Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/1133
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dc.contributor.authorErsoy, Oğuzhan-
dc.contributor.authorPedersen, Thomas Brochmann-
dc.contributor.authorKaya, Kamer-
dc.contributor.authorSelçuk, Ali Aydın-
dc.contributor.authorAnarim, Emin-
dc.date.accessioned2019-06-26T07:40:32Z
dc.date.available2019-06-26T07:40:32Z
dc.date.issued2016-11-25
dc.identifier.citationErsoy, O., Pedersen, T. B., Kaya, K., Selçuk, A. A., & Anarim, E. (2016). A CRT?based verifiable secret sharing scheme secure against unbounded adversaries. Security and Communication Networks, 9(17), 4416-4427.en_US
dc.identifier.issn1939-0114
dc.identifier.urihttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/sec.1617-
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/1133-
dc.description.abstractFor commitments on secrets, statistical hiding is a must when we are dealing with a long-term secret or when the secret domain is small enough for a brute-force attack by a powerful adversary. Unfortunately, all the Chinese Remainder Theorem-based verifiable secret sharing schemes in the literature are either insecure or suffer from the vulnerability of computationally hiding commitments. To the best of our knowledge, there exist five such studies where two of them were already proven to be insecure. In this work, we first show that two of the remaining schemes are also insecure, that is, the schemes reveal information on the secret even when the adversary is passive. In addition, the remaining one is only secure against a computationally bounded adversary which can be a problem for secret sharing schemes requiring long-term secret obscurity or using small secret domain. We propose a modification for the latter scheme and prove that the modified scheme is a secure verifiable secret sharing scheme against an unbounded adversary. Lastly, as an application, we show how to use the new scheme for joint random secret sharing and analyze the practicality and efficiency of the proposed schemes. Copyright (C) 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherWiley-blackwellen_US
dc.relation.ispartofSecurity And Communication Networksen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen_US
dc.subjectVerifiable Secret Sharingen_US
dc.subjectChinese Remainder Theoremen_US
dc.subjectAsmuth-Bloomen_US
dc.subjectStatistically Hiding Commitmentsen_US
dc.subjectJoint Random Secret Sharingen_US
dc.titleA CRT-based verifiable secret sharing scheme secure against unbounded adversariesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentFaculties, Faculty of Engineering, Department of Computer Engineeringen_US
dc.departmentFakülteler, Mühendislik Fakültesi, Bilgisayar Mühendisliği Bölümütr_TR
dc.identifier.volume9
dc.identifier.issue17
dc.identifier.startpage4416
dc.identifier.endpage4427
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000389253400036en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-84994817786en_US
dc.institutionauthorSelçuk, Ali Aydın-
dc.identifier.doi10.1002/sec.1617-
dc.authorscopusid7004457288-
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ3-
item.openairecristypehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf-
item.grantfulltextopen-
item.fulltextWith Fulltext-
item.openairetypeArticle-
item.cerifentitytypePublications-
item.languageiso639-1en-
crisitem.author.dept02.3. Department of Computer Engineering-
Appears in Collections:Bilgisayar Mühendisliği Bölümü / Department of Computer Engineering
Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection
WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection
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