Rationalizability of one-to-one matchings with externalities

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/9816

Title:	Rationalizability of one-to-one matchings with externalities
Authors:	Mumcu, Aye Sağlam, İsmail
Issue Date:	2008
Publisher:	Economics Bulletin
Abstract:	In this paper, we show that the one-to-one matching model of Mumcu and Saglam (2008) studying stability under interdependent preferences is refutable. We also give a sufficient characterization of the set of matchings that are rationalizable inside the core.
URI:	https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/9816
ISSN:	1545-2921
Appears in Collections:	WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection

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