Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/1774
Title: Strategic Voting and Coordination Problems in Proportional Systems: An Experimental Study
Authors: Blais, Andre
Erişen, Cengiz
Rheault, Ludovic
20431
Keywords: Strategic Voting
 Coordination Games
 Experimental Method
 Proportional Systems
 Thresholds
Issue Date: Jun-2014
Publisher: SAGE Publications Inc.
Source: Blais, A., Erisen, C., & Rheault, L. (2014). Strategic voting and coordination problems in proportional systems: An experimental study. Political Research Quarterly, 67(2), 386-397.
Abstract: We investigate strategic voting in proportional representation (PR) systems where parties are organized in pre-electoral coalitions and subject to a vote threshold. We show that such political systems are likely to generate coordination problems among the supporters of a coalition, and we examine voter behavior in this setting using a laboratory experiment with repeated rounds of elections. Our findings suggest that in absence of electoral history, voters cannot coordinate their efforts successfully and are more likely to vote sincerely. However, as history becomes available, the vote threshold induces strategic coordination on parties that performed best in previous elections.
URI: https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912913520573
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/1774
ISSN: 1065-9129
Appears in Collections:Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection
Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü / Department of Political Science
WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection

Show full item record

CORE Recommender

SCOPUSTM   
Citations

9
checked on Jul 13, 2022

WEB OF SCIENCETM
Citations

9
checked on Jul 14, 2022

Page view(s)

96
checked on Aug 8, 2022

Google ScholarTM

Check

Altmetric


Items in GCRIS Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.