Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/8876
Title: On existence of equilibrium under social coalition structures
Authors: Caskurlu, Bugra
Ekici, Ozgun
Kizilkaya, Fatih Erdem
Keywords: Existence of equilibrium
resource selection games
coalition structures
Proof Nash Equilibria
Strategy
Games
Issue Date: 2022
Publisher: Cambridge Univ Press
Abstract: In a strategic-form game, a strategy profile is an equilibrium if no viable coalition of agents (or players) benefits (in the Pareto sense) from jointly changing their strategies. Weaker or stronger equilibrium notions can be defined by considering various restrictions on coalition formation. For instance, in a Nash equilibrium, it is assumed that viable coalitions are singletons, and in a super strong equilibrium, it is assumed that every coalition is viable. Restrictions on coalition formation can be justified by communication limitations, coordination problems, or institutional constraints. In this paper, inspired by social structures in various real-life scenarios, we introduce certain restrictions on coalition formation, and on their basis, we introduce a number of equilibrium notions. As an application, we study our equilibrium notions in resource selection games (RSGs), and we present a complete set of existence and nonexistence results for general RSGs and their important special cases.
URI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0960129522000214
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/8876
ISSN: 0960-1295
1469-8072
Appears in Collections:Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection
WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection

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