Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/1115
Title: Disappearance of reputations in two-sided incomplete-information games
Authors: Özdoğan Atabay, Ayça
182115
Keywords: moral hazard
reputation
two-sided incomplete information
Issue Date: Nov-2014
Publisher: Academic Press Inc Elsevier Science
Source: Özdog?an, A. (2014). Disappearance of reputations in two-sided incomplete-information games. Games and Economic Behavior, 88, 211-220.
Abstract: This paper examines the sustainability of reputations in a class of games with imperfect public monitoring and two long-lived players, both of whom have private information about their own type and uncertainty over the types of the other player. This class, namely reputation games with one-sided moral hazard, can capture economic interactions that may involve hidden-information or hidden-action. Extending the techniques of Cripps et al. (2004), it is found that neither player can sustain a reputation permanently for playing a noncredible behavior in these games; and, the reputations disappear uniformly across all Nash equilibria. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
URI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.10.002
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/1115
ISSN: 0899-8256
Appears in Collections:İktisat Bölümü / Department of Economics
Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection
WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection

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