Games of Capacity Allocation in Many-To Matching With an Aftermarket

Abstract

In this paper, we study many-to-one matching (hospital-intern markets) with an aftermarket. We first show that every stable matching system is manipulable via aftermarket. We then analyze the Nash equilibria of capacity allocation games, in which preferences of hospitals and interns are common knowledge and every hospital determines a quota for the regular market given its total capacity for the two matching periods. Under the intern-optimal stable matching system, we show that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium may not exist. Common preferences for hospitals ensure the existence of equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies whereas unlike in games of capacity manipulation strong monotonicity of population is not a sufficient restriction on preferences to avoid the non-existence problem. Besides, in games of capacity allocation, it is not true either that every hospital weakly prefers a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium to any larger regular market quota profiles.