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Title: Hedonic Expertise Games
Authors: Çaşkurlu, B.
Kızılkaya, F.E.
Özen, B.
Keywords: Common ranking property
Hedonic games
Team formation
Pareto principle
Common ranking property
General class
Global set
Hedonic games
Nash stable partitions
Team formation
Polynomial approximation
Issue Date: 2021
Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
Abstract: We consider a team formation setting where agents have varying levels of expertise in a global set of required skills, and teams are ranked with respect to how well the expertise of teammates complement each other. We model this setting as a hedonic game, and we show that this class of games possesses many desirable properties, some of which are as follows: A partition that is Nash stable, core stable and Pareto optimal is always guaranteed to exist. A contractually individually stable partition (and a Nash stable partition in a restricted setting) can be found in polynomial-time. A core stable partition can be approximated within a factor of 1-1e and this bound is tight. We discover a larger and relatively general class of hedonic games, where the above existence guarantee holds. For this larger class, we present simple dynamics that converge to a Nash stable partition in a relatively low number of moves. © 2021, Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
Description: 14th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2021 -- 21 September 2021 through 24 September 2021 -- 265329
ISBN: 9783030859466
ISSN: 0302-9743
Appears in Collections:Bilgisayar Mühendisliği Bölümü / Department of Computer Engineering
Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection

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