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Title: Rationalizability of one-to-one matchings with externalities
Authors: Mumcu, Aye
Sağlam, İsmail
Issue Date: 2008
Publisher: Economics Bulletin
Abstract: In this paper, we show that the one-to-one matching model of Mumcu and Saglam (2008) studying stability under interdependent preferences is refutable. We also give a sufficient characterization of the set of matchings that are rationalizable inside the core.
ISSN: 1545-2921
Appears in Collections:WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection

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