Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/7707
Title: Time inconsistency and learning in bargaining games
Authors: Akın, Zafer
Keywords: hyperbolic discounting
learning
bargaining
delay
Issue Date: 2007
Publisher: Springer Heidelberg
Source: 1st Spain-Italy-Netherlands Meeting on Game Theory (SING 1) -- JUN 24-26, 2005 -- Maastricht, NETHERLANDS
Abstract: This paper studies an alternating-offers bargaining game between possibly time-inconsistent players. The time inconsistency is modeled by quasi-hyperbolic discounting and the "naive backwards induction" solution concept is used in order to obtain the results. Both naive agents who remain naive and those who learn about their own preferences are considered. Offers of the players who are naive or partially naive are never accepted by any type of player in either no learning or gradual learning cases. The game between a naive or partially naive player who never learns and a time-consistent agent ends in an immediate agreement if the time-consistent agent is the proposer. A one period delay occurs if the time-consistent agent is the responder. The more naive the player is, the higher the share received. In addition, two naive agents who never learn disagree perpetually. When naive and partially naive agents play against exponential or sophisticated agents and they are able to learn their types over time, there exists a critical date before which there is no agreement. Therefore, the existence of time-inconsistent players who can learn their types as they play the game can be a new explanation for delays in bargaining. The relationship among the degree of naivete, impatience level and bargaining delay is also characterized. Specifically, for sufficiently high discount factors, agreement is always delayed. On the other hand, if the naive agent has sufficiently firm initial beliefs (slow learning or high degree of naivete), agents agree immediately.
URI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0076-3
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/7707
ISSN: 0020-7276
1432-1270
Appears in Collections:İktisat Bölümü / Department of Economics
Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection
WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection

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