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Title: Inefficiency of Random Serial Dictatorship under incomplete information
Authors: Akyol, E.
Keywords: Allocation without transfers
Bayesian incentive compatibility
Random Boston mechanism
Random Serial Dictatorship
Issue Date: 2023
Publisher: Academic Press Inc.
Abstract: We study the problem of allocating n objects to n agents without monetary transfers in a setting where each agent's preference over objects is private. We assume that each agent's value vector (values for n objects) is independently drawn from an exchangeable distribution and show that the celebrated Random Serial Dictatorship mechanism is welfare inferior to another allocation method, the Random Boston mechanism, when the number of agents and objects is large. Specifically, every type of every agent has a strictly higher interim expected utility under the Random Boston mechanism than under the Random Serial Dictatorship mechanism. Moreover, this strict dominance holds even at the limit. © 2023 Elsevier Inc.
ISSN: 0022-0531
Appears in Collections:Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection
WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection

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