Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/6770
Title: Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket
Authors: Mumcu, Ayşe
Sağlam, İsmail
Keywords: [No Keywords]
Issue Date: 2009
Publisher: Springer
Abstract: In this paper, we study many-to-one matching (hospital-intern markets) with an aftermarket. We first show that every stable matching system is manipulable via aftermarket. We then analyze the Nash equilibria of capacity allocation games, in which preferences of hospitals and interns are common knowledge and every hospital determines a quota for the regular market given its total capacity for the two matching periods. Under the intern-optimal stable matching system, we show that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium may not exist. Common preferences for hospitals ensure the existence of equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies whereas unlike in games of capacity manipulation strong monotonicity of population is not a sufficient restriction on preferences to avoid the non-existence problem. Besides, in games of capacity allocation, it is not true either that every hospital weakly prefers a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium to any larger regular market quota profiles.
URI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0364-2
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/6770
ISSN: 0176-1714
1432-217X
Appears in Collections:İktisat Bölümü / Department of Economics
Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection
WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection

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