Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/3857
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dc.contributor.authorÇaşkurlu, Buğra-
dc.contributor.authorEkici, Özgün-
dc.contributor.authorKızılkaya, Fatih Erdem-
dc.date.accessioned2020-10-22T16:40:35Z-
dc.date.available2020-10-22T16:40:35Z-
dc.date.issued2020
dc.identifier.citationÇaşkurlu, B., Ekici, Ö. and Kizilkaya, F. E. (2020). On efficient computation of equilibrium under social coalition structures. Turkish Journal of Electrical Engineering & Computer Sciences, 28(3), 1686-1698.en_US
dc.identifier.issn1300-0632
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/3857-
dc.identifier.urihttp://journals.tubitak.gov.tr/elektrik/issues/elk-20-28-3/elk-28-3-33-1910-164.pdf-
dc.identifier.urihttps://app.trdizin.gov.tr/makale/TXpNNE5EazFOUT09-
dc.description.abstractIn game-theoretic settings the key notion of analysis is an equilibrium, which is a profile of agent strategies such that no viable coalition of agents can improve upon their coalitional welfare by jointly changing their strategies. A Nash equilibrium, where viable coalitions are only singletons, and a super strong equilibrium, where every coalition is deemed viable, are two extreme scenarios in regard to coalition formation. A recent trend in the literature is to consider equilibrium notions that allow for coalition formation in between these two extremes and which are suitable to model social coalition structures that arise in various real-life settings. The recent literature considered the question on the existence of equilibria under social coalition structures mainly in Resource Selection Games (RSGs), due to the simplicity of this game form and its wide range of application domains. We take the question on the existence of equilibria under social coalition structures from the perspective of computational complexity theory. We study the problem of deciding the existence of an equilibrium in RSGs with respect to a given social coalition structure. For an arbitrary coalition structure, we show that it is computationally intractable to decide whether an equilibrium exists even in very restricted settings of RSGs. In certain settings where an equilibrium is guaranteed to exist we give polynomial-time algorithms to find an equilibrium.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherTurkiye Kliniklerien_US
dc.relation.ispartofTurkish Journal of Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciencesen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen_US
dc.subjectAlgorithmic game theoryen_US
dc.subjectlaminar equilibriumen_US
dc.subjectcontiguous equilibriumen_US
dc.subjectresource selection gamesen_US
dc.titleOn efficient computation of equilibrium under social coalition structuresen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentFaculties, Faculty of Engineering, Department of Computer Engineeringen_US
dc.departmentFaculties, Faculty of Engineering, Department of Artificial Intelligence Engineeringen_US
dc.departmentFakülteler, Mühendislik Fakültesi, Bilgisayar Mühendisliği Bölümütr_TR
dc.departmentFakülteler, Mühendislik Fakültesi, Yapay Zeka Mühendisliği Bölümütr_TR
dc.identifier.volume28
dc.identifier.issue3
dc.identifier.startpage1686
dc.identifier.endpage1698
dc.relation.tubitakinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/TÜBİTAK/EEEAG/118E126en_US
dc.authorid0000-0002-4647-205X-
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000532359500033en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85084527606en_US
dc.institutionauthorÇaşkurlu, Buğra-
dc.identifier.doi10.3906/elk-1910-164-
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ4-
dc.identifier.trdizinidTXpNNE5EazFOUT09-
item.openairetypeArticle-
item.fulltextNo Fulltext-
item.openairecristypehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf-
item.languageiso639-1en-
item.grantfulltextnone-
item.cerifentitytypePublications-
crisitem.author.dept02.3. Department of Computer Engineering-
Appears in Collections:Bilgisayar Mühendisliği Bölümü / Department of Computer Engineering
Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection
TR Dizin İndeksli Yayınlar / TR Dizin Indexed Publications Collection
WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection
Yapay Zeka Mühendisliği Bölümü / Department of Artificial Intelligence Engineering
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