Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/10703
Title: Signaling games in multiple dimensions: Geometric properties of equilibrium solutions
Authors: Kazikli, Ertan
Gezici, Sinan
Yuksel, Serdar
Keywords: Signaling games
Multi-dimensional cheap talk
Game theory
Information theory
Nash equilibrium
Rate-distortion theory
Multidimensional Cheap Talk
Communication
Information
Issue Date: 2023
Publisher: Pergamon-Elsevier Science Ltd
Abstract: Signaling game problems investigate communication scenarios where encoder(s) and decoder(s) have misaligned objectives due to the fact that they either employ different cost functions or have inconsistent priors. This problem has been studied in the literature for scalar sources under various setups. In this paper, we consider multi-dimensional sources under quadratic criteria in the presence of a bias leading to a mismatch in the criteria, where we show that the generalization from the scalar setup is more than technical. We show that the Nash equilibrium solutions lead to structural richness due to the subtle geometric analysis the problem entails, with consequences in both system design, the presence of linear Nash equilibria, and an information theoretic problem formulation. We first provide a set of geometric conditions that must be satisfied in equilibrium considering any multi-dimensional source. Then, we consider independent and identically distributed sources and characterize necessary and sufficient conditions under which an informative linear Nash equilibrium exists. These conditions involve the bias vector that leads to misaligned costs. Depending on certain conditions related to the bias vector, the existence of linear Nash equilibria requires sources with a Gaussian or a symmetric density. Moreover, in the case of Gaussian sources, our results have a rate- distortion theoretic implication that achievable rates and distortions in the considered game theoretic setup can be obtained from its team theoretic counterpart.& COPY; 2023 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
URI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.automatica.2023.111180
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/10703
ISSN: 0005-1098
1873-2836
Appears in Collections:Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection
WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection

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