Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/3978
Title: Bargaining over collusion: the threat of supply function versus Cournot competition under demand uncertainty and cost asymmetry
Authors: Sağlam, İsmail
Keywords: Duopoly
Collusion
Bargaining
Cournot competition
Supply function competition
Uncertainty
Issue Date: Oct-2020
Publisher: Springer
Source: Saglam, I. (2019). Bargaining over collusion: the threat of supply function versus Cournot competition under demand uncertainty and cost asymmetry. The Japanese Economic Review, 1-23.
Abstract: In this paper, we study bargaining over collusion profits in a duopolistic industry with cost asymmetry and demand uncertainty. We consider disagreement payoffs obtained from the non-cooperative equilibrium of either the quantity competition or the supply function competition, and bargaining solutions splitting the gains from agreement either equally or proportionally. We find that each duopolist has always incentive to join a collusive agreement, and the more efficient firm (the less efficient firm) in the cartel always obtains a higher agreement payoff when the disagreement payoff is obtained from the equilibrium of supply function competition (quantity competition).
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/3978
https://doi.org/10.1007/s42973-019-00027-6
ISSN: 1352-4739
Appears in Collections:İktisat Bölümü / Department of Economics
Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection
WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection

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