Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/7449
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dc.contributor.authorSağlam, İsmail-
dc.date.accessioned2021-09-11T15:57:05Z-
dc.date.available2021-09-11T15:57:05Z-
dc.date.issued2022en_US
dc.identifier.issn0391-2078-
dc.identifier.issn1972-4977-
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s40812-021-00191-0-
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/7449-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we study how a monopolistic firm with unknown costs may behave under the threat of regulation. To this aim, we integrate the self-regulation model of Glazer and McMillan (Q J Econ 107(3):1089-1099, 1992) with the optimal regulatory mechanism devised by Baron and Myerson (Econometrica 50(4):911-930, 1982) for the case of asymmetric information. Simulating the equilibrium outcome of our integrated model for a wide range of parameter values, we show among many results that the firm threatened with regulation always constrains its price; moreover, the price the firm charges under the threat of regulation can be even lower than the price it has to charge when it is regulated.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherSpringernatureen_US
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Industrial And Business Economicsen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen_US
dc.subjectMonopolyen_US
dc.subjectRegulationen_US
dc.subjectSelf-regulationen_US
dc.subjectAsymmetric informationen_US
dc.titleSelf-regulation under asymmetric cost informationen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentFaculties, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of Economicsen_US
dc.departmentFakülteler, İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, İktisat Bölümütr_TR
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000660566500001en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85107120605en_US
dc.institutionauthorSağlam, İsmail-
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s40812-021-00191-0-
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ1-
item.openairecristypehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf-
item.grantfulltextnone-
item.fulltextNo Fulltext-
item.openairetypeArticle-
item.cerifentitytypePublications-
item.languageiso639-1en-
crisitem.author.dept04.01. Department of Economics-
Appears in Collections:İktisat Bölümü / Department of Economics
Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection
WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection
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