Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/6655
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dc.contributor.authorÇelikkol Erbaş, Bahar-
dc.contributor.authorAbler, David G.-
dc.date.accessioned2021-09-11T15:43:05Z-
dc.date.available2021-09-11T15:43:05Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.issn0924-6460-
dc.identifier.issn1573-1502-
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-007-9163-y-
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/6655-
dc.description.abstractThe merits of different types of regulatory tools in eliminating pollution and at the same time inducing innovation have long been an interest of researchers in both environmental economics and industrial organization. Although there is a substantial theoretical literature investigating the potential for various environmental policies to attain these dual goals, this is a challenging empirical problem because every industry has its own inherent characteristics that play an important role in determining the performance of different regulatory tools. The majority of the work to date focuses on pollution abatement while leaving pollution prevention understudied. In most of the literature firms are also assumed to be symmetric. Asymmetries among firms add another degree and level of complexity to their strategic interactions, and affect the performance of different regulatory tools. This paper investigates the performance of two alternative regulatory tools, an emissions performance standard and an emissions tax, in reducing pollution and inducing pollution prevention and abatement R&D in the US pulp and paper industry. We construct a model representing the industry in an asymmetric Cournot duopoly framework, calibrate the model to disaggregated industry data, and run scenarios to replicate the behavior of the firms in an imperfectly competitive output market. Our results suggest that pollution prevention R&D can respond quite differently than abatement R&D to different policy instruments. The results indicate that R&D spillovers among firms play crucial role in technology development and strategies of the firms. Our results also suggest that strategic interactions between firms in an imperfectly competitive industry can have significant impacts of the levels of both types of R&D.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.relation.ispartofEnvironmental & Resource Economicsen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectenvironmental policyen_US
dc.subjectpollution preventionen_US
dc.subjectpollution abatementen_US
dc.subjectR&Den_US
dc.subjecttechnologyen_US
dc.titleEnvironmental policy with endogenous technology from a game theoretic perspective: The case of the US pulp and paper industryen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentFaculties, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of Economicsen_US
dc.departmentFakülteler, İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, İktisat Bölümütr_TR
dc.identifier.volume40en_US
dc.identifier.issue3en_US
dc.identifier.startpage425en_US
dc.identifier.endpage444en_US
dc.authorid0000-0001-6126-2125-
dc.authorid0000-0002-1305-6498-
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000256822200007en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-45749113005en_US
dc.institutionauthorÇelikkol Erbaş, Bahar-
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10640-007-9163-y-
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ1-
item.openairecristypehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf-
item.grantfulltextnone-
item.fulltextNo Fulltext-
item.openairetypeArticle-
item.cerifentitytypePublications-
item.languageiso639-1en-
Appears in Collections:İktisat Bölümü / Department of Economics
Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection
WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection
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