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Title: Measuring external stability in one-to-one matching
Authors: Sağlam, İsmail
Keywords: One-to-one matching
deferred acceptance
top trading cycle
external stability
Issue Date: 2020
Publisher: Economics Bulletin
Source: Saglam, I. (2020). Measuring external stability in one-to-one matching. Economics Bulletin, 40(1), 234-247.
Abstract: We consider a one-to-one matching model where the population expands with the arrival of a new individual. Individuals in this population are matched according to the deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm where men propose and women accept or reject. Using computer simulations of this model, we study how the matching utilities of individuals are affected when the initial size of the population or the degree of heterogeneity in preferences change. We also investigate to what extent the preference heterogeneity affects the difference between the likelihoods of matching obtained under the DA algorithm and the Top Trading Cycle algorithm.
ISSN: 1545-2921
Appears in Collections:İktisat Bölümü / Department of Economics
Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection
WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection

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