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|Title:||A note on Jackson's theorems in Bayesian implementation||Authors:||Sağlam, I.||Issue Date:||2008||Abstract:||This note shows that in an incomplete information situation the closure condition will be satisfied by all social choice sets if and only if the set of states of the society which all agents believeoccur with positive probability satisfies the 'connection' condition. It then follows from Jackson's fundamental theorems that whenever 'connection' is satisfied and there are at least three agents in the society, for the implementability of social choice sets in Bayesian equilibrium the incentive compatibility and Bayesian monotonicity conditions are both necessary and sufficient in economic environments. It also follows that the incentive compatibility and monotonicity-no-veto conditions are sufficient in noneconomic environments.||URI:||https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/5525||ISSN:||1545-2921|
|Appears in Collections:||İktisat Bölümü / Department of Economics|
Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection
WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection
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