Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/8206
Title: Collusion in supply functions under technology licensing
Authors: Çelen, İhsan
Sağlam, İsmail
Keywords: Market Power
Equilibrium
Oligopoly
Issue Date: 2021
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Abstract: We consider an infinitely lived duopoly with asymmetric costs and study the incentives of the firms to collude or compete in supply functions under the possibility of technology licensing. Simulating the subgame-perfect Nash equilibria of alternative industry organizations, we show that licensing makes collusion harder; but it always has a positive effect on the welfares of consumers and the less efficient firm in the duopoly.
URI: https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3460
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/8206
ISSN: 0143-6570
1099-1468
Appears in Collections:İktisat Bölümü / Department of Economics
Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection
WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection

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