topics, it is the duty of lower rank leaders to make comment on them or they are mentioned in booklets etc.¹⁴⁰ Next section will be about the well-known publication: *Dabiq*.

4.2.1.3. “Dabiq” : A publication As a Secondary Source for Invitation to Jihad

Propaganda by printed publication is not a novelty among jihadi groups at all. Since the Iraqi War, such groups have been disseminating their ideas and calling youngsters for armed struggle. Furthermore they have been giving hints and tips for home-made ammunition and weaponry. *Al-Fursa,n*, *Sada al Rafidayn*, *Inspire*, *Al-Malahem*, *Ihya e Khilafat*, *Resurgence*, *Palestine*, *Benefit of The Day*, *Azan* and many more could be given as examples. Although al-Qa'idaism has adopted such manner in the field, The Islamic State has made it even more complicated and maybe more successful under the name of *Dabiq*. Name of the magazine is purposefully selected. It has a history and a prophetic narration as follows. : “*Abu Huraira reported Allah's Messenger (may peace be upon him) as saying: The Last Hour would not come until the Romans would be defeated at a land at al-A'maq or*

¹⁴⁰ Harith Hasan al-Qarawee., The Discourse of ISIS: Messages, Propaganda and Indroctrination” *Twitter and Jihad : The Communication Strategy of ISIS*, Monica Maggioni & Paolo Magri(ed.) *ISPI Press* , Milano , 2015,

in Dabiq....”¹⁴¹ And this name is made mentioned by Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi previously and by *Jihadi John* when announcing the beheading of Peter Kassig as the following :

*“The spark has been lit here in Iraq, and its heart will continue intensify- by Allah’s permission-until it burns the crusader armies in Dabiq. We are burying first American crusader here, in Dabiq and eagerly waiting for the rest of your armies.”*¹⁴²¹⁴³

Dabiq’s first issue is released only one month after the invasion of Mosul, precisely on 5th of July 2014 ¹⁴⁴and up until now (July 2015) 10 issues have been printed and released. It should be born in mind that unlike the speeches made by key leaders, articles *Dabiq* Magazine are less direct and propagate jihadism in indirect ways/ It shouldalso be noted that this study did not cite from each issue but rather created a dataset of 4 random issues.

4.2.1.3.1 Issue 1: The Return of Khilafah

"On the Page 10 , under the title of “ The world had divided into two camps” : “ Amirul Mu’minin ¹⁴⁵ said :

¹⁴¹ Sahih Muslim, “Kitab Al Fitan wa Ashrat As Sa’ah.” Hadith no : 6924

¹⁴² Cyphre, Louis , (January 13, 2015) , “ Onthoofding van Peter Kassig Abdul Rahman 16 November 2014” <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dn8nwPRVf5g> **YouTube** Retrieved 05-25-2015

¹⁴³ As can be seen, this commentary consists of 2 sentences. It must be pointed that first sentence is completely belong to al-Zarqawi when he was performing his beheading in Iraq.

¹⁴⁴ Monica Maggioni. “ The Islamic State: Not That Surprising If You Know Where to Look” Twitter and Jihad : The Communication Strategy of ISIS, Monica Maggioni & Paolo Magri(ed.) *ISPI Press* , Milano , 2015, p 72

¹⁴⁵ En: Leader of the Muslims. Firstly adopted by Umar bin Khattab when he took Office of leadership and it became a synonym of “ Kaliph” after him.

“ O Ummah of Islam, indeed the world today has been divided into two camps and two trenches, with who third camp present: The camp of the Muslims and the camp of kufr (disbelief) and hypocrisy.- the camp of the Muslims and the mujahidin everywhere and the camp of the jews, the crusaders, their allies and with them the rest of the nations and religious of kufr, all being led by America and Russia and being mobilized by the Jews.”

On the same page under the title of “ A Call to Hijah” : “ Amirul Mu’minin said : *Therefore, rush O Muslims to your state. Yes, it is your state. Rush, because Syria is not for the Syrians and the Iraq is not for Iraqis. The State is for all Muslim, all the Muslims. O Muslims Everywhere, whoever is capable of performing hijrah to The Islamic State then let him do so because hijrah to the land of Islam is obligatory”.*

On the same page under the title of “ A Call to All Muslim Doctors, Engineers, Scholars and Specialists” : Amirul-Mu’minin said:

“We make a special call to the scholars, fuqaha’ (experts in Islamic jurisprudence), and callers, especially the judges, as well as people with military, administrative, and service expertise, and medical doctors and engineers of all different specializations and fields. We call them and remind them to fear Allah, for their emigration is wajib ‘ayni (an individual obligation), so that they can answer the dire need of the Muslims for them. People are ignorant of their religion and they thirst for those who can teach them and help them understand it. So fear Allah, O slaves of Allah.”

On the page 27 under the title of “ The Islamic State Is A True Imamah”¹⁴⁶ “ *And upon them (Islamic scholars) is to understand that The Islamic State -on account of what Allah has blessed it with victory, consolidation and establishing the religion-is regarded as an unquestionable imamah. As such, anyone who rebels against its*

¹⁴⁶ Imam, in Arabic language means “ leader” but in such context used in the magazine, it is political, religious and military leadership combined in one person or one entity.

authority inside its territory is considered a renegade, and it is permissible to fight him after establishing the hujjah¹⁴⁷ against him.”

4.2.1.3.2 Issue 2 : *The Flood*

On the Page 3 under the “Foreword” it is written

“ First priority is to perform hijrah from wherever you are to The Islamic State, from dârul-kufr to dârul-islâm. Secondly, if you cannot perform hijrah for whatever extraordinary reason, then try in your location to organize bay’ât (pledges of allegiance) to the Khalīfah Ibrāhīm.¹⁴⁸ Publicize them as much as possible. Gather people in the masājid, Islamic centers, and Islamic organizations, for example, and make public announcements of bay’ah. Try to record these bay’āt and then distribute them through all forms of media including the Internet. It is necessary that bay’ah becomes so common to the average Muslim that he considers those holding back as grossly abnormal. This effort, inshā’allah, will encourage Islamic groups to abandon their partisanship and also announce their bay’ah to the Khalīfah Ibrāhīm.”

On the pages 18-19 under the title of “ Hijrah and Jihad” it is written that

“Allah’s Messenger (Sallallahu alayhi wa sallam) said , “ Hijrah will not cease as long as there is jihad” Allah’s Messenger (Sallallahu alayhi wa sallam) said, “ Shaytan sat in wait for the son of Adam upon the roads. He sat in wait for him on the path of Islam and said “Will you accept Islam, leave your religion and the religion of your forefathers! So he disobeyed him and accepted Islam. Then he sat in wait for him upon the path of hijrah and said, ‘Will you emigrate and abandon your land and your sky? The muhājir is like a horse fastened by a rope to a peg!’ So he disobeyed him and emigrated. Then he sat in wait for him upon the path of jihād and said, ‘Its exhaustion of oneself and one’s wealth; you’ll fight and be killed. Your wife will be married [after you],and your wealth will be divided.’ So he disobeyed him and performed jihād. Whoever does this of them and then dies or is killed or drowns or is stomped upon to death by his riding animal, it is then incumbent upon Allah to enter him into Jannah”.

¹⁴⁷ Clarifying his error to him with religious evidences.

¹⁴⁸ Referring to al-Baghdadi

4.2.1.3.3. Issue 3 : *A Call to Hijrah*

On the page 26 under the title of “ Introduction: Hijrah from Hypocrisy to Sincerity”

it is written that

“Therefore, every Muslim professional who delayed his jihad in the past under the pretense of studying Shari’ah, medicine, or engineering etc., claiming he would contribute to Islam later with his expertise, should now make it number one priority to repent and answer the call to hijrah especially after the establishment of the Khilafah. This Khilafah is more in need than ever before for experts, professionals and specialists who can help contribute in strengthening its structure and tending to the need of their Muslim brothers. Otherwise, his claims will become a greater proof against him on Judgment Day. As for the Muslim students who use this same pretense now to continue abandoning the obligation of the era, then they should know that their hijrah from darul kufr to darul Islam is more obligatory and urgent than (than) spending an unknown number years studying while exposed to doubts and desires that will destroy their religion and thus end for themselves any possible future of jihad.”

On the page 27, under the title “ Part 2: The Fear of Hypocrisy” it is written that :

“So abandoning hijrah – the path to jihād – is a dangerous matter. In effect, one is thereby deserting jihād and willingly accepting his tragic condition of being a hypocritical spectator. He lives in the West amongst the kuffār for years, spends hours on the Internet, reads news and posts on forums, only to be encompassed by the verse, {They think the parties have not [yet] withdrawn. And if the parties should come [again], they would wish they were in the desert among the Bedouins, inquiring [from afar] about your news. And if they should be among you, they would not fight except for a little} [Al-Ahzāb: 20]. One should ask himself, “What is the assurance that I’m not encompassed by this verse or others like it?” “Ask yourself, “What is the assurance that Allah did not dislike my being dispatched? Maybe He saw in me a trait of hypocrisy which I cannot see, and therefore He banned me from jihād?” This constant feeling of self-doubt should destroy one’s insides. In the recent past, sincere Muslims would weep and pray daily for an escape from the lands of qu’ūd (abandonment of jihād) to the lands of jihād, even if to live only as a soldier in constant wait for the opportunity to battle. They

would dream of going to Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, Chechnya, Algeria, Somalia, and Waziristan, but to no avail. They knew that the only way for a man claiming a mustard seed of faith in his heart to preserve his faith would be to leave the West. Before, such an idea might have sounded impossible for some, but now there is a Khilāfah prepared to accept every Muslim and Muslimah into its lands and do all it can within its power to protect them while relying on Allah alone.”

On the page 31 under the name of “There Is No Life Without Jihad” “Jihad not only grants life on the larger scale of the Ummah, it also grants a fuller life on the scale of the individual. This life of Jihad is not possible until you pack and move to the Khilafah.”

On the page 37 under the title of “ Advice for Those Embarking Upon Hijrah” it is written that

“ So do not say to yourself “ I will never succeed in my hijrah” Most of those who have tried, have successfully reached the Khilafah. Amongst them are those who travelled by land, sometimes on foot, from country to country, crossing border after border and Allah brought them safely to the Khilafah. Do not worry about money or accommodation for yourself and your family. There are plenty of homes and resources to cover you and your family”

4.2.1.3.4. Issue 4 : The Failed Crusade

On the page 10 under the title “My Provision Was Placed For Me In the Shade Of My Spear” it is written that

“This hadīth indicates that Allah did not send His messenger to endeavor to seek the dunyā, nor to gather the dunyā and its treasures, nor to strive to seek its causes, rather He sent him as a caller to His tawhīd with the sword. What is implied by this is that he kills Allah’s enemies who refuse to accept tawhīd, legitimizes the spilling of their blood and the taking of their wealth, and enslaves their women and children, and thereby his provision becomes what Allah has given him of spoils from the property of His enemy. This is because wealth was created by Allah for the children of Adam only to assist them in obeying and worshipping Him. So whoever uses it to assist himself in kufr of Allah and shirk with Him, then Allah will give mastery to His Messenger and his followers over him, so that they seize it from him and return it back to one who is more worthy than him from the people who worship Allah, practice tawhīd of Him, and submit obediently towards Him. For this reason their wealth is called fay’ [the root of the word means to restore or return], because it returns to one who is more deserving of it and it returns to the usage for which it was created.”

On the page 44 under the title of “ Rush to Support Your State O Muslim” it is written that “ *Every Muslim should get out of his house, find a crusader, and kill him. It is important that the killing becomes attributed to patrons of The Islamic State who have obeyed its leadership. This can easily be done with anonymity. Otherwise, crusader media makes such attacks appear to be random killings. Secrecy should be followed when planning and executing any attack. The smaller the numbers of those involved and the less the discussion beforehand, the more likely it will be carried out without problems. One should not complicate the attacks by involving other parties, purchasing complex materials, or communicating with weak-hearted individuals. “Rely upon Allah and stab the crusader” should be the battle cry for all The Islamic State patrons. Finally, do not forget that Allah is with the Muslims and will never abandon them to His enemies. And The Islamic State will remain until its banner flies over Rome.*”

Dabiq Magazine has ten issues so far. In addition to the aforementioned issues, there are also “*Remaining and Expanding*” , “ *Al Qai’dah of Waziristan : A Testimony From Within*”, “ *From Hypocrisy to Apostasy : The Extinction of the Greyzone*”, “ *Shari’ah Alone will Rule Africa*” “ *They Plot and Allah Plots*” and “*The Law of Allah or the Laws of Men*” issues. It should be noted that The Islamic State has several more magazines like *ISR* and *ISN* in English, *Tevhid* and *Konstantiniyye* in Turkish and moreover it has video releases too.

4.2.1.4 HD Video Releases

The Islamic State did something not any other Jihadi organization has done before, which is professionally shot video-movies and documentary series. Some of which are about beheadings and exerting penalties whereas some others are to show force and propagate the current situation in the territories under the control of The Islamic State. Repeating the theme in the speeches, sermons and magazines could be easily found in video releases filmed and uploaded by al-Hayat Media Outlet, main media source of The Islamic State. Thus, the final instrument of The Islamic State is to

make propaganda through videos uploaded to Internet, diffused by the help of the social media.

Although The Islamic State has numerous uploads, the most popular ones are examined. First video is “Flames of War”. The quotations below indicate how The Islamic State underscores its jihadist attitude.

00:14-00:48 *“In the face of the dark wave of the crusader force. The historical land of two rivers bore life to a mission that would transform the political landscape of the world.*

A mission that would herald the return to the khilafah and revive the creed of tawheed. It was the establishment of The Islamic State nourished by the blood of the truthful mujahedeen to unite the ummah on one calling, one banner, one leader.”

02:23-02:33 *“ As the ravenous flame continued spreading, roaring in the fuel of nusayri blood. The flames in Iraq, meanwhile continued their crawl, growing stronger, leaving the Americans in bewilderment.”*

31:11-32:16 *“Allah continued to humiliate the enemies of The Islamic State, especially in Iraq where the deviant Safawi forces and their high-tech U.S. weaponry were up against the mujahidin.*

The brothers were relentless in their attack as the flames of war took their toll on the Safawi forces”

54:37-55:07 *“ al-Baghdadi : Finally, this is a message that we direct to America. Know, O defender of the cross, that a proxy war won't help you in Sham just as it didn't help you in Iraq. As for the near future, you will be forced into a direct confrontation, with Allah's permission, despite your reluctance. And the sons of Islam have prepared themselves for this day, so wait and see, for we too are also going to wait and see.”*

There is also a video series called “Saleel As Sawarim”¹⁴⁹ produced as a propaganda series . This series was shockingly successful for The Islamic State as it caught the attention of the masses. On march 17, 2014¹⁵⁰ when the fourth and final version of this series was uploaded to the internet, it reached the peak in terms of tweets, watch count and mentions online. Video series are basically about the IS attacks launched on Iraqi ground forces or assassinations of local political leaders. Launch on al-Anbar, Fallujah can be seen here. The IS forces deployed and employed HD drones to shoot film and gave detailed information about martyrdom attacks reported by these vehicles. And it also has a section for “inviting people to repentance”

It can be seen from the statistics that the Islamic State’s graphic of twitter-based propaganda campaign is more than successful. Reaching to approximately 2000 tweets per hour after each video release¹⁵¹ Islamic State’s campaign is also dominating top tiers of the trending lists of Twitter. The most frequently used hashtag is “Saleel as sawarim- rabi” (rabi’ meaning “four”), second one is “ The Islamic State in Iraq and Levant” , and third one is “ The Islamic State”¹⁵²

In the final analysis, The Islamic State has launched an aggressive war against its enemies by using the means of popular culture and media. It is safe to posit that The Islamic State maintains this war by three channels, which are speeches delivered by key leaders, video releases in numerous genres and magazines in several languages. All of these instruments are analyzed in this chapter. Thus, it can be argued that The Islamic State explicitly describes and categorizes its enemy. These categories are

¹⁴⁹ Clanging of The Swords

¹⁵⁰ Prucha, Nico, (19th May 2014) “ Is This the Most Successful Release of a Jihadis Video Ever?” <http://www.jihadica.com/is-this-the-most-successful-release-of-a-jihadist-video-ever/> Retrieved 2015-05-27

¹⁵¹ *Ibid*

¹⁵² *Ibid.*

repeatedly mentioned by such sources. Of those, parent states –Iraq and Syria- are defined not only as enemies in the field but also their ideologies and their creed (Shi’a, Rafidhiyya and Nusayri) are regarded as a target. These names and enemy description have been indicated without leaving any doubt about it. Therefore, it would not be wrong to argue that The Islamic State aims to gain upper hand against its enemies in terms of jihadist discourse.

In the next section, the discourses of the parent states, Iraq and Syria regarding jihadism is examined in order to make a comparative analysis.

4.2.2. Jihadi Discourse of Parent States

As mentioned previously, discourses of the ruling elite in The Islamic State’s parent states is also analyzed. Because the time span of this thesis is between the years 2013-2015, I will focus on this time period. Although there are many speeches by low rank authorities or semi-official institutions, I will only reflect official statements of the ruling elite.

4.2.2.1. The Republic of Iraq

President of the Republic of Iraq, Fuad Masum” on April 23rd, 2015 , had a speech in Turkey under the title of “ *President of the Republic calls of the people and the nations of the world to stop one man to eliminate the curse of terrorism*” He said “ *The curse of our times in which we live is that extremism and terrorism which violence is currently being practiced in the name of religion and sectarianism. The*

worst example of this group is Da'esh¹⁵³ (IS) who reached their hatred and obscurantism even to the effects of our cherished population and our people and besides peoples of the all world, humanitarian values and human dignity and the right to live and right to believe.”¹⁵⁴

He also continued in the same meeting “We stand for solidarity and unified position against this terrible calamity, which cannot be repelled if we neglect to consider joint action and responsibility.”¹⁵⁵

President Masum, on 6th of August 2014 made a similar speech when he met Undersecretary of Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Baghdad. He said “In another aspect of the meeting, I warn you about serious terrorist plots organized by Da'esh in the region adding that the fight against this organization requires effort in which everyone co-operates to stop extension of this obscurantist thought.”¹⁵⁶

President of Iraq uttered similar words in his well-known interview with Michael Gordon, National Security Correspondent of *New York Times*, in 26th of September 2014. Masum said “How did this terrorist organization come about? When we go back in history, we find that there were many similar organizations practicing terrorism, while the group of (inaudible) in the past, they were—they used to drug the youth, brainwash them, and make death as something that they should wish for through giving them baseless dreams. So they used to carry out suicide attacks.

¹⁵³ AdDawlat al Islamiyya fil ‘Iraqi wa ash Sham (capital letters of the name of the group makes Da’esh)

¹⁵⁴ “ (April 23, 2015) , لإرهاب آفة على لقضاءل وخذ رجل وقفة إلى العالم ونول شعوب يدعو الجمهورية ر نين <http://presidency.iq/> ر نين-دعوا لجمهورية- ر نين” Retrieved 2015-05-27

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

- ر نين <http://presidency.iq/> , (August 6th 2014), ” الإهابية دهى مخططك بنو العالم المظقة دول يذدر معصوم الرشن“¹⁵⁶ <http://presidency.iq/> ر نين-دعوا لجمهورية- ر نين” Retrieved 2015-27-05

Many times, a lot of these terrorist practices were in the name of religion or in the name of sect. And there was mixed—and terrorist acts were mixed between religious sectarian and political.”¹⁵⁷

He also said the following words during the same interview “*At the beginning, some simple people thought that these people will be a win for the Sunnis, but then when they saw them, they attacked the Sunnis, they realized that they are not with the Sunnis for this. ISIS does not represent the Sunnis, does not represent the Shia, does not represent anybody. It is an evil plant that was—that grew in this area. And as I said, they believe in one religion, just their religion, and they are not bound to a certain boundary, and its not only Iraq and Levant. If they can, they will control the whole world.*”¹⁵⁸

Indeed, the words above are very crucial to understand two opposite mentalities dealing with the very same incident happening in the field. A comparison between the paragraph above and any speech belonging to The Islamic State elite is sufficient to constitute a scale from 0 to 1 in terms of jihadi discourse.

Masum continues: “*And also, for the religious awareness and education, the clergymen, people of religion should concentrate on saying that Islam or highlighting that Islam is not the religion of killing people and terrorism, especially in today's world. For example, today, there are no slaves. Today, in this world, in this day and age, we should not have anything called slaves and be a free people. The international campaign is an excellent start, and we hope that this campaign will yield positive results in getting rid of ISIS.*

¹⁵⁷“Iraqi President Fuad Masum on ISIS and Iraq’s Challenges”, 26 September 2014, <http://www.cfr.org/iraq/iraqi-president-fuad-masum-isis-iraqs-challenges/p35742> *Council on Foreign Relations* retrieved 2015-05-27

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

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President Masum , in his meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany on August 16, 2014, noted that “*Iraq is facing a new kind of violence against Iraqis in general, terrorism and against members of religious minorities, Kaloesean, Christians and others, in the areas controlled by the criminal organization. There is a need for concerted efforts of the international community with Iraq in order to put an end to this expansion terrorist and end being a great danger not only to Iraq, but by the whole region and the world.*”¹⁶⁰

President Masum made a speech about the victory of the Iraqi Army alongside Persmerga and Sunni tribesmen against The Islamic State forces in Iraqi city Tikrit on 31st of March 2015 and said “ *..... praising the resistance of our people with all its components to stop one man to cancel democratic system and praising for cleansing all cities and territory from terrorist elements.*”¹⁶¹

Ibrahim al-Jaafari, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq, has made similar speeches numerous times. One of them was on December 8, 2014 in IISS Manama Dialogue 2014 : 10th Regional Security Summit. In his speech Jaafari contended that : “*With this diverse treasury and this Iraq, which is so great in terms of its past, its present*

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid*

(August) والعالم المنظمة على دفي خطر ومواجهة للذبحين الولي الدعم أهمية وكدان لألماني الخلدية ووزير معصوم الرشق¹⁶⁰ خطر ومواجهة للذبحين الولي الدعم أهمية وكدان لألماني الخلدية ووزير معصوم الرشق (http://presidency.iq/الرشق, 2014) 16th, 2014) “http://presidency.iq/” Retrieved 2015-05-27 “/ والعالم المنظمة على دفي

يهنى الجمهورية ر ذين (http://presidency.iq/ (March 31st 2015)) “ تكر يت بتحر ير العراقين يهنى الجمهورية ر ذين¹⁶¹ “Retrieved 2015-05-27-2015” تكر يت بتحر ير العراقين

*and its civilization, it is today dealing with a shameful violation by forces of evil who have taken for themselves the name 'Daesh'*¹⁶²

He marked his most important words for this thesis as follows : *"I would like to tell you something. Whoever imagines that Daesh represents Islam is mistaken. Even they are committing an offence, a sin. It has no relationship with religion. I said in 2004 that Daesh has no religion, no faith and no nation. It was as though I was reading the future, that the Christian communities would be penetrated by Daesh organisations. Their Christian religion would be held against them and the Christian religion is innocent. It will also perhaps spread if the world remains silent about what is happening now in Iraq, Syria and the region. It will also spread to the Hindu, Confucian and Buddhist communities, all of which are innocent. Daesh has no religion; it is not bound by religion or values. We should not associate the name of Daesh with Islam.*

Islam is a religion of peace, love and forgiveness, its name is 'peace' (as-salam). When a Muslim prays, he ends with 'peace and Allah's mercy and blessings be upon you' (as-salam alaykum wa rahmat Allah wa barakatu). When you see someone you greet them with peace. Islam is a religion of peace. Anyone who associates themselves with Islam must shape themselves in the morals of Islam. It has no relationship to religion."¹⁶³

¹⁶² Iraq, Syria and Regional Security : Ibrahim Al Jaafari , (08 December 2014,) <https://www.iiss.org/en/events/manama%20dialogue/archive/manama-dialogue-2014-3b96/plenary2-f6a1/jaafari-ce95> **IISS**, Retrieved 2015-05-27

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*

Heider al-Abadi, Iraqi Prime Minister, spoke to *Der Spiegel* after the liberation of Tikrit on 3rd of April 2015 and in his interview, he employed an anti-jihadi discourse as follows: “ *The liberation of Tikrit is very encouraging. However, Daesh (the Arab acronym for The Islamic State) remains a major threat -- not only for Iraq, but also for the whole world. They keep on recruiting people, they have huge financial resources and, honestly, a uniformed army alone cannot face it on its own* ”¹⁶⁴

On September 24, 2014, Prime Minister of Iraq delivered a speech at a United Nations Security Council Meeting regarding the issues going on in the Iraqi territories. In his speech he noted : “*Iraq stands today in the vanguard of the fight against terrorism and against The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), which has attacked my country and displaced thousands of our citizens in Mosul, in the north, occupied our territory, killed hundreds of Iraqi citizens on sectarian grounds in Tal Afar and other places, and targeted religious minorities including the Shabak, Yazidis, Christians and others. Those areas have suffered from sectarian and religious cleansing that has changed their demographics and destroyed their cultural and religious heritage.*”¹⁶⁵

On May 25th, 2015 Iraqi Minister of Interior Affairs Muhammad al Ghabban had an interview with Sophia Shevardnadze on Iraqi politics and The Islamic State. He openly uttered the following supporting the other key leaders of Iraq : “*First of all, ISIS has nothing to do with Islam, really. Frankly speaking, of course they put Islam*

¹⁶⁴ Koebel, Susanne *Der Spiegel*, (3rd April 2015) “ Interview with Iraqi Prime Minister Al-Abadi: “ The Liberation of Tikrit is Very Encouraging” <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/iraqi-prime-minister-al-abadi-discusses-gains-over-islamic-state-a-1027059.html> Retrieved 2015-05-27

¹⁶⁵ Prime Minister Dr. Heider Al-Abadi Speech at the UN Security Council Meeting (24 September 2014) <http://pmo.iq/pme/press/24-9-2014ech.htm> Retrieved 2015-05-29

as an idea that they are related to Islam, they announced the caliphate of Islam, but their acts are against all Muslims. They killed everybody from Islam sects."¹⁶⁶

4.2.2.2.Jihadi Discourses from Arab Republic Of Syria

On April 20, 2015 President Bashar al-Assad of Syria said the following words during an interview with France 2 TV “ *They send weapons to the same terrorists under the title of moderate opposition when Obama said its elusive, so the armaments will actually go to whom? To the terrorists. So this is contradiction. It does not work.*”¹⁶⁷

President Al-Assad , during his interview with Expressen Newspaper on 17th April 2015, blamed jihadi groups for being terrorists and proxies of Wahhabism,¹⁶⁸ and blamed jihadism for being the primary source of terrorism. He said “*The Wahhabi ideology, which forms the foundation for every kind of terrorism in the world. No terrorist acts for the last decades in the Middle East and in the world happened without this ideology. Every terrorist bases his doctrine on the Wahhabi ideology.*”¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁶ RT, (25 August 2015),” Iraqi Interior Minister : Iran Saved Our Country”,” <http://rt.com/shows/sophieco/261713-is-middle-east-iraq/>” Retrieved 2015-05-29

¹⁶⁷President al-Assad : The Biggest Victory Today is to Eliminate Terrorism, Terrorists and Terrorist Thinking” (06 October 2013),” <http://syriatimes.sy/index.php/interviews?start=10> SyriaTimes, Retrieved 2015-05-29

¹⁶⁸ In fact, in terminology there is no defined “ Wahhabism”. It is more of a revival of Salafism by the writings of Islamic scholar Muhammad bin Abdilwahhab. Here “Wahhabism” is used in for a religio-politic behaviour code of Gulfian Arab leaders.

¹⁶⁹ Al-Assad : Wahhabism Foundation of Every Terrorism (April 17 2015),”<http://www.english.alahednews.com.lb/essaydetails.php?eid=29164&cid=386#.VWiujs-VSmE> *Alahed* Retrieved 2015-05-29

With his interview with the RTP, a Portuguese channel, in 4th of March 2015 President Al-Assad employed a challenging discourse to Jihadists and said “The Syrians are determined to continue fighting terrorism, defending their country and defying hegemony.”¹⁷⁰

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Syria, Walid al Moallem, explicitly portrayed the opinion of him and the Syrian Government in Geneva Talks held in January 2014 by uttering the following words: “*Ladies and Gentlemen, how is what has happened and continues to plague Syria, meeting these aspirations? How can a Chechen, Afghani, Saudi, Turkish or even French and English terrorist deliver on the aspirations of the Syrian people, and with what? And The Islamic State that knows nothing of Islam except perverse Wahhabism? Who declared anyway that the Syrian people aspire to live thousands of years in the past?*”¹⁷¹ He continued “*In the name of the revolution, children are killed in their schools and students in their universities, women are extorted in the name of jihad al-nikah and other forms, mosques are shelled whilst worshipers kneel at prayer, heads are severed and hung in the streets, people are burned alive in a true holocaust that history and many countries will deny without being accused of anti-Semitism.*”¹⁷²

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is repeating his anti-jihadist discourse by expanding its limits from a military perspective to a full-scale warfare in his

¹⁷⁰ Bashar Al-Assad, March 06, 2015,” Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad: “The West has no Desire to Combat Terrorism”. West Channels “Money and Armaments” to ISIS” <http://www.globalresearch.ca/syrias-president-bashar-al-assad-the-west-has-no-desire-to-combat-terrorism-west-channels-money-and-armaments-to-isis/5434929?print=1> , *Global Research* Retrieved 2015-05-29

¹⁷¹ The Geneva II Peace Talks, Syrian Foreign Minister:” The West Publicly Claims to Be Fighting Terrorism, Whilst It is Covertly Nourishing It , (22 January 2014), <http://www.intifada-palestine.com/2014/01/geneva-2-minister-walid-al-moallem-representing-syrian-people/> *Intifada* Retrieved 2015-05-29

¹⁷² *Ibid.*

interview with Literarni Noviny periodical on January 15, 2015 by the following words : *“We need to fight terrorists because they are killing innocent people, and we have to defend these people. This is the most important and urgent method to deal with it. But if we want to talk about the crisis, fighting terrorism doesn’t need an army, but needs good policies. We should fight ignorance with culture and education, should build a good economy to fight poverty, and there should be an exchange of information among the countries concerned with fighting terrorism.”*¹⁷³

During the same speech, the President declared the enemy by their names by saying *“We are fighting all sorts of terrorists, whether ISIS, Jabhet al-Nusra, or others”*¹⁷⁴ al-Assad thus said the main objective of the greater campaign: *“The biggest victory today is to eliminate terrorism, terrorists and terrorist thinking.If we do not fight terrorism, we are deceiving ourselves. Fighting terrorism is the priority now.”*¹⁷⁵

On August 29, 2012 President Bashar al-Assad propounded his policy towards jihadism in his interview with *Addounia TV* and said *“Solving the crisis is not only through the elimination of terrorism, or through force. We have to use all possible means including tolerance. That is why we continue to embrace this policy.”*¹⁷⁶

Same doctrine that spoken with different words on 4th of June 2012 by President of Syrian Arab Republic, Bashar al-Assad in Syrian National Assembly. He concluded that *“Terrorism will not be able to break our people's will; and proud Syria will*

¹⁷³ Assad : Killing Civilians Terrorism, France Attacks Bring EU Policies to Account (January 15, 2015) <http://www.almanar.com.lb/english/wapadetails.php?eid=190947> *Int'l Press* Retrieved 2015-05-29

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁵ President al-Assad : The Biggest Victory Today is to Eliminate Terrorism, Terrorists and Terrorist Thinking” (06 October 2013),” <http://syriatimes.sy/index.php/interviews?start=10> *SyriaTimes*, Retrieved 2015-05-29

¹⁷⁶ Syria : Bashar al-Assad Interview (29 August 2012), http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/syria/bashar_assad_interview_120829.htm *Al-Bab*, Retrieved 2015-05-30

remain the heart of pan-Arabism and the castle of steadfastness. It will regain its health and foil the attempts of haters and conspirators and will again witness their disgraceful defeat."¹⁷⁷

On January 7, 2013, President Bashar al-Assad delivered a speech in Damascus Opera Hall about ongoing issues in Syria and openly employed an anti-jihadi discourse as a parent state. He continues as follows: "...*They have killed civilians and the innocent in order to kill light and brightness in our country. They have assassinated qualified and distinguished people in order to spread their ignorance over our minds*"¹⁷⁸

President al-Assad during his same speech directly mentioned Jihadi movements functioning in Syria as follows: "*Takfiris*¹⁷⁹ *were working at the back rows through bombings and mass killing, leaving the armed gangs at the front line, but the unity of the Syrian people and army forced them to move to fighting at the front lines where they led the rudder of a ship of blood, killing and mutilation. Because takfiri thought is alien to our country, they had to import it from abroad, whether through terrorists or thought. Thus, takfiris, terrorists, al-Qaeda members calling themselves Jihadis streamed from everywhere to command the combat operations on the ground. The gunmen, having failed, retreated to the backlines as aides in acts of kidnapping,*

¹⁷⁷ *Voltaire Network*, (4 June 2012), "Speech Delivered by H.E. President Bashar al-Assad at the People's Assembly", <http://www.voltairenet.org/article174496.html> Retrieved 2015-05-30

¹⁷⁸ Bashar al-Assad ,(January 07, 2013) *Global Research*, "The West has Brought Terrorists to Syria: President Bashar Al Assad's Historic Speech. Full Transcript" " <http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-west-has-brought-terrorists-to-syria-president-bashar-al-assads-historic-speech-full-transcript/5317977> Retrieved 2015-05-29

¹⁷⁹ *Takfir*, stemming from Arabic for "Kefere" in terminology means announcing some person (*Muayyen Takfir*) or a community (*umum takfir*) out of religion either by their actions or by their belief. Making *Takfir* on some person or group changes the law and rules to be applied on them and allows Muslims to wage war on him or them. Making *takfir* is a strictly regulated topic in Islamic belief.

pillaging and sabotage, as servants, and at best, guides who spy on their fellow citizens to serve criminals takfiris who only speak the language of slaughtering and mangling.”¹⁸⁰

President al-Assad continued in the same speech “*We are fighting those, most of whom are non-Syrians, who came for twisted concepts and fake terms they call Jihad, but nothing can be farther from Jihad and Islam.*”¹⁸¹

President Bashar Al-Assad opined that the discourse being used in the field (since 1970s-80s) against his regime is flavored with Islamic intonation. On this basis he believed to disperse two from each other and denounce one of them while accepting other. He clarified his ideas in his speech on January 10, 2012 in Damascus University and said that *'We say that there is a great religion – Islam, and there are terrorists taking cover under Islam. Who should we banish: religion or terrorism? Do we denounce religion or terrorists? Do we fight those who trade in Islam or fight terrorism? The answer is clear: It is not the fault of Islam when there are terrorists who take cover under the mantle of Islam.'*¹⁸²

Yet one another landmark of al-Assad’s stance towards the jihadi actions in general and in Syria is clearly uttered in his interview with *Al-Thawra* Newspaper on July 4 , 2013 . He said : “*Syria has not turned into a land for Jihad. Jihad usually denotes benevolence; it is about construction, development, defending the country and the messages advocated in religion relating to virtuousness, justice and equality. What*

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁸² *Terrorism, Ibid.*

is happening in Syria is the complete opposite to the concept of jihad; Syria has turned into a land for terrorism.”¹⁸³

Building on the statements above, the ruling elites of both partner states, Iraq and Syria, take a sword-sharp stance in opposition to *de facto* state that emerged in their lands. Pointing few points before skipping to the next section helps to draw a clearer picture. In the discourse of The Islamic State leaders and releases there are several points that have been repeatedly made. These are, roughly, the description of the foe (Shi’a, USA, Coalition, “Apostate Regimes”), the way to be conducted (fight) and the law to be followed and installed (Divine Law). In the exact opposite discourse of Iraq and Syria is adopting a policy that directly targets the discourses of The Islamic State. The discourse of the leaders of both parent states repeatedly uttered that jihadi groups are a plot, jihadism is something else that it is shown by armed and Jihadi groups have no relation nor any link with the Islamic doctrine. Furthermore, parent states are inclined to accept the USA-led coalition and air operations as long as no ground troops take place. Finally, parent states have an inclusive approach and regard the Shia, the Sunni and other groups as indispensable parts of the community founded on shared values. That indicates a complete contradiction on the scale of “Jihadi Discourse”. Thus when one side is taken as “1” the other group inevitably nests on “0” on the same scale. This shows us that The Islamic State, as a *de facto state* adopts a more jihadi discourse than its parents states do and is the winner in the “competitive jihadism” game.

¹⁸³ Studying Syria’s Radical Islamic Organizations (5 July 2013) <http://rdnews.tumblr.com/post/54723551188/syria-has-not-turned-into-a-land-for-jihad-jihad> *Syrintel*, Retrieved 2015-05-30

Once it is agreed upon that The Islamic State adopts a more jihadi discourse, the following section will be about gauging the influence of the jihadist discourse on the consolidation of sovereignty, which is the dependent variable.

4.3. Dependent Variable: Consolidation of Sovereignty

As mentioned previously, the dependent variable of this thesis is the consolidation of sovereignty of The Islamic State after its (so far) 2 year long campaign. Although the indications of a state are vastly agreed upon and quoted in the Methodology chapter of this thesis according to the League of Nations' criteria, it would be unrealistic to expect The Islamic State to meet those requirements at once. Again, these qualifications are a permanent population, a defined territory, a functioning government and capacity to enter into relationship with other states. However, due to *the fact that The Islamic State* has an incompatible policy, which is warring, the other states are unwilling to enter into relationship with it . They also ban their population from accessing them as well. Neither is The Islamic State, by its very nature, unwilling to enter into such an international relationship.

Due to these reasons, the first three conditions, which are a defined territory, a permanent population and a functioning government, are dealt with in the period between late 2013 and mid-2015.

4.3.1. A Defined Population

Population is undoubtedly one of the most important requisites for a political entity to be called a “state”. Hence, regardless of the number of individuals that make up this population, permanency is important. For the states, *de facto* or not, it is a necessity to have a permanent population.

However, it is rather challenging to study a *de facto* state because it is still under construction. Moreover, in regards to The Islamic State, there are extra difficulties. One of them is that, parents states have not conducted systemic census and there is an ambiguity on the population rates. Secondly, both countries have experienced a civil war period (Iraq since 2003 and Syria is since 2011) and this has caused population loss, displacement inside and outside of these countries. Yet another problem is that because The Islamic State is rather a black box and no international authority is allowed to get inside its borders, numbers get even more unreliable. Thus, there is no sound information about the final situation in terms of population count. Thus, I will accept my base values as final well-known numbers and I will check final updates for each province in order to get closer to final numbers.

4.3.1.1 Population in Core Territory

The Islamic State has three core zones, which are al-Anbar, Mosul and Al-Raqqah. These, however, are both names of the provinces as well as of their capitals . The rest of the territories like Ramadi, Palmyra, Samarra, Idlib, and Halab are under

the control of al- Baghdadi administration but they are of secondary importance. Thus, I will first try to map the population of the three mentioned core provinces and then add the current population of secondary annexes. In Syria, there are 15,8 million people affected by the war out of 21,5 million of the total population and 11,4 million are displaced. 7 Million (app.) of them are displaced inside Syria and 4,5 million sought asylum in other countries mainly in Turkey, Lebanon and Iraq. The table below shows the number of internally displaced people (IDP)¹⁸⁴.

Aleppo: 1.787.000 people	Deir ez Zor : 441.000 People
Rural Damascus: 770.000 People	Damascus: 410,600 People
Idleb : 708. 000 People	Lattakia:300.000 People
Homs: 506.000 People	Dar'a : 266.000 People
Tartous: 452.000 People	Hama: 245.500 People
Al-Hasekeh : 197.500 People	Al-Raqqah : 177.000 People
Quneitra : 72.000 People	As-Sweida : 69.000 People

Al-Raqqah is the current capital of The Islamic State. Al-Raqqah governorate consists of four districts:*Tal Abyadh, Al- Thawrah, Al-Raqqah* and *A'in A'isa*¹⁸⁵. According to 2010 estimations of the Syrian National Census Office, the total amount of Syrian citizens living in Al-Raqqah Governorate(not to be confused with Al-Raqqah city) is 921.000. Both The Islamic State and the Western sources share the opinion that after *The Islamic State* captured the province, the population size tripled. The Islamic State sources claim that new population is 2 Million due to the

¹⁸⁴ Snap, Regional Analysis Syria, *RAS Quarterly*, 2014 Issue -3 p.9

¹⁸⁵ الـرقعة المد اقطه, *Wikipedia*, http://ar.wikipedia.org/wiki/الرقعة_مد_اقطه Retrieved 2015-05-31

wave of migration towards The Islamic State¹⁸⁶ Yet According to US Think-Tanks, only the size of the capital “Al-Raqqah” is tripled from 220.000 in 2004 census to 880.000 as of 2015.¹⁸⁷ Thus, seeing the other districts as *ceteris paribus*, with the new arrival of 660.000 people to the Al-Raqqah city, the secondary estimation is around 1,7 millions (including births). As can be seen above, 177.000 of this number is IDP whereas the origin of the rest is unknown. Besides small cities and counties that The Islamic State rules, there are 2 core provinces in Iraq as well.

Iraq is a war-torn country with an estimated population of 32,7 Million.¹⁸⁸ According to the United Nations, 2 Millions of the population have immigrated to other countries since 2012.¹⁸⁹ In Iraq, al-Mosul and al-Anbar are two core provinces. These are population-dense areas as well.

As for al-Mosul, the picture remains still. Both The Islamic State and the Iraqi Government call it the “Province of Nineweh” as a second name. The province is divided into 30 districts. Some of the most populated of them are Al-Mosul with 1,475 Million, Tal-Afar with 300.000, Sinjar with 166.000 and Tal-Kaif with 167.000 population according to 2014 estimates.¹⁹⁰ (Since no census has been held for decades, all numbers are based on estimations derived from poll-counts.) Al-Mosul province, in general, comprises 3,524.000 people within provincial borders.

¹⁸⁶ A Detailed Report in English – Wilaayat Raqqa Thrives Under The Islamic Khilafah” , (May 11, 2015)” <https://ansarukhilafah.wordpress.com/2015/05/11/a-detailed-report-in-english-wilaayat-raqqa-thrives-undrr-the-islamic-khilafah/> **ansarukhilafah** Retreved 2015-05-30

¹⁸⁷ Holiday , Joesph (March 15, 2015) “ The Opposition Takeover in Al-Raqqah”” <http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/opposition-takeover-al-raqqa>” Retrieved 2015-05-31

¹⁸⁸ *UNData*, (2015) “Iraq” <http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=Iraq> Retrieved 2015-05-30

¹⁸⁹ Battle for Iraq and Syria in Maps (18 May 2015) <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034>” **BBC** ,Retrieved 2015-05-30

¹⁹⁰ Iraq, Population Chart <http://www.citypopulation.de/Iraq.html> Retrieved 2015-05-31

When *The Islamic State* stormed al-Mosul and seized the province in 2014, these calculations and estimations were valid. Nevertheless, with the capturing of al-Mosul province, internal displacements occurred within Iraqi especially from al-Mosul to other provinces.

When *The Islamic State* entered into al-Mosul province, it is claimed that around half a million (estimation) residents fled from the province.¹⁹¹

Upon the raid of The Islamic State, demographics of Ninewah province changed drastically. As of May 7, 2015, IDP's from Ninewah Province constitute the %36 of the total IDPs of Iraq, which is around 1,058,238 people.¹⁹² Yet, for a more precise calculation, two more parameters should be taken into consideration. The first one is the people displaced *within* the borders of Ninewah Province while thesecond is the people who turned back (returnees).

According to the Displacement Tracking Matrix XX of May 15, Ninewah hosts 190,836 IDP's that constitute %6 of the total population of IDP's in Iraq.¹⁹³

Ninewah both accepted and sent IDPs between April 2014 and May 2015. While the number of people who left Ninewah was 1.058.238 people, 190,836 people came to it. 187,548 of the new arrivers changed their locations within Ninewah Province¹⁹⁴.

As of May 2015, 41.946 people who formerly left Ninewah came back to their province.

¹⁹¹ Robertson, Nick & Smith-Spart, Laura (11 June 2014) " Fresh off Mosul victory, militants in Iraq wrest control of Tikrit" <https://web.archive.org/web/20140612004130/http://edition.cnn.com/2014/06/11/world/meast/iraq-violence/index.html> *CNN Middle East*, Retrieved 2015-05-31

¹⁹² *Ibid.* Footnote 183.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

Before gauging the estimated size of the current population, displacements before June 2014 should be borne in mind as well. According to ACAPS's displacement profile¹⁹⁵, as of 25th of June 2014, 500.000 people were displaced from al-Mosul compared to 85.000 people displaced from Tal-Afar. 140.000 of whom displaced within the borders of al-Ninawah. That makes a total count of 446.000 people displaced to other provinces (mostly Kurdish populated cities) of Iraq. And after June 2015, as was calculated above, 828.744 people displaced outside the al-Ninewah Province. In total, 1.374.744 people left Al-Ninewah since end of 2013 from the al-Ninewah province. Previous population o was 3.524.000 and 2.150.000 is supposed to people live within the borders of al-Ninewah Province. This number is nearly consistent with the size of population given by The Islamic State and United Nation as well. Al-Anbar is the third core province under the rule of The Islamic State. Al-Anbar Governorate has 7 main districts some of them are Ramadi, Fallujah, al-Baghdadi, al-Anbar, Terbil and Kabisa. The last census was made in 2003 and population was 1,5 million people. As of 2014 it was estimated that 1,65 million people live in al-Anbar governorate. Number of total displacement until May 7, 2015 is 465.480 out of which 446.454 people displaced within the borders of al-Anbar governorate. Thus, between April 2014 and May 2015 number of displaced people is 19.026 people.

According to the United Nations Databank, there are more displacements between January and April of 2014. According to the UN Refugee Agency, the number of displaced people between those dates is 63.008 families. Among them 42.059

¹⁹⁵ Iraqi Displacement Profile, (4th of July 2014),” http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/iraq_displacement_profile_4_july_2014.pdf ACAPS Retrieved 2015-05-

families moved into al-Anbar Province and 20.949 families fled away to al-Anbar Province¹⁹⁶. Thus, approximately 126.000 people fled from al-Anbar province between these dates. The final campaign of the Shi'a militia and the Iraqi forces against The Islamic State caused another immigration wave in al-Anbar between May 24th-25th, 2015. According to *OCHA*(Office for The Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), this final campaign caused 11.539 families to displace, of which 9.803 are still inside the al-Anbar province.¹⁹⁷ With the information presented above, it can be said that although the percentage of total displacement within the governorates is rather high, inter-governorate displacements are of utmost importance. For al-Anbar, the population size that re-placed to other governorates is 157.000 people. Which for today, makes a population of around 1,35 million. In line with the population data examined above, it is clear that the population residing in the “core territory” of The Islamic State is about 5,1 millions of people. However, there are other densely populated cities apart from these governorates and those should be added to this number as well.

¹⁹⁶ Emergency Response for Internally Displaced People in Anbar, Iraq, supplementary Budget Appeal (March 2014) ,””
<http://www.unhcr.org/532030669.pdf> *UNHCR The UN Refugee Agency* Retrieved 2015-06-01 p.3

¹⁹⁷ OCHA Flash Update, Iraq Crisis-Anbar Displacement , (24-25 May 2015),
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ocha_flash_update_no_6_-_anbar_displacement_24-25_may_2015.pdf
ReliefWeb Retrieved 2015-06-01

4.3.1.2 Population in Other Settlements

Apart from the aforementioned core territory that comprises al-Anbar, al-Nineweh and al-Raqqah directorates, The Islamic State also owns other populated settlements both in Iraq and Syria. *The Islamic State* captured “*Jurf al Sakhar*” city in Babylon governorate in March 2014 with 80.000 estimated population within.¹⁹⁸ In June 2014's offensive, The Islamic State forces assaulted and captured 4 settlements within Kirkuk province of Iraq.¹⁹⁹ Al-Hawija city being the largest among them both by size of territory and population of 451.00 people, the total population of all four settlements makes up to 0,6 million residents in Iraq.

As for Syria, *The Islamic State* currently occupies settlements in Hasaka, Aleppo and Deir al-Zawr governorates apart from al-Raqqah. In Deir al-zawr, The Islamic State holds Mayadin and al-Bukamal provinces which combined population amounts to 750.000 people.²⁰⁰ In Hasaka governorate, al-Baghdadi's administration rules Shaddadeh(15.000) , Markada and al-Arish districts which in total makes 90,095 people. And in Aleppo, The Islamic State controls Jarablus and Manbij cities with their 467.000 population combined.²⁰¹

¹⁹⁸ Sender, Hanna, (June 12, 2014) “ Map of ISIS Controlled Cities in Iraq”, <http://www.ibtimes.com/map-isis-controlled-cities-iraq-1599768>” *International Business Times* Retrieved 2015-06-01

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ General Census Office, (March 2011) , “Deir al Zawr, “http://www.cbssyr.org/new%20web%20site/General_census/census_2004/NH/TAB09-1-2004.htm Retrieved 2015-06-01

²⁰¹ Ibid.

In Syria and Iraq, the estimation of the population size under the rule of *The Islamic State* is 1.987.000 people. When the population in core territories is added this number reaches 7 million people.

To summarize the section this study highlighting the population element, it should be said that there is no available and updated sources about the fluxes entering or exiting the territory under the rule of The Islamic State. It is especially impossible to estimate the number of foreigners who immigrated to The Islamic State. In contrast, it is possible to make estimations by calculations that consider IDP's refugees as is done above. As the aftermath, the number of people living under the rule of The Islamic State regime is estimated around 7 millions and there is no indication as to mass emigration from city centers that are not exposed to war with the Syrian forces or other factions. one year after the announcement of the caliphate, the 7 million population claimed by al-Baghdadi administration is confirmed as shown above and this indicates a positive outcome.

4.3.2. A Defined Territory

The Islamic State portrays a unique entity in world politics. It wages war against its parent states –Syria and Iraq-, local insurgent groups (ranging from jihadists to Kurdish PYD) , Lebanon, Hizballah, United States, Canada, UK, France and 60+ countries. This necessitates an ever-lasting war period and it is not surprising to observe territorial gains and losses of The Islamic State.

This study, therefore, analyzes the territories under the rule of The Islamic State in two categories. On the one hand, as mentioned before, Al-Ninwah, Al-Anbar and

Al-Raqqah provinces are regarded as the core territories. On the other hand, The Islamic State also controls side territories in which its domination is fragile and disputed.

The Islamic State captured al-Ninewah province from the Iraqi forces after 3 days-long rush operations in early June 2014.²⁰² Comprising 30 districts, al-Ninewah governorate occupies 37,300 km² of earth. Al-Raqqah of Syria is another province that is fully under the control of al-Baghdadi and moreover al-Raqqah city is announced to be the first capital city of The Islamic State. By attempting to annex al-Raqqah in June 2013, The Islamic State challenged *Jabhat al Nusra* and regime forces. The Islamic State announced its uncontested superiority over al-Raqqah in January 2014.²⁰³ The province occupies 19.616 km² and is located in upper-mid of the Syria. Al-Anbar is the final core-territory slice of The Islamic State and this predominantly Sunni populated province is on the Syrian border of Iraq. Divided into 39 settlements and 7 main districts, al-Anbar is the largest portion of Iraq by the territorial size.

Anbar is a vastly Sunni populated tribal province alienated from Iraqi affairs by being exposed to sectarian and authoritarian policies of pro-Shi'a Nouri al-Maliki.²⁰⁴ Thus, the coming of *The Islamic State* is hugely welcomed by the residents of the al-

²⁰² Al-Salhy, Suadad & Arango , Tim (10 June 2014) “ Sunni Militants Drive Iraqi Army Out of Mosul” http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/11/world/middleeast/militants-in-mosul.html?_r=0 *The New York Times* , Retrieved 2015-06-02

²⁰³ A Mysterious Fall of Raqqah, Syria's Kandahar” (11 August 2013) <http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/17550> *Al-Akhbar* Retrieved 2015-06-02

²⁰⁴ Boghani, Priyanka, (28 October 2014) “In Their Own Words : Sunnis on Their Treatment in Maliki's Iraq” <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/iraq-war-on-terror/rise-of-isis/in-their-own-words-sunnis-on-their-treatment-in-maliki-iraq/> *Frontline* , Retrieved 2015-06-02

Anbar province. Although The Islamic State started a campaign for capturing al-Anbar (and captured Fallujah and Ramadi) in January 2014, the Iraqi Army launched a counter offensive in June –July 2014. During the fall offensives in September-October 2014, the governorate was re-captured by The Islamic State. Al-Anbar's 138,500 km² area caused The Islamic State to gain a momentum and a strategic depth helped the invasion of Dair al Zawr of Syria due to the geopolitical leverage because of the territorial characteristics of the province Al-Anbar.

In addition to calculating only core territory, which means 196.000 km² of uncontested dominancy, The Islamic State also controls some other parts of Iraq and Syria.

The Islamic State has control of *Dair al Zawr* governorate except its capital city, *dair al zawr*. Comprised of 3 main districts, *Dair al Zawr* governorate has 33.000 km² surface area 20.000 of which is under the rule of al-Baghdadi. In Haseke governorate of Syria, 12.000 km² out of 23.300 km² belong to The Islamic State's rule. With 12 Districts and nearly 5 millions of population, Aleppo is also partly under the occupation of The Islamic State. Peripheral parts of 'Ain al Arab alongside Jarablus and Manbij are being controlled by al-Baghdadi which makes 6.000 km² out of 18,500 km². Jurf Al Sakhar is another province under the control of The Islamic State. Located within the borders of Kirkuk Governorate of Iraq, Jusrf al Sakhar occupies 700 km² Hawija, one third of the Kirkuk governorate by size, is also under the direct command of *The Islamic State* and occupies 4.000 km² in Iraq. And finally *The Islamic State* launched its final offensive to ancient city of Palmyra and as of May 22, 2015, The Islamic State captured the city that is located in the borders of Homs Governorate. By capturing 20.000 km² of area from Homs, *The Islamic State* has 96.000 km² only in whichyria makes up half of the country. Thus, The

Islamic State controls 196.000 km² as core territory and nearly 60.000 km² as side territory. When the expanding and re-capturing of the lost provinces trend is analyzed , one can argue that The Islamic State is able to keep its core territory incontestably under its own ruling and conducts an expansionist-jihadist policy although it gains or loses momentum in side territories from time to time.

As for defined territory, just like the size of population, it is not strictly defined what should be tool for territorial definition. Russia Federation and Canada can be equally treated with Monaco and Djibouti although there is an immense gap as to their surface areas. Borders are not required to be fixed as well and may shrink or expand like Israel expanded several times after 1948. However, what is sought is a functioning government that rules over these territories. The following section will be about *The Islamic State's* governing capabilities.

4.3.3. A Functioning Government

According to international customary law codes that regulate statehood of political entities there is one more requirement to be met, which is a functioning government. The type of regime and government is not specified. It should be noted that there is a gap in the Montevideo Agreement on the definition of “ functioning” . Although it implies the control over the territories, level of control is not defined or specified. Thus , the United States of America and Mali are both sovereign states although their level of control over their territories are fairly distant from each other.

The Islamic State arose with the claim of statehood and has initiated an assertive state building agenda.

Under this section, this paper will analyze military structure, organizational structure and media organization of *The Islamic State* and its social policies.

4.3.3.1. Military

The military structure and capacity of The Islamic State is a field studied by think-tanks and US Military bodies. Annual reports of The Islamic State (*al-Naba*), which are published in Arabic language, offer great deal of information about this topic. According to such annual reports, the attack types are as follows:

Assassination	Bombing
Setting houses on fire	Suicide Vests
Armed Attacks	Rocket
Launchers	SVBIED's ²⁰⁵
BTRs	Technicals,
Main Battle Tanks	Artillery

Moreover, The Islamic State has a well-organized army organization with a functioning army chain from top to bottom.²⁰⁶ Moreover, this military force is not focused only on one or two fronts but is capable to carry out multi-tasks efficiently, up to seven districts at once. It also can adapt itself to various battle-types and conduct a different kind of attacks (assault, defense, urban warfare etc) at once in different provinces. Thus, The Islamic State has rapid and rather versatile army.

²⁰⁵ Please check abbreviations section.

²⁰⁶ Marshall, Alex, (November, 9, 2014) "How ISIS got its anthem" , <http://www.theguardian.com/music/2014/nov/09/nasheed-how-isis-got-its-anthem> **The Guardian** Retrieved 05-19-2015. p.9

Not only in matter of *Blietzkrieg* assault The Islamic State is not only professionalized in Blietzkreig style assaults but also adopts several tactics to repel the attacks. According to assault it aspires to repel. These are categorized under five main chapters.

The first methodology that The Islamic State performs is called “Fortified Defense”²⁰⁷ in which The Islamic State prepares blockades in the populated areas of the city . It thus maximizes the enemy death toll, destroys bridges and critical infrastructure to keep enemy reinforcements at bay and denies to leave the city. The main goal is maximizing the death toll of the enemy.

Second defense strategy of The Islamic State is called “Area Defense” where *The Islamic State* defends areas under threat by which refers to deploying the land-mines, anti-tank and anti-personnel mines and counter mobility obstacles in order to slow down the enemies to advance towards *The Islamic State* controlled zones.²⁰⁸

Third strategy is called “Zone Defense” that is to launch; which requires a surprise attack on enemy forces from a distant point in order to dodge the enemy assaults.²⁰⁹

Fourth strategy is called “Hibernation” *during* which The Islamic State forces remain on hold without assaulting the enemy. The rationale behind this strategy is re-gaining power for future operations where *The Islamic State* forces remain on hold in one city alongside forces of enemies of IS without assaulting. This is called hibernation because it also regains its power to conduct future operations.

Fifth and the last strategy of The Islamic State is called “expansion”²¹⁰ which refers to The Islamic State’s operations behind the enemy lines in order to gain new lands

²⁰⁷ McFate, Jessica Lewis, (May 2015), “The ISIS Defense in Iraq and Syria :Countering an adaptive Enemy” Middle East Security Report ,Institute for the Study of War.p 27

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

and evade from the immediate attack. *The Islamic State's* Ain al-Arab operation can be given as an example. During December 2014, when the advance of *The Islamic State* was stalled and retreat begun, *The Islamic State* launched another line in Iraq (to Baghdad) and weakened the forces collected in 'Ain al-Arab of Aleppo. The declaration of new provinces (*wilayat*) in *Khorasan*, *Sinai*, and Indonesia are further examples for the fifth method.

The Islamic State utilizes different tactics for its attacks as well.

First one is conventional regular warfare where they behave like modern nation armies in the field by utilizing main battle tanks, artilleries, armors *and et cetera* and this is to use gain terrains.²¹¹

Second one is the asymmetric warfare by which The Islamic State disrupts enemy forces and causes havoc and dissidence by infiltrating among them, assassinating their leaders or officers and utilizing explosions strapped on the chests or in the cars.

Third tactic is using terror as a tool to cause intimidation among people and security forces and cause immediate fear.²¹²

The fourth one is to use Cyber Warfare to disseminate ideas, making calls for jihad, propagating their assaults and showing executions or the ability to hack the systems of the USA and the Israeli systems. This method is rather new and unwelcomed yet.

The Islamic State has advantages regarding the composition of army as well. Especially four elements help The Islamic State to fight fiercely.

Firstly, the jihadist ideology and the effect of faith help forces to fight more vehemently. Moreover, this helps to upsurge in the number of suicide attacks where needed because of the promised reward for those who do it.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² Ibid.

Secondly, as mentioned before, former *Ba'athist* officers helped *The Islamic State* to form a regular hierarchy rather than dispersed units lacking command chain.

As for the thirdly, experienced warriors from Afghanistan, Caucasias, Bosnia, Kashmir and elsewhere influxed to the Khilafa upon the call of al-Baghdadi and this caused an upsurge in battling experience total.

Fourthly, although there is a central command chain in military structure, *The Islamic State* conducts two policies regarding their commanders. Firstly, it makes them get married to daughters of local Sunni tribes in order to prevent them from rising as warlords. Secondly, commanders in the field are provided semi-autonomy to prevent from losing time by bureaucratic processes and gives them stamina and strength during the operations.

The main objective of military operations of *The Islamic State* is not gaining territories. *The Islamic State* has two parameters for launching an offensive to a place: population and resources. It can be seen that, *The Islamic State* military is striving to gather all sunni-populated areas under its own flag. If a province has natural resources like oil and gas or power sources like dams and generators, regardless of the religion of its residents ,it is a natural target for it.²¹³

There are speculations about the exact number of the military power of the IS. Foreign intelligence services estimate the number of army to be around 32.000 manpower. It is a well-known fact that most of the people joining to *The Islamic State's army* are from Arab lands, the locals of Syria and Iraq excluded. Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan are first top four tier by combined 16.000

²¹³ Barrett, *loc.cit.*

participation.²¹⁴ United Kingdom, France, Russia, Turkey and Germany are the other countries on the top ten of the list.²¹⁵

4.3.3.2. Organizational Structure

One of the features of The Islamic State that differentiates the entity from other jihadi groups like *Al-Qai'dah* is their skill in organizing a state bureaucracy. By doing so, *The Islamic State* enables itself to reach outer spaces with effective methods due to a functioning system.

The Islamic State has adopted a well-established organizational structure. In this structure, al-Baghdadi is the supreme ruler under whose supreme commands are two senior advisors. Currently, both of these advisors are ex-Ba'athists. Each advisor is responsible of one country, Iraq and Syria. This can be said as first circle of leadership.

On second circle, there are the councils. This council structure has six sub-councils which are Provincial Council, Military Council, Security and Intelligence Council, Religious Affairs, Finance Affairs and Media Relations.²¹⁶ Directly under al-Baghdadi, there is a “cabinet” called “Shura Council” and there is also a “*divan*” called “Shari’a Council whose members are the notable figures of The Islamic State

²¹⁴ Saudis Most likely to join ISIS, %10 of group's fighters are women” (20 october 2014) <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/middle-east/14758-saudis-most-likely-to-join-isis-10-of-groups-fighters-are-women> *Middle East Monitor*, Retrieved 2015-06-02

²¹⁵ Withnall, Adam (23 June 2014) “ Iraqi Crisis : Isis ‘has recruited at least 1500 Britons’ to fight abroad, warns BirminghamMP” <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/iraq-crisis-isis-has-recruited-at-least-1500-britons-to-fight-abroad-warns-birmingham-mp-9556790.html> *The Independent* Retrieved 2015-06-02

²¹⁶ Barrett, *Ibid.*

like al-Shishani and al-Adnani. Not as a “ministry” similar to the ones in Shura Council but there are six more posts for secondary issues. These are Supervisor of IEDs, Supervisor of logistics, Supervisor of guesthouses and suicide bombers, Supervisor of prisoners, Supervisor of affairs of women and orphans and there is spokesman.²¹⁷ This is mostly considered as a normally functioning organization with its well built structure and hierarchy.

Media organization of The Islamic State is rather important and directly organized under the Shura council. Media operations are held in de-centralized bodies such as nearly autonomous media bodies. Media warfare is being conducted by multiple several thousand subscriber owner *YouTube* accounts at once until they get suspended, or Blogs or anonymous websites like *Archive.org* and *Justpaste.it* and most importantly by *Twitter* accounts. By the help of these accounts ,people are being informed of news instantly through first hand source.s. Moreover, because it is challenging to track them down and suspend in a very short time, it is folding its effectiveness. In The Islamic State these kinds of operations are conducted by media organs, which can be, analyzed under two categories. The first category is the official and non-autonomous media outlets. These are al-Furqan, Al-Hayat, Ajnad and al-I’tisam Media foundations. These outlets are specialized on publishing online magazines and HD propaganda videos. The second category comprises of semi-autonomous media outlets of which every *wilayat* should have. There are 28 semi autonomous media outlets, some of which are “*Wilayat al-Anbar*”, “*Wilayat Gharb Afriqiya*”” *Wilayat Sinai*” and “ *Wilayat Tarabulus*”. These organizations are publishing videos and news regarding their own territories. And, finally, *The Islamic*

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*

State media warfare is carried on the shoulders of “*twitter Jihad*”. Millions of supporters distribute these releases and publications via twitter

The Islamic State uses such media means in order to create original, cult and charismatic heroes or very extraordinary characters. Notorious “*Jihadi John*” who beheaded Peter Kassig, James Foley, Kenji Goto and many others has undoubtedly become a very important symbol. Moreover he was continuing this by rehearsing what Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi started in Iraq and as mentioned before, he quoted directly from him. And a final example is “*Abu Umar al Shishani*” who became a very powerful figure by such campaign especially during ‘*Ain al Arab*’ campaign of *The Islamic State*.

Apart from these, The Islamic State keeps law-enforcement forces functioning within the cities and opens courts, universities and built roads and opens customer service hubs. The departments below organize these affairs;²¹⁸

The Media Department

The Judiciary Court& Public Complaint Department

The Health Department

The Donation, Daawah and Mosque Department

The Hisbah (Inspection) Office

The Education Office

The Public Security Department

The Agriculture & Irrigation Department

The Police Department

The Zakat Department

The Public Service Department.

²¹⁸ *ansarukhilafah, Ibid.*

It is compulsory on each and every wilayah to install and operate these departments as they are counted as the main responsibility of the rule for the people who reside under IS's rule.

The Islamic State re-shapes the curriculum according to their ideology and the universities actively function in al-Mosul , al-Anbar and elsewhere.²¹⁹ Moreover, The Islamic State delivers passports²²⁰ , prints ID cards with advanced chipsets,²²¹ applies penalties on people, mints money from genuine golden and silver²²² and copper.²²³

The Islamic State also conducts an efficient taxation policy within its sovereignty zone. Mainly under two categories, Muslim and Non-Muslim, people are obliged to pay *zakat* (for Muslims) and *jizyah*²²⁴ (for non Muslims)²²⁵. Also because of the ideology that they follow , electricity and water, medicine and health services, as well as educational services are supplied for free.

²¹⁹ Nabeel, Gilgamesh (25 November 2014) "The Islamic State's Plan for Universities" <http://www.al-fanarmedia.org/2014/11/islamic-states-plan-universities/> *Al-Fanar Media*, Retrieved 2015-06-03

²²⁰ ISIS allegedly issues "Caliphate" passport" (5 July 2014) <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/07/05/ISIS-allegedly-issues-caliphate-passport.html> *Al-Arabiya* Retrieved 2015-06-03

²²¹ "ISIS issuing Photo IDs in Syrian Stronghold Raqqa"(17 April 2015) <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/04/17/ISIS-issuing-photo-IDs-in-Syrian-stronghold-Raqqa.html> *Al-Arabiya*. Retrieved 2015-06-03

²²² The Islamic State,(2015) "https://ia802704.us.archive.org/17/items/TheIslamicState2015-FullEbook/TheIslamicState2015FullEbook.pdf *Archive* Retrieved 2015-06-03

²²³ ISIS to mint own Islamic dinar coins in gold ,silver and copper" (November 2014) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/14/isis-gold-silver-copper-islamic-dinar-coins> *The Guardian*, Retrieved 2015-06-03

²²⁴ Convert, pay tax, or die. The Islamic State warns Christians" (Friday 18, 2014)"<http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/18/us-iraq-security-christians-idUSKBN0FN29J20140718> *Reuters* Retrieved 2015-06-03

²²⁵ If fact, Zakat and Jizyah are not taxation but there is no English vocabulary stressing same meaning.

As can be seen, The Islamic State is effectively building a state apparatus in the modern sense. One of them is its military wing, which dominates the agenda. However, in addition to that, The Islamic State is involved in a state-building process within its borders Thus as Safia Auode asserted, The Islamic State is posing a challenge to Meta statehood narratives by its new position.²²⁶ Consequently, The Islamic State fights against Iraq and Syria by pointing out its jihadist ideology. As a result of this, The Islamic State gains credits and invests this credit into its *sui generis* state building campaign.

²²⁶ Auode, Safia , “Statehood of ISIS between practice, international law and religion”https://www.academia.edu/9951214/The_Statehood_of_ISIS_between_practice_international_law_and_religion”
Academia.edu Retrieved 2015-03-06

CHAPTER FIVE

BRIDGING THE GAP

World politics is going through a turbulence period. This turbulence is being resulted with different facts in different places on earth. Middle East, on the other hand is one of the hotspots of these changes and turbulence. Occupations, wars, insubordinations, regime changes and finally born of a new entities are immediate and observable outcomes so far. Iraq and Syria, beyond all, are hosting all of these changes within their borders including witnessing of emerging new entities. However, this new entities are introducing brand new concepts to contemporary world politics. Moreover, at the background of this novel transformation are sometimes coalition of former rivalries like Ba'athist and Islamists. This new kind of synthesis is producing unexpected political entities like the Islamic State.

This new political entity is claiming a political autonomy and sovereignty over a territory that is shared by two adjacent states. In addition to this, the Islamic State is adopting an administrative body and policy that challenges entire international regime. Because of current international regime is built on sovereign state-oriented Westphalian system and working on defined behavior codes (i.e. International law codes, diplomatic customary et cetera), such new entity has become a subject of this

established codes, theories and reflexes.

Clearly seen that familiar state-oriented method of analyzing the Islamic State is not functioning properly. There are important reasons to explain this. First, the Islamic State is not defining itself with contemporary world policy tools. It has new identity, new tools and new end-goals. As for second, the Islamic State is utterly challenging pillars of modern international relations rules and highlighting that it has no desire to settle down. Thirdly, no previous grand theory or approach was developed or used in such case and this is causing confusion as to methodology of dealing with the political entity in the field and the radicalization/propagation process. Fourthly, the Islamic State has developed enough skills in military, propaganda, and institutionalization and established a working administration and this was unexpected from a organizations that is labeled as terrorist.

As James Rosenau states, world politics go through turbulence when two of three levels starts to change at once. Today, it is observable that in the Middle East scale especially; micro and macro levels are being changed simultaneously.

It is clear that there is a need for a new theoretic tool to understand *de facto* states with jihadi identities. However, there are two complications as to fulfill such observation. One of which is the Islamic State is displaying ordinary *de facto* state behavior which is to strive for recognition by their targeted audience and to survive on the other hand it has built a new identity that differentiates the Islamic State from other *de facto* states. Another complication is that any grand theory is incapable to explain the Islamic State and their actions.

In this paper competitive jihadism is offered to define and recognize the major reasons that a jihadi *de facto* state may born into and especially how it organize itself and its ideology to survive and gain recognition. Competitive jihadism is basically a

set of actions derived from jihad as ideology and jihadist policies as way of implementing this ideology against less- jihadist groups or to other jihadist groups with more jihadist policies. This notion is primarily empowered by Rosenau's turbulence approach when explaining the dynamics of the jihadist policies and its relations with general world politics meanwhile it uses Caspersen's competitive democratization while explaining why a jihadi *de facto* state is actually uses jihadism as primary tool.

James Rosenau suggests that there should be change in two levels to talk about turbulence. For the Islamic State case, it is broadly applicable approach to understand the reality in the field. The Islamic State emerged from the change in micro level and macro level. As can be found in the previous chapter, perception changes of ex-Ba'ath members and change of how Sunnite relocated their identity constituted and reshaped micro level changes. These two changes inevitable have these two groups to espouse each other. Today, the Islamic State's main driving force is not a composition of these two groups by coincidence. Once they espouse each other against common opponent, this process caused their perception to change and unify towards to it as Rosenau's micro level change expects. Their caliphate and caliph creating procedure should also be taken as their collective identity building process. Which is also suggested by Rosenau by under the name of change of micro level.

However, this entity started to challenge two sorts of enemies. One of them is their challenge with parent states. This challenge is posed to both international state-oriented system and to ideology of the system. Thus, it is safe to argue that this challenge is macro level challenge. Second group is their conflict with other local groups be it jihadi groups or ethnic-ideology based entities. This level is a part of

micro level. In this level the Islamic State is creating a jihadist policy and getting into competition with other power focuses as I call it competitive jihadism. Although turbulence approach offers us a scope to understand when and why these changes occur, it doesn't really give the answer of "how". It is vital to understand why a *de facto* state may pursue an ideology based policy especially this ideology is not compatible with contemporary world politics.

As Nina Caspersen argued, a *de facto* state competes with their parent states for recognition in international system and tries to guarantee its survival by getting into competition with parent state over the democratic promises. The more democratic policy a *de facto* state adopts the more recognition it gets Caspersen argues. However, it is impossible to apply this rule on a political entity that doesn't aim to get recognition from established world policy agents, sovereign states. The Islamic State designates the Muslim community as their target audience and so competes over this population instead of sovereign state system. Thus, competitive democratization is channelized to Muslim community and is transformed to competitive jihadism.

The competitive jihadism norm constitutes the micro-macro level of change in politics. This new theoretic approach will link the gaps between fact and the theory and will help to understand cause-effect linkages between contemporary world politics and jihadi *de facto* states. The Islamic State linked its change in micro levels as stressed above and its challenge that posed to international system by using their micro-macro level brigade, jihadist policies namely. These policies helped the Islamic State to attract the attention of their targeted audience. These jihadist policies are highlighted in the fourth chapter. Establishing a caliphate, installing shari'a law, accepting jihad as primary discursal subject, appointing opponents and competing

them especially using putting jihad forward helped the Islamic State to propagate itself and to gain fighters, citizens and recognition.

As can be seen clearly, as a jihadi *de facto* state, the Islamic State, utilized the same methodology with a regular democratic *de facto* state and competes their parents in jihadism. This created a link between micro and macro levels of turbulence. Leaders of the Islamic State devised jihadism policy as a bridge between micro and macro levels , micro-macro level namely.

This micro-macro level of turbulence is not directed to the parent states only. The Islamic State launched this all out war to other factions in the field as well in order to gain recognition by the Muslim community and gain fighting manpower. Although sharing similar end-goal and ideologies, fight between the Islamic State and once its branch Jabhat al Nusra as can be best explained as well by using competitive jihadism. Because ultimately manpower to be shared is the most important source for both parent states and the *de facto* factions on the field.

It can be seen on the chapter four how the Islamic State called all Muslims to fight in their ranks and reminded about the consequences if they don't participate in. It should be noted that this discourse policy is feeding the Islamic State in every angle possible. This is why the admiral ship of jihadist policies of the Islamic State is the speeches of the leaders and paralleling publications. As can be seen on the hypothesis testing chapter, the more the Islamic States successfully challenges its opponents the more it consolidates its sovereignty. This consolidation process is becoming a state building period that longs for a further nation building process. It should be borne in mind that this micro-macro level successfully established by the Islamic State that uses jihadism as its state identity.

The Islamic State has been displaying a policy portrait that is fully compatible with

dynamics of the new power vacuum in Syrian soil and in Iraq and is creating a stability hub for building a state. This is indeed how a *de facto* state expected to born. As there is a power vacuum and turbulence, the Islamic State has launched an ideology that built its legitimacy on it. This ideology, jihadism, linked the two levels of turbulence of each other. To have more power and to survive, the Islamic State wishes this turbulence to remain until it guarantees its survival and recognition. As Caspersen argued, it is in the nature of *de facto* states. So does the Islamic State benefit this power vacuum and turbulence by creating competition with parent states. It builds a narration and it acts according to that narration. This action is to launch wars, release messages, displaying theatric executions, building infrastructure, schools and namely building a state and a nation. In this zero-sum game with the parent states, the more a side acquires human resource the more that part gets closer to victory. Competitive jihadism reasoning helps to understand why there is such a brutal warfare on media and propagation as well as war of discourses as well by appreciating the role of manpower for the competition for both sides. Moreover it gives an insight into how a jihadi *de facto* state builds its legitimacy and how it differentiates from non-jihadi *de facto* states

In this study, I examined the effect of jihadi policies on consolidation of a *de facto* state's sovereignty by comparing discourses and policies of a jihadi *de facto* state and its parent states and the results showed that when a jihadi *de facto* state implemented a successful competition campaign, it will consolidate its state building process.

As to recapitulate, the research on the Islamic State case showed us that when a jihadi *de facto* state successfully implements a more jihadist policy than their parent states, its will consolidate its sovereignty in correlation.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

The Islamic State adopts a jihadist policy and could be coded as “1” while the parent states which are the Arab Republic of Syria and Republic of Iraq reject the idea of jihadism and could be coded as “0” in the jihadi policy implementing scale.

There is a certain difference between The Islamic State and its parent states as to their stands towards the adoption of jihadi discourse. While The Islamic State is utilizing jihadi discourse in every opportunity it can get, its parent states are especially abstaining from such discourse and displaying a rather contrasting view. This fact indeed produces a healthy environment to test the hypothesis because both parent states and the *de facto* state are at the other ends of jihadi discourse scale. All the empirical evidences show this result literally without one single exception. Thus, it is safe to argue that The Islamic State is the uncontested winner of the competitive jihadism game.

In regards to the hypothesis presented in this study, the winner of the competitive jihadism is supposed to consolidate its sovereignty. This study shows that The

Islamic State is able to keep its sovereignty, to install order, to have a functioning government and to attract the militants from the various parts of the globe²²⁷. On the other hand, it is apparent that the Syrian and Iraqi governments have lost their control over their territories. In other words, these parent states are unable exert their sovereignty rights stemming from Westphalian system.

The achievements of The Islamic State are the product of its attraction, which stems from its jihadist policy. Such jihadism has created a safe haven for those who discontent the *status quo* in the region and the global order. Therefore ,state building efforts and the foreign fighters, Sunni tribes, ex- Ba'ath officers and local people contributed to the expansionist strategy of The Islamic State.

The Islamic State, contrary to its image in the media is not an entity composed of radical gangs which aim to produce terror. Although its methodology in expanding its sphere of influence could be legitimately regarded as barbaric by international community ,The Islamic State's goal such as creating a functioning government and building a state apparatus could be examined by the concepts of the modern state. Thus, The Islamic State presents a complicated picture, which portrays an entity using illegitimate instruments to reach a legitimate conclusion.

In the final analysis, it is clear that The Islamic State's ambition to establish a state espoused by its jihadi policy yielded a positive outcome. Thus, this study shows that *de facto* states that have jihadi characteristics get in a jihadi discourse competition with their parents states to attract attention of their targeted audience, gain recognition by it and ultimately gain legitimacy on the basis of their constitutive

²²⁷ Please regard to Haldun Yalçinkaya's " International Cooperation Against Foreign Terrorist Fighters : The Experience of Turkey" for further information.

ideology. This study revealed a positive correlation between a successful jihadi discourse campaign of a *de facto* state and the consolidation level of its sovereignty. This study draws an analytic framework and puts forward a tool for the future researches. Moreover, it shows that new decades world politics will witness more jihadi *de facto* states. Imarat Kavkaz, Somaliland, Taliban, Islamic State, Keshmir Islamic Emirate , Islamic State and finally new attempts for it made by Jabhat al Nusra and Ahrar al Sham are only few examples of this new trend. Further researches could be conducted to determine a possible linkage between jihadi *de facto* states and their interaction with the local population. Another research may be conducted about the main roots of this trend and its characteristics. As a understudied field, the relationship between cyber jihad and state building process should be studied. Sociological background in which jihadi *de facto* states are born remains as an enigma to be solved.

Additional research in the field of jihadi *de facto* states will add to the understanding about the impact of the jihadi *de facto* state reality and provide a feedback mechanism that will allow future efforts in this area to more fully meet its intended goals and objectives.

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APPENDIX ONE

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

There are some useful terms and concepts in Arabic with their equivalences in the English Language. These words are left in their original language in the study although they are espoused with their definitions on footnotes. Below are the most important ones among them.

<i>Hadith:</i>	Prophetic Sayings and narrations
<i>Takfir:</i>	Listing a Muslim as an infidel
<i>Jihad:</i>	Stuggling on the path of Allah against one's himself /herself and against the infidels by all means possible.
<i>Ummah:</i>	Islamic nation
<i>Mujahid:</i>	Holy Warrior
<i>Baya(h) :</i>	Oath of allegiance
<i>Fatwa:</i>	Islamic orders issued by religious authority
<i>Kaliph:</i>	Legally chosen supreme leader of Islamic nation.
<i>Ayah:</i>	Qur'anic Verse
<i>Shaheed:</i>	Martyr
<i>Istishad:</i>	Martyrdom Operation

APPENDIX TWO

SPEECHES OF “The Spokesman” Al-ADNANI

On 21st of September 2014,²²⁸ Al-Furqan Media Outlet uploaded a speech of al-Adnani, the spokesperson of *The Islamic State*. The video lasts 41 minutes and 49 seconds, uploaded in Arabic language under the title “ Indeed your Lord is Ever Watchful.” I quoted from this speech several times below. Vital points that are also regarded to of concern in this thesis are shown as following :

“O soldiers of The Islamic State! Be ready for the final campaign of the crusaders. Yes, by Allah’s will, it will be the final one. Thereafter, we will raid them by Allah’s permission and they will not raid us. Be ready, for by Allah’s permission you are befitting for it. The crusaders have returned with a new campaign. They have come

²²⁸ ISIS Audio Urges Muslims Everywhere to Kill ‘Unbelievers’ “, (21 September 2014)
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2014/09/21/isis-audio-threat-canada_n_5859062.html **Huffington Post** Retrieved 05-25-2015

so that the dust clears the fog disappears, and the masks fall, and thereby the hoax of falsehood is exposed and the truth becomes clearly visible”²²⁹

“And so we promise you by Allah’s permission that this campaign will be your final campaign. It will be broken and defeated, just as all your previous campaigns were broken and defeated, except that this time we will raid you thereafter, and you will never raid us. We will conquer your Rome, break your crosses, and enslave your women, by the permission of Allah, the Exalted. This is His promise to us; He is glorified and He does fail in His promise. If we do not reach that time, then our children and grandchildren will reach it, and they will sell your sons as slaves at the slave market”

“So mobilize your forces, O crusaders. Mobilize your forces, roar with thunder, threaten whom you want, plot, arm your troops, prepare yourselves, strike, kill, and destroy us. This will not avail you. You will be defeated.”

“O Americans, and O Europeans, The Islamic State did not initiate a war against you, as your governments and media try to make you believe. It is you who started the transgression against us, and thus you deserve blame and you will pay a great price. You will pay the price when your economies collapse. You will pay the price when your son are sent to wage war against us and they return to you as disabled amputees, or inside coffins, or mentally ill.”

²²⁹ "لنريك لبالموذن" Indeed Your Lord is Ever Watchful , Uploaded on (April 27 , 2015) , ابنة خذ يجة رضي الله عنها https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H5Ym_Pohp3s YouTube Retrieved 05-25-2015

“It was only then that the crusaders realized the extent of the threat. It was only then that their emotions and sentiments were stirred. It was only then that their hearts spoke and their tears flowed. It was only then that they suffered pain and anguish. It was only then that America and its allies rose in alarm and summoned one another, terrified. The jews The jews! Save the jews!”

“Indeed, the reality of their opposition and resistance has become very clear, and the nusayriyyah and rāfidah were not able to contain themselves. The nusayriyyah began openly calling for America’s help, and welcoming their strikes against The Islamic State, completely forgetting their alleged sovereignty, their imaginary strength and capabilities, and their enmity towards America, which in fact was just a lie.”

“So rally around the mujahidin, O Sunnis of Shām, and stop your sons from joining the army and the sahwah councils, for what good is there in an army built by the crusaders which they then train on the laps of the tawāghīt²³⁰”

“Your state is facing a new campaign by the crusaders. So O muwahhid²³¹, wherever you may be, what are you going to do to support your brothers? What do you wait for as the people have become two encampments and the heat of the war increases day by day muwahhid, we call you up to defend The Islamic State”

“So O muwahhid, do not let this battle pass you by wherever you may be. You must strike the soldiers, patrons, and troops of the tawāghīt. Strike their police, security, and intelligence members, as well as their treacherous agents. Destroy their beds.

²³⁰ Plural form of the word “taghut” in terminology means any person, institution etc that changes the divine law in expanse of installing their own.

²³¹ In terminology, “muwahhid” is a person who testifies the oneness of Lord with their words and actions.

Embitter their lives for them and busy them with themselves. If you can kill a disbelieving American or European – especially the spiteful and filthy French – or an Australian, or a Canadian, any other disbeliever from the disbelievers waging war, including the citizens of the countries that entered into a coalition against The Islamic State, then rely upon Allah, and kill him in any manner or way however it may be. Do not ask for anyone’s advice and do not seek anyone’s verdict. Kill the disbeliever whether he is civilian or military, for they have the same ruling. Both of them are disbelievers. Both of them are considered to be waging war [the civilian by belonging to a state waging war against the Muslims]. Both of their blood and wealth is legal for you to destroy, for blood does not become illegal or legal to spill by the clothes being worn. The civilian outfit does not make blood illegal to spill, and the military uniform does not make blood legal to spill. The only things that make blood illegal and legal to spill are Islam and a covenant (peace treaty, dhimma, etc.). Blood becomes legal to spill through disbelief. So whoever is a Muslim, his blood and wealth sanctified and whoever is a disbeliever, his wealth is legal for a Muslim to take and his blood is legal to spill. His blood is like the blood of a dog; there is no sin for him in spilling it nor is there any blood money to be paid for doing such”

“So O muwahhid! O you who believes in walā’ and barā’! will you leave the American the Frenchman, or any of their allies to walk safely upon the earth while the armies of the crusaders strike the lands of the Muslims not differentiating between a civilian and fight They have killed nine Muslim women three days ago by striking a bus transporting the from Shām to Iraq. Will you leave the disbeliever to sleep safely at home while the Muslim women and children shiver with fear of the roars of the crusader airplanes above their heads day and night? How can you

enjoy life and sleep while not aiding your brothers, casting fear into the hearts of the cross worshippers, and not responding to their strike with multitudes more?

So O muwahhid! wherever you may be, hinder those who want to harm your brothers as much as you can. The best thing you can do is to strive to your best and kill a disbeliever, whether he be French, American, or from any of their allies. “

“If you are not able to find an IED or a bullet, then single out the disbelieving American, Frenchman, or any of their allies. Smash his head with a rock, or slaughter him with a knife, or run him over with your car, or throw him down from a high place, or choke him poison him. Do not lack. Do not be contemptible. Let your slogan be, “May I not be saved if the cross worshipper and taghūt (ruler ruling by manmade laws) patron survives. If you are unable to do so, then burn his home, car, or business. Or destroy his crops. If you are unable to do so, then spit in his face. If your self refuses to do so, while your brothers are being bombarded and killed, and while their blood and wealth everywhere deemed lawful by their enemies, then review your religion”

As can be seen above, Adnani’s speech is profoundly stressing that ongoing war is between two camps; Muslims and Crusades and their allies which are Shi’a, Nusayriyya, Jews and apostate regimes. He justifies the cause and actions of the state, expects participation of people to the ranks of The Islamic State , defines enemies and describes the way of acting against them . This is very vital especially when these words are uttered by second top rank person in the *State*.

One another well-known speech of al-Adnani is named as “ Say : Die in Your Rage.” As It became a tradition for IS leaders to name their speech after a Qur’anic

verse, this speech also in such case. In Holy Qur'an, verse goes as the following "Here you are loving them but they are not loving you, while you believe in the Scripture - all of it. And when they meet you, they say, "We believe." But when they are alone, they bite their fingertips at you in rage. Say, "Die in your rage. Indeed, Allah is Knowing of that within the breasts."²³² Release is uploaded online on 26th of January 2015²³³ in four languages by al-Furqan Media Outlet and is 9 minutes and 37 seconds long.

00:54- 01:17 *Gather ,O spiteful crusaders, and unify your allies amongst the apostates, the Rafidah and the atheists. Gather, from your alliance collectively and support one another. Gather every day and form your plots and schemes. Gather, conspire and mobilize. The muwahhids will fear you not!. The Mujahideen will not be frightened by you!*²³⁴

02:14- 02:53 *O Jews, O Crusaders, O Rafidah, O murtaddin, O Sahwa, O criminals, O enemies of Allah altogether! Indeed we will remain upon our path, confident of our Lord's support. So die in your rage! By Allah, you will not see from us- by the permission of Allah- except that which will grieve you. So praise be to*

²³² Holy Qur'an , Chapter Ali Imran verse 119.

²³³ Audio Statement by IS Spokesman Abu Muhammad al-'Adnani as-Shami –Say “ Die In your Rage” (26 January 2015), <https://pietervanostaeyen.wordpress.com/2015/01/26/audio-statement-by-is-spokesman-abu-muhammad-al-adnani-as-shami-say-die-in-your-rage/> **Pieter vanostaeyen** Retrieved 05-25-2015

²³⁴ "الشيخ العدناني" قل موتوا بغيظكم، (April 27, 2015) *YouTube*, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VI4IUuKn9A8> **YouTube** Retrieved 05-25-2015

Allah who has made The Islamic State a thorn in your eyes, a choking pain in your throats a spear in your chests and a rage burning in your hearts. Die in your Rage!

04:14-04:53 *Therefore, we call upon all the muwahhidin in Khurasan²³⁵ to join the caravan of the Khilafah and abandon disunity and factionalism. So come to your state, o mujahidin.! Come to your Khilafah for you are the forerunners. You have fought the English, the Russians and the Americans and upon you today is a new fight; a fight to enforce tawhid and vanquish shirkq (**polytheism but here also includes Christianity and Judaism as well**). So come forth! Humbling yourselves before Allah and Allah will honor you and raise you. Come forth, for this is an opportunity for the Muslims and it has not yet passed you by, so do not lose it.*

05-17-05:56 *So unsheathe your swords and take out your spears! Be firm and do not weaken or soften. It will either be victory through which Allah will honor Islam and Muslims or martyrdom by which we will meet Allah having been excused and indeed we see victory only two bows' length away or even closer. As for the near term, by Allah's power and strength, this crusade will be broken and we will have thereafter- by Allah's permission- a meeting in al-Quds and an appointment in Rome, prior to which the crusade armies will be defeated in Dabiq²³⁶, indeed they see it as distant but we see it as near.*

07:33-07:59 *Likewise, we renew our call to the muwahiddin in Europe and the disbelieving West and everywhere else, to target the crusaders in their own lands and wherever they are found. We will argue, before Allah, against any Muslim who*

²³⁵ Afghanistan, Pakistan and bordering part of Iran.

²³⁶ Although Dabiq is a mere village in today's Syria, in Islamic terminology it espouses a broader meaning which will be described in the following chapter.

has the ability to shed a single drop of crusader blood but does not do so, whether with an explosive device , a bullet, a knife, a car, a rock or even a boot or a fist.

This speech requires a consideration bearing in mind Hebdo Attacks in France and parliament issues in Australia. So, clearly al-Adnani is asking Muslims all over the world to perform the same with what means they have or they can get and regardless of their whereabouts. Moreover, he lays emphasis on the enemies and clearly names them (Shi'a, Coalition Force, Regimes in Middle East, Jews and Muslim forces who took their sides against The Islamic State) as al-Baghdadi does in his every other speech as well. This double-edged speech threatens the opponents of The Islamic State while trying to empower their own ranks.

Al-Adnani made another speech of which name is “ *So they Kill and Are Killed* “ on 12nd of March 2015 and released online by al-Furqan Media Outlet . Media is 27 minutes and 52 seconds long.²³⁷

05:47-06:53 “*So come, O Muslims, to your State, for we call on you to mobilize for jihād and incite you and invite you to emigrate to your brothers in West Africa... “Here, there is open declaration of tawhīd. Here is the land of Islam. Here is the land of the Caliphate.*”²³⁸

After propagating The Islamic State and calling Muslims to *The Islamic State* , al-Adnani is specifying

17:28-18:32 “ *O Sunnis of Iraq, Sham, the Arabian Peninsula, and Yemen! We have warned you for a long time against the filthy Rafidah. What we warned you against*

²³⁷ The Islamic State Times,(no time specified) ,” <http://istimes.tumblr.com/adnani>” Retrieved 05-25-2015

²³⁸ So They Kill and Are Killed , (March 2015) https://ia601504.us.archive.org/20/items/SoTheyKillAndAreKilled_201503/So%20They%20Kill%20and%20Are%20Killed.pdf” **Archive.org** Retrieved 05-25-2015

has come to pass and we continue to warn you. If they lied to you and showed you the soft skin of the snake before, then today they they have revealed their fangs and sprayed their venom. They have blatantly and brazenly announced their Safavid empire and its capitol, Baghdad. Today, they have unveiled their faces of rancor which you have seen in Baghdad, Damascus and Sanaa which you have seen in al-Houla, Douma, and Baaniyas... The Safawid Rafidah today have entered a new stage in their war against the Sunnis. They have begun to believe that it is within their power to take areas of the Sunnis and control them completely. They no longer want a single Muslim from the Sunnis living in the empire they desire. ”

20:02-21:15 *O Sunnis in Iraq, Shām, the Arabian Peninsula, and Yemen, and we especially address those in Iraq! The filthy Safavid Rāfidah did not come from Iran, Basra, Najaf, Karbala, and other places, advancing towards their death, having their necks struck, their bodies dismembered, themselves slaughtered and killed like cattle... to defend you. The filthy Rāfidah’s claim of defending the Sunnis and securing their areas is only like the spiteful Crusaders’ claim of defending Islam, protecting it from corruption, and aiding the weak and oppressed. The Rāfidah came, O Sunnis, to take your homes, lands, and wealth. They came to kill your men and enslave your women. The Iranians came to take revenge on the Iraqis for the eighties. They came to take revenge on the Sunnis for al-Husayn (may Allah be pleased with him) whom they killed and over whom they have wept and beaten themselves for hundreds of years.”*

Spokesperson of *The Islamic State* has another speech uploaded online under the title “ *What comes to you of good is from Allah*” Uploaded on June 2014²³⁹ by

²³⁹ The Islamic State Times, Ibid.

the al-Furqan Media Outlet. Duration of video is 16 minutes and 56 seconds and in Arabic language.

09:59-10:33 “Continue in your jihād. {And what is with Allah is better and more lasting.} ²⁴⁰

*The lions – lions of assassination – their ambitions
on battle day is to get the prey not his belongings.*

[poetry]

March to meet your Lord. Don't be distracted by victory. Don't be gentle with your enemy, after Allah has granted you their shoulders. Continue your advance, for the furnace of war has not been fully heated, and it will not be so except in Baghdad and Karbala. So strap up and be ready, and be ready!.”²⁴¹

15:10-16:35 *Roll up your sleeves to uncover arms of diligence. Do not compromise a single hand span of land you liberated. The Rawāfid must not step upon it once again except over your bodies and remains. Advance forward to Baghdad of [Hārūn] Ar-Rashīd, Baghdad of khilāfah, for we must settle some debts there. Be certain of Allah's victory as long as you fear Him, for the Rawāfid are a forsaken nation. Allah is exalted above granting them victory over you, for they are mushrikīn, worshippers of men and stones. Finally, this is a message to the fool of the Rāfidah Nouri²⁴². What have you done with your people, little fool? No one is more foolish than you except he who is pleased with you as a president and leader. You will always remain the seller of underclothing. You have nothing to do with*

²⁴⁰ Holy Qur'an, Al-Qasas : 60

²⁴¹ Abu Kerim, (December 3, 2014), “Whatever of Good Reaches You, Is from Allah” <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SNW9qMA27A> **YouTube** Retrieved 05-25-2015

²⁴² Nouri Al Maliki

politics and military leadership. You wasted a historical chance for your people to control Iraq. The Rāfidah will continue to curse you as long as some of them exist. Truly, between us is a settling of debts. You spoke the truth although you are a liar. There will be a heavy and long account. However, the settling of debts will not be in Samarra and Baghdad, rather in Karbala the defiled and Najad the most polytheistic.

Other speech of al-Adnani is named as “ *He will surely establish for them their religion which He has preferred for them*” uploaded internet by Al-Furqan Media Outlet and translation of it is uploaded online by Fursal AlBalagh Media Translation Department of *The Islamic State*. Audio is 16’21” long and upload on 3rd of April 2014. Some important and related quotations from this speech is like following :

02:28- 03:11 *And whoever is thinking of entering into a war with us then he should consider this 1,000 times. O Ahlus-Sunnah (**Sunni Muslims**) in Mesopotamia (Iraq), verily the battle today has become evidently clear, it is a battle between Truth and falsehood, between disbelief and belief, between polytheism and monotheism, a battle between all of the Rawāfiḍ and all of Ahlus-Sunnah, and it will not end except with the supremacy of one of the two groups. So select which of the ranks you shall be among - and may Allah forbid - that the people of polytheism be victorious over the people of monotheism And so O Ahlus-Sunnah in Iraq, verily you should know the truth, and it is that there is no coexistence or peace with the Rawāfiḍ!*²⁴³

04:05- 04:28 *It is time that you O Sunnah of Iraq to know the way of honour and authority, the way of prosperity, security and happiness. It is time that you know*

²⁴³ Archive.org (No uploader name and information regarding the uploader.)

https://ia700600.us.archive.org/13/items/al_adnani2/kalima.mp3 Retrieved 05-26-2015

there are no rights without Jihad, no justice without Jihad, no honour without Jihad, no security without Jihad, no hope without Jihad, no life without Jihad.

06:58- 07:25 O groups of Sunnah in Iraq, it will not harm you to disbelieve in democracy and gather around the Mujāhidīn. It will not harm you to support and grant victory to the Religion of Allah. So form into a union this time headed by Sheikh Abū Bakr Al-Baghdādī, and by the Will of Allah you will never regret that, and if you are to gather around the Mujāhidīn, you will have control over the Arabs, and the Non-Arabs will be submissive to you, and you will rule the world. So gather around the Mujāhidīn!

And Finally, there are total 21 speeches of al-Adnani 16 of which are released in the specified interval of this thesis duration which range between 60 minutes and 9 minutes.