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Title: The Success of the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm Under Heterogenous Preferences with Endogenous Aspirations
Authors: Sağlam, İsmail
Keywords: Mate search
One-to-one matching
Agent-based simulation
Issue Date: Feb-2021
Publisher: Springer
Source: Saglam, I. (2020). The success of the deferred acceptance algorithm under heterogenous preferences with endogenous aspirations. Computational Economics, 1-15.
Abstract: In this paper, we consider a one-to-one matching model with two phases; an adolescence phase where individuals meet a number of dates and learn about their aspirations, followed by a matching phase where individuals are matched according to a version of Gale and Shapley’s (Am Math Mon 69:9–15, 1962) deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm. Using simulations of this model, we study how the likelihoods of matching and divorce, and also the balancedness and the speed of matching associated with the outcome of the DA algorithm are affected by the size of correlation in the preferences of individuals and by the frequency individuals update their aspirations in the adolescence phase.
ISSN: 0927-7099
Appears in Collections:İktisat Bölümü / Department of Economics
Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection
WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection

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