Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/8200
Title: On Singleton Congestion Games with Resilience Against Collusion
Authors: Çaşkurlu, B.
Ekici, Ö.
Kızılkaya, F.E.
Keywords: Game theory
Pareto principle
Coalition structure
Congestion Games
Cost-function
Increasing costs
Nash equilibria
Novel applications
Pareto-efficient
Partition equilibrium
Potential function
Cost functions
Issue Date: 2021
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
Abstract: We study the subclass of singleton congestion games in which there are identical resources with increasing cost functions. In this domain, we prove that there always exists an outcome that is resilient to weakly-improving deviations by singletons (i.e., the outcome is a Nash equilibrium), by the grand coalition (i.e., the outcome is Pareto efficient), and by coalitions with respect to an a priori given partition coalition structure (i.e., the outcome is a partition equilibrium). To our knowledge, this is the strongest existence guarantee in the literature on congestion games when weakly-improving deviations are considered. Our proof technique gives the false impression of a potential function argument but it is a novel application of proof by contradiction. © 2021, Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
Description: 27th International Conference on Computing and Combinatorics, COCOON 2021 -- 24 October 2021 through 26 October 2021 -- 267259
URI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-89543-3_4
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/8200
ISBN: 9783030895426
ISSN: 0302-9743
Appears in Collections:Bilgisayar Mühendisliği Bölümü / Department of Computer Engineering
Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection
WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection

Show full item record

CORE Recommender

Page view(s)

10
checked on Dec 26, 2022

Google ScholarTM

Check

Altmetric


Items in GCRIS Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.