Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/2572
Title: Optimal bidder participation in public procurement auctions
Authors: Onur, İlke
Taş, Bedri Kamil Onur
Keywords: Public procurement auctions
 Endogeneity
 Competition
Issue Date: Jun-2019
Publisher: Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature
Source: Onur, I., & Tas, B. K. O. (2019). Optimal bidder participation in public procurement auctions. International Tax and Public Finance, 26(3), 595-617.
Abstract: This paper empirically identifies the optimal number of bidders to achieve the lowest procurement prices in public procurement auctions. We examine a unique data set that covers all Turkish government procurement auctions comprising more than half a million observations for the period 2005–2012. We present a novel and easy-to-implement method to investigate the number of bidders required for the public procurement markets to be competitive. Our results suggest that procurement costs decrease until six to eight bidders. Policy makers can employ the method to investigate the optimal number of bidders and design policies to promote competition. Moreover, policy makers can also make use of the optimal numbers as focal points to inspect whether competitive efficiency is achieved in public procurement auctions.
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/2572
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-018-9515-2
ISSN: 0927-5940
Appears in Collections:İktisat Bölümü / Department of Economics
Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection
WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection

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