Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/6864
Title: Imperfect information processing in sequential bargaining games with present biased preferences
Authors: Akın, Zafer
Keywords: Quasi-hyperbolic discounting
Imperfect information processing
Sequential bargaining
Issue Date: 2009
Publisher: Elsevier Science Bv
Abstract: This paper studies an alternating-offers bargaining game between a time-consistent player and a time-inconsistent player who processes information on future self-preferences imperfectly. Time-inconsistency and information processing are modeled by using cognitive and mood state approaches, respectively. This model structure allows for the learning of the partially naive time-inconsistent agent. The results characterize the relationship among the level of naivete, the level of learning probability and the equilibrium. We find critical values of the model parameters that specify whether the agreement is delayed and characterize the probabilistic nature of the agreement. In addition, comparative static results are reported with respect to time preferences. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
URI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2009.05.005
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/6864
ISSN: 0167-4870
Appears in Collections:İktisat Bölümü / Department of Economics
Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection
WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection

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