Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/11810
Title: Allocation without transfers: a welfare-maximizing mechanism under incomplete information
Authors: Akyol, Ethem
Keywords: School Choice
Random Assignment
Auctions
Interim
Boston
Publisher: Springer
Abstract: This paper studies the allocation of multiple copies of indivisible objects to agents with multi-object demands in the absence of monetary transfers. We look for a welfare-maximizing ordinal mechanism in an incomplete information setting where agents' preferences are privately known. Our main finding establishes the significant welfare gains of the so-called Ranking mechanism. When each agent's type (values for objects) is independently drawn from an exchangeable distribution, the Ranking mechanism yields higher interim utility for all agents compared to any symmetric equilibrium of any other symmetric ordinal mechanism, regardless of the agents' cardinal values.
URI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01552-z
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/11810
ISSN: 0176-1714
1432-217X
Appears in Collections:Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection
WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection

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