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|Title:||Rationalizability of one-to-one matchings with externalities||Authors:||Mumcu, Aye
|Issue Date:||2008||Publisher:||Economics Bulletin||Abstract:||In this paper, we show that the one-to-one matching model of Mumcu and Saglam (2008) studying stability under interdependent preferences is refutable. We also give a sufficient characterization of the set of matchings that are rationalizable inside the core.||URI:||https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/9816||ISSN:||1545-2921|
|Appears in Collections:||WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection|
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