Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/8897
Title: Acquisition, Aggregation, and Sharing of Information in Sequential-Move Aggregative Games
Authors: Cumbul, Eray
Keywords: Social Value
Resource Dilemmas
Asymmetric Information
Private Information
Cournot Oligopoly
Supply Chain
Public-Goods
Stackelberg
Coordination
Uncertainty
Issue Date: 2022
Publisher: Amer Economic Assoc
Abstract: We study quadratic payoff common-value sequential-move aggregative games with signaling. Applications include Stackelberg quantity-setting, public good contribution, common resource, gas emission, and manufacturer-retailer games. Whereas efficient aggregation of information occurs in large Stackelberg markets, it does not occur in the four remaining large markets. If all agents share their information with their followers, expected welfare increases in the Stackelberg and supply chain games and it decreases in the remaining three games. Finally, we characterize the conditions for payoffs and welfare to increase with more precise private or public information. We also provide robustness checks when the values are private.
URI: https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20190059
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/8897
ISSN: 1945-7669
1945-7685
Appears in Collections:Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection
WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection

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