Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/7533
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dc.contributor.authorMumcu, Ayşe-
dc.contributor.authorSağlam, İsmail-
dc.date.accessioned2021-09-11T15:57:39Z-
dc.date.available2021-09-11T15:57:39Z-
dc.date.issued2021en_US
dc.identifier.issn1545-2921-
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/7533-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we consider college admissions with early decision (ED) using a many-to-one matching model with two periods. As in reality, each student commits to only one college in the ED period and agrees to enroll if admitted. Under responsive and consistent preferences for both colleges and students, we show that there exists no stable matching system, consisting of ED and regular decision (RD) matching rules, which is nonmanipulable via ED quotas by colleges or ED preferences by colleges or students. We also show that when colleges or students have common preferences and each student applies early only to the top-ranked college with respect to her RD preference, then no college has a strict incentive to offer a single-choice ED program. On the other hand, if students compromise in the ED market and make early application to colleges that are not top-ranked, then colleges may become better off when they offer ED programs than when they do not.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipTurkish Academy of Sciences, in the framework of Distinguished Young Scientist Award Program (TUBA-GEBIP)en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipThe authors thank the Associate Editor Parimal Bag and an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments and suggestions that have greatly improved the paper. The authors have no conflicts of interests to declare. An early draft of this paper was written while the second author received financial support from Turkish Academy of Sciences, in the framework of Distinguished Young Scientist Award Program (TUBA-GEBIP). The usual disclaimer applies.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherEconomics Bulletinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofEconomics Bulletinen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subject[No Keywords]en_US
dc.titleStrategic Issues in College Admissions with Early Decisionen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentFaculties, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of Economicsen_US
dc.departmentFakülteler, İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, İktisat Bölümütr_TR
dc.identifier.volume41en_US
dc.identifier.issue1en_US
dc.identifier.startpage66en_US
dc.identifier.endpage78en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000640959300007en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85104747271en_US
dc.institutionauthorSağlam, İsmail-
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
item.fulltextNo Fulltext-
item.grantfulltextnone-
item.openairetypeArticle-
item.openairecristypehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf-
item.languageiso639-1en-
item.cerifentitytypePublications-
crisitem.author.dept04.01. Department of Economics-
Appears in Collections:İktisat Bölümü / Department of Economics
Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection
WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection
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