Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/7534
Title: Strategic Issues in One-to-One Matching with Externalities
Authors: Mumcu, Ayşe
Sağlam, İsmail
Keywords: Game theory
one-to-one matching
externalities
stability
strategic manipulation
Issue Date: 2021
Publisher: World Scientific Publ Co Pte Ltd
Abstract: We consider strategic issues in one-to-one matching with externalities. We show that no core (stable) mechanism is strategy-proof, extending an impossibility result of [Roth, A. E. [1982] The economics of matching: Stability and incentives, Math. Oper. Res. 7(4), 617-628] obtained in the absence of externalities. Moreover, we show that there are no limits on successful manipulation of preferences by coalitions of men and women, in contrast with the result of [Demange, G., Gale, D. and Sotomayor, M. [1987] A further note on the stable matching problem, Discrete Appl. Math. 16(3), 217-222] obtained in the absence of externalities.
URI: https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198920500152
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/7534
ISSN: 0219-1989
1793-6675
Appears in Collections:İktisat Bölümü / Department of Economics
Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection
WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection

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