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Title: A stochastic game model on container security
Authors: Bakır, Niyazi Onur
Kardeş, E.
Issue Date: 2011
Source: 11th IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security, HST 2011, 15 November 2011 through 17 November 2011, Waltham, MA, 88064
Abstract: We present a stochastic game model that compares alternatives for better container security. The players are an attacker who plans a nuclear attack, and a defender who considers two interdiction alternatives. The attacker can choose the container path, the attack method and the target, whereas the defender might improve transportation security and inspections at domestic seaports. In the baseline case, the attacker ships a nuclear weapon under the disguise of a front company and through a foreign seaport that does not participate in the Container Security Initiative. The target is a domestic seaport despite the higher economic toll of an urban attack. The defender should improve transportation security, but improvement decisions on domestic seaport inspections should be scrutinized carefully. © 2011 IEEE.
ISBN: 9781457713750
Appears in Collections:Endüstri Mühendisliği Bölümü / Department of Industrial Engineering
Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection

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