Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/4033
Title: On Existence of Equilibrium Under Social Coalition Structures [Conference Object]
Authors: Çaşkurlu, Buğra
Ekici, Özgün
Kızılkaya, Fatih Erdem
Keywords: Congestion Games 
 Price of Anarchy 
 Braess Paradox
Issue Date: Oct-2020
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
Source: Caskurlu, B., Ekici, O., and Kizilkaya, F. E. (2019). On existence of equilibrium under social coalition structures. arXiv preprint arXiv:1910.04648.
Abstract: In a strategic form game, a strategy profile is an equilibrium if no viable coalition of agents benefits (in the Pareto sense) from jointly changing their strategies. Weaker or stronger equilibrium notions can be defined by considering various restrictions on coalition formation. In a Nash equilibrium, for instance, the assumption is that viable coalitions are singletons, and in a super strong equilibrium, every coalition is viable. Restrictions on coalition formation can be justified by communication, coordination or institutional constraints. In this paper, inspired by social structures in various real-life scenarios, we introduce certain restrictions on coalition formation, and on their basis, we introduce a number of equilibrium notions. We study our equilibrium notions in resource selection games (RSGs), and we present a complete set of existence and non-existence results for general RSGs and their important special cases.
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/4033
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-030-59267-7_23
ISBN: 978-303059266-0
ISSN: 3029743
Appears in Collections:Bilgisayar Mühendisliği Bölümü / Department of Computer Engineering
Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection

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