Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
|Title:||On Singleton Congestion Games with Resilience Against Collusion||Authors:||Çaşkurlu, B.
|Issue Date:||2021||Publisher:||Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH||Abstract:||We study the subclass of singleton congestion games in which there are identical resources with increasing cost functions. In this domain, we prove that there always exists an outcome that is resilient to weakly-improving deviations by singletons (i.e., the outcome is a Nash equilibrium), by the grand coalition (i.e., the outcome is Pareto efficient), and by coalitions with respect to an a priori given partition coalition structure (i.e., the outcome is a partition equilibrium). To our knowledge, this is the strongest existence guarantee in the literature on congestion games when weakly-improving deviations are considered. Our proof technique gives the false impression of a potential function argument but it is a novel application of proof by contradiction. © 2021, Springer Nature Switzerland AG.||Description:||27th International Conference on Computing and Combinatorics, COCOON 2021 -- 24 October 2021 through 26 October 2021 -- 267259||URI:||https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-89543-3_4
|Appears in Collections:||Bilgisayar Mühendisliği Bölümü / Department of Computer Engineering|
Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection
WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection
Show full item record
checked on Dec 26, 2022
Items in GCRIS Repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.