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|Title:||Correlated equilibrium under costly disobedience||Authors:||Özdoğan, A.
|Issue Date:||2021||Publisher:||Elsevier B.V.||Abstract:||We extend Aumann's (1974) model of correlated equilibrium by requiring each player to bear an exogenously given cost if s/he disobeys the recommendation of the mediator. Calling the modified solution the costly correlated equilibrium (costly-CE), we show that in any finite normal-form game that has an unpure Nash equilibrium, the set of costly-CE strictly expands even with an arbitrarily small increase in the disobedience cost provided that the game is non-trivial and there is room for expansion. We also study the effects of the disobedience cost on the total welfare of players and the value of mediation. © 2021 Elsevier B.V.||URI:||https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.08.003
|Appears in Collections:||İktisat Bölümü / Department of Economics|
Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection
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checked on Aug 8, 2022
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